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Purpose
The purpose of this study of one university president’s role
as a boundary person is 1) to describe and analyze those functions
and activities that the university president carries out; 2) to
construct a profile of the major agencies and interest groups outside
the university with which he must interact in the course of performing
his duties; 3) to describe and analyze the demands or expectations
of the people with whom he interacts; and 4) to describe and examine
the coping mechanisms of the president in mediating between conflicting
demands and expectations.
Method
The case study was employed in this work to study the boundary
activities of one university president . Data collection techniques of
non—participant observation, interviews* analysis of documents and
records, and reflective analysis were used to provide contextual infor-
mation in portraying the role of the university president. The intent
was to gain a qualitative, realistic assessment of a complex
dynamic
process
.
Summary
The study presents an analysis of presidential interactions
by form, frequency, flow, and function - for the purpose of showing
the process level pressures contained in the university president's
job. Other managerial studies are used to place the statistical analysis
of this study in perspective.
The purpose was to denote some of the boundary pressures and demands
on the office of the university president. To portray those demands
the study examined the communication flow between the university president
as the focal person and external groups in the university’s environment.
Individual acts on the part of the university president were then analyzed
to depict his boundary spanning activities over time.
The President's roles of monitor, disseminator, spokesman,
negotiator, disturbance handler, liaison, figurehead, and others
became evident through the analysis as did the quantity and pace of
his work, his interaction patterns, his use of different
media, the
interplay between his rights and duties, the relationship
between action
and reflection in his work, and his relationships to a
variety of contacts
Once the five major problem areas of the year, 1972-73, were
identified, all major external role senders and their expectations
for the president’s role performance were
discussed. General implica-
tions are drawn for the future of the university,
after assessing the
expectations of the president's external role
senders. Those impli-
cations showed a tendency toward internal
and external central!-
zation and reduction in institutional autonomy.
Role theory was used to analyze three mini-cases of the
university president's interactions with external role senders.
Examples of inter-sender conflict, intra-sender conflict, inter-role
conflict, and person-role conflict were presented and analyzed. Also
some discussion of the coping mechanisms the president used to deal
with the four different types of role conflict were discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1973 Ken Metzler
,
a journalist, published a Confrontation,
The Death of a College President
. The book was a true account of a
man driven to a point of mental breakdown and, subsequently, to his
death, by the stresses of his job, that of the university presidency.
When Kenneth Pitzer was inaugurated as president of Stanford
University in 1970, John Gardner said in an introductory speech,
We have now proven beyond reasonable argument
that a university community can make life
unlivable for a president. We make him the
scapegoat for every failure of society. . .
We can fight so savagely among ourselves that
he is clawed to ribbons in the process. We
have yet to prove that we can provide the kind
of atmosphere in which a good man can survive
(Bennis, 1973, p. 59).
What was it like to be a university president in 1972? What
were some of the major issues and problems that confronted anyone who
occupied that office? Who are some of the principle "actors” outside
the university who either aid in the solutions to those issues and
problems or who add tension and polarity to those problems which even-
tually result in crisis?
Statistics seem to show that the office of university president
is an extremely difficult position to hold for an extended length of
time. Although the numbers are always changing, there is a large list
of higher educational institutions presently carrying on presidential
searches (Bennis, 1973, p. 17). The average turnover annually for this
office is approximately 30% (Bennis, 1973, p. 17). The median for
years
2on the job is four and, of 1,222 polled, 86% (1,054) said they had
held that position for the first time (Hodgkinson, 1971, p. 262).
The position has changed. At one time it was not uncommon for
a man to hold that office for twenty years or more. For example,
Charles Van Hise was president of the University of Wisconsin from
1903 to 1918 and Lawrence Lowell at Harvard from 1909 to 1934 (Kerr,
1963, p. 13). There was a time when men held these positions almost
like monarchs (Kerr, 1963, p. 13). Lowell of Harvard believed a
president should "never feel hurried" or "work under pressure."
There was a time when a president’s attitude was to have an educational
plan and "though the faculty could have some say, the plan was not to
be subject to interferences or substantially altered" (Kerr, 1963, p.32).
The pace of academic administration has quickened. The average
presidential tenure in 1960 was eleven years, in 1969 it was seven
(Metzler
,
1973, p. 162), and as previously stated in 1971 it was four
years (Hodgkinson, 1971, p. 262). Why the significant increase in the
turnover in this position in recent years? Is it that search procedures
are so faulty as to select unstable or unsuitable people for the job?
Could it be that there are not enough qualified people in the nation to
fill the positions? Or could it be that the job is so demanding and
conflict ridden that there quickly comes a point where the person must
"bale out" or run the high risk of losing effectiveness and health?
Poor search procedures, and the mismatching of the individual to
the particular institution, no established career ladders or
administra-
with resultant amateurism (Riesman, 1969, p. 81),tive training programs
3and the pressures and demands inherent in the position itself are all
contributing factors which give rise to fluctuations in presidential
tenure and turnover rates.
The focus of this study will be the third cause, that of the
conflictful demands and pressures inherent in the office or role of
the university president.
Purpose
During the course of his day the university president interacts
with a wide range of people in the society to perform certain functions
that influence the course of action of the institution which he leads.
The purposes of this study are 1) to describe and analyze the functions
that the university president carries out; 2) to construct a profile of
the types of offices or roles with which he must interact outside the
university in the course of performing his duties; 3) to describe and
analyze the demands or expectations of the people with whom he interacts
in order to perform those duties; and 4) to describe and examine the
coping mechanisms that help the president deal with conflicting areas,
expectations, or demands that arise from his interaction with people in
the process of carrying out his role.
There are three key variables to be explained and examined at
length in order for this study to achieve its purposes. Those
variables
are 1) the university - its purposes, needs, and
characteristics that
set the stage for the types of activities the
president will perform
(see Appendix A); 2) the actual activities and
interactions that result
from the president's efforts to serve the university;
and 3) the people
4outside the university who shall be called the environment, that give
raison d'etre and resources to the university.
In a theoretical sense this study will lead the reader to under-
stand the social geography of the university using the office of presi-
dent as the focal point. To phrase it differently, the purpose is to
examine how the university president, who is the embodiment of the
relationships with the external constituencies, manages to create the
proper boundary transactions between the external constituencies and
the internal life of the university.
In a practical sense this is the study of the problems of a
university president in managing his organization, the environmental
impingements on his organization, and his own psyche. This study will
portray what it is like to span the boundaries between two "worlds",
the university and the larger society it serves.
In a historical sense this study will be the account of one
president’s year in the process of managing a fairly typical higher
educational institution in the 1970's.
Need and Justification for Research
There are four major reasons for conducting this research:
First, the role of the president’s office in relationship to
the external environment of the university has not been studied system-
atically or in depth. The literature in regard to this question is
quite limited. The tendency for the academic specialist to study
everything but the milieu he exists in is being overcome by the
demands
of educators, administrators, sociologists and
behavioral scientists
5alike, who now see a need for greater understanding of the university
and its social context. Victor Baldridge, a sociologist, says:
As the University assumes a more critical
societal role. . .external influences encroach
more and more into academic halls, always
pushing and pulling the university toward
some particular image.
Unfortunately, organization theorists have
devoted little attention to the relations
between organizations and their environments
(Baldridge, 1971, p. 124).
Terry Lunsford, a research specialist at the Center for Research
and Development in Higher Education at the University of California in
Berkeley, writes, "The day of the university's isolation as an 'ivory
tower' probably is gone forever. Intensive interaction with the outside
world is now inescapable." Lunsford then begins to outline suggested
directions for research:
. . .
much more systematic attention should
be given to the roles of university adminis-
trators and trustees. Recent crises have
created new interest in the 'marginal' roles
of administrators and governing board members
in mediating between the values and demands
of those outside the university (Lunsford,
1968, p. 87).
Warren Bennis, the President of the University of Cincinnati and
a leading organizational theorist, says that part of the problem
of
change in organizations (specifically SUNY Buffalo) is trying to
"appreciate" environmental factors or external forces impinging
the
university at the time change is attempted (Bennis, 1973, p.
142).
A review of the literature on organizations and
environments
(Kahn, et. al., Lawrence and Lorsch) shows the apparent
lack of
#
information and lacuna in quality studies of
transactions at the
6interface between the environment and the organization. The above
cited writings bemoan the lag in efforts to study this relationship
of organizations in general, to say nothing about this particular
problem in higher education. Lawrence and Lorsch write:
It is no mystery that organizations must carry
on transactions with their environment simply
to survive, and, even more importantly, to grow.
Other analysts of organizational affairs have
consistently mentioned transactions with the
environment as a crucial if not the most crucial
issue. It is an issue that has been dealt with
extensively by economists and by specialists in
business policy and strategy. They have dealt
primarily with the content of those relation-
ships—the actual kind and amount of goods,
services, and funds that are part of these trans-
actions. But the issue has not been extensively
studied by specialists in the application of
behavioral sciences, and attention has not been
focused on such human aspects affecting the
quality of the information exchanged across
the organizational boundaries. What are the
major determinants of the quality? What are
its consequences? Such questions have been
asked many times of the relations between
individuals and groups within the organization,
but the boundary-spanning relations have simply
not been subjected to comparable scrutiny
(Lawrence and Lorsch, 1969, p. 23).
A second reason why this relationship should be studied is that
external environments surrounding universities are placing increasing
demands upon the university to adapt and respond in ways that are
different from the past. Many different consortia-cooperative arrange-
ments are forming by kind of institution (i.e. land grant college,
junior
college, university), by region, by state, by city (Hodgkxnson, 1971,
p. 20). Over three-quarters of the presidents polled
told of an addition
in the number of working relationships with other
institutions (Hodgkinson,
71971, p. 20). Over one half of the 1,222 presidents polled reported
an increase in cooperative programs with local industry and eighteen
percent felt there was an increase in the amount of influence in
state departments of education (Hodgkinson, 1971, p. 21).
Thirdly, the boundary position is important because it oversees
a break-point in organizational purpose and may constitute a major area
for intergroup conflict. People on the boundary are constantly in
contact with people on the outside and through interaction with them
are the first to sense discrepancies between what the organization
ought to be doing and what it is actually doing (Bennis, 1970, p. 43).
The last reason for this research is that boundary people may
find themselves in a position where their "role senders", the people
they interact with in the environment, hold conflicting and incompatible
expectations for their role performance. These incompatible expectations
can bring about a great deal of tension and anxiety for the person
occupying this intersitial role. Administrators, as well as behavioral
scientists, need to know more about how the boundary person handles these
problems in order to train more effective administrators.
There are many boundary positions in universities which could have
been studied. However, the focus of this study is on the office of uni-
versity president for the reasons listed below:
1) One main reason for this focus is that the president is the
main legitimized administrative leader for the organization
and has a main impact on the university's course of action.
A second reason for this focus has to do with the centrality
of the presidential office, the size of most modern universities,
2 )
8and the complexity of administration which magnifies the
conflict and ambiguity connected with the president’s job.
This places even more burden on an already difficult
boundary position.
The reasons why this relationship between the boundary person
and the organization’s external environments in most organizations in
general and in higher educational institutions in particular has remained
neglected are somewhat unclear. One reason might be that organizational
structure facilitates internal examination because it tends to focus
troubles and unsatisfactory work relations on single sources, that is
the shared superior in the hierarchy. Another reason why such a study
may have been neglected is that with boundary-spanning relations the
external people involved are under no obligation to cooperate with the
organization or with the organization’s boundary person. Furthermore,
when there are several delegates from interacting organizations, it may
be difficult for the boundary person as well as for the researcher to
know which relationship to focus on in resolving conflict or understanding
differences of opinion. A third possible reason is that the academic
disciplines such as economics and business have remained faithful to
traditional academic divisions, and it is just recently that behavioral
scientists have begun interdisciplinary studies to examine crucial inter-
dependent relationships that cross traditional academic lines.
Whatever the reasons for non-examination, the need to understand
this key relationship is still with us, especially in higher
education.
9In summary, the four reasons for conducting research on a
boundary person are:
1) This role has not been studied in depth.
2) The external environments of universities are placing
increasing demands upon the university to adapt and
respond in ways that are different from the past.
3) A boundary position is important because it oversees a
break point in organizational purpose and may constitute
a major arena for intergroup conflict.
A) Administrators need to know about how boundary people
handle the conflict inherent in the role in order to
become more effective administrators.
In order to begin to delve into the problems of understanding
the boundary person’s role, some basic terms need to be explained.
This will be done in Chapter I.
CHAPTER I
THEORETICAL ORIENTATION
Definitions and Criteria
The purpose of this study is to examine the interface between a
modern urban university and its external environment; more specifically
the office of a university president as it interacts with external
people, problems, and agencies.
There seems to be some variance in the way the term environment
is used in the literature on organizations. Schmuck and Miles (1971)
and Golembiewski (1972 ) use an Environmental Description Questionnaire
constructed to assess a variety of characteristics of organizational
climate such as openness and responsibility. Halpin (1963) and Owens
(1970 ) discuss the Organizat ional Climate Description Questionnaire
which measures such organizational characteristics as image and con-
sideration. It seems that both approaches try to assess the same basic
elements of an organization. They are trying to define the organization's
atmosphere, climate, its tone or individual personality.
Because the concepts of climate and environment are often used
interchangably
,
they become confusing. The writers mentioned above
conceptualize climate or environment as the quality of attitudes and
behaviors of persons who hold various positions within organizations.
Similarly writers in the field of leadership do not sufficiently
differentiate these concepts. For example, Hersey and Blanchard (1972)
describe environment as those factors that may be subject to consideration
11
by the leader. "The environment consists of the leader himself and
his followers, superiors, associates, organization and job demands"
(Hersey and Blanchard, 1969, p. 109). They go on to say that a
motivating environment is one that takes into consideration, job
enrichment programs, Maslow's hierarchy of needs, and Likert’s scales
concerning organizational characteristics such as confidence and
trust, and friendliness of interaction.
For the purposes of this study the terms climate and environment
will have two separate and distinct meanings. The term climate will be
used to mean the atmosphere, tone, or tenor of a particular sequence of
events or interactions. Therefore, the statement "it is a climate of
the times", can be as well understood as, "the climate of that organiza-
tion is moving toward openness." The term environment shall be defined
in the next section.
Systems Approach
Because a system’s perspective is taken in this study the term
environment will take on another meaning. Although the word "system"
has been defined in many contexts, most writers agree that a system is
a set of parts coordinated to reach or accomplish a given set of goals.
An animal and a university are each, in their own way, a system. There
are many ways to examine the process of how a system goes about reaching
its goals. We could study a subsystem's relationships to other subsystems
and to the whole. This would be akin to studying the office of university
of president as a subsystem and its relationship to various parts of the
university such as the deans, the academic and non-academic divisions,
faculty and student groups, and so on, as other subsystems.
12
The study of a subsystem’s relationship to other subsystems
and the whole seems an appropriate response when the goals and the
process of reaching those goals depend to a large degree on the
organization of those subsystems and the nature of the subsystems’
interdependencies (Emery and Trist, 1967
,
p. 20). This kind of study
would then be the analysis of internal processes or of the relation-
ships of subsystems in organizations to the whole.
A second method would be the study of the relationship of the
whole to other wholes or to the greater whole: the environment. This
is the perspective behind this dissertation.
Another dimension that helps to define what environments are
(beside the one already mentioned concerning structure or the relation
ship of parts to the whole) is the criterion of organizational purpose
Definitions of organizations combine structure and purpose in a way
which helps explain the distinction between environment and system.
Gross, Giacquinta and Berstein’s definition of formal organization is
typical and illustrative.
Organization Defined
A formal organization is
A rationally contrived, deliberately designed and
goal-oriented social system that organizes indivi-
duals in a formalized authority structure and in
a division of labor that links members to one
another as occupants of interrelated positions.
We use the concept of role to refer to a set of
expectations or standards applied to the behavior
of incumbents of positions (Gross, et. al., 1971,
p. 15).
13
The three major ingredients of formal organizations are 1)
division of labor, 2) coordinated effort, and 3) common goals or
purpose (see also Schien, 1965, p. 7; Etzioni, 1964, p. 3). From
these characteristics the distinction between system or organization
and environment can be made.
Environment Defined
By fiat then the environment is that which is not "included"
in the purpose, coordination, and division of labor of an organization.
To say it in another way, the environment is those people who do not
directly work for the specific goals of the organization under coor-
dination and division of labor. Purpose automatically defines and
divides organizations from each other, and at the same time defines
any one organization's environment. The main purpose of a university
is different from that of a hospital or a city hall, and therefore
their task environments are different.'*'
It is possible to have two organizations with the same purpose
in the same basic environment as in the case of two universities in
one metropolitan area or two universities in two similar metropolitan
areas. In both cases the quality of interaction of these organizations
with their environment depends then upon the individual organizations'
idiosyncratic needs and problems.
•^The term task environment refers to those organizations external
to the focal organization which contribute to its goals and purposes.
14
Environments are, of course, relative to the system that is
focused upon. Certain parts of the environment will differ depending
on whether the focal system is a hospital, governmental agency, or a
university. Environments are relative depending on the scope or level
of the system focused upon. For example, if the focal unit is a
college of Arts and Sciences then the subsystem would be the depart-
ments which comprise the college and the task environment would be the
rest of the university.
The problem of actualization of goals and purposes of the organ-
ization can be studied by either analyzing the subsystems or parts of
the total system that affect the attainment of these goals or by
analyzing the contexts or surroundings in which the total system exists
and draws from in order to complete and renew its purposes. That con-
text or surrounding in which the total system exists and draws from in
order to complete and renew its purposes is essentially the systems'
environment
.
The purposes of organizations are to deal with different aspects
of societal needs; accordingly, the expectations and job obligations of
the members of the organization require somewhat different skills and
behaviors. Different purposes also result in the need for different
resources from the environment and the returning of different services
to the environment.
In this way organizations can be conceived of as open systems.
It is like the difference between a physical object (a stone) and a
into itself certain types ofliving thing that survives by "importing
15
material from Its environment, transforming these In accordance with
Its own system characteristics and exporting other types back Into
the environment" (Emery and Trist, 1967, p. 22).
Open System Defined
The open system is a
Dynamic system; that is, it is characterized by a
continuing process of input, transformation, and
output. Organizational input characteristically
includes people, materials, and energy; organiza-
tional output typically takes the form of products
and services, although it may consist mainly of
direct psychological returns to members. The open-
ness of the organization as a system means that it
is externally dependent upon its environment for
the absorption of its products and services and
for providing the necessary input which reactivates
the process of transformation, thereby maintaining
the organization in existence (Kahn, et. al. 1964
P. 12).
It is difficult to draw a clear distinction between system and
environment. When do outside resources become inside building blocks?
All the limited work on this interface cautions against the possibility
of precise delineation of the term boundary (Kahn, 1964, p. 7; Emery
and Trist, 1967, p. 20; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1969, p. 16). These
writers do, however, imply that some distinctions can be made to help
us understand this key area even though criteria for what is part of
the organization and what is not, who is in the organization and who
is not are always subject to constant qualification.
The boundary is semipermeable, letting in those resources it
needs to function and returning resources to the environment. Most of
these transactions result in the process of resource procurement and
disposition. A university may take in new laboratory supplies and return
16
a new synthetic drug to the environment. It may take in a new faculty
member to teach and return Ph.D.'s to the environment to be hired by
other universities, industry, or government. The criteria for what is
internal to an organization and what is external are difficult to define
absolutely because just as the system is evolving and changing, so are
the boundaries.
The organization is made clear and its boundaries prescribed by
the relationships and interaction patterns through which it carries out
the on-going cycles of input-transformation-output. These, of course,
are comprised of numerous motivated acts of human beings (Kahn and Wolfe,
1964, p. 13). It follows that the organization survives and functions
only so long as people can be motivated to perform the behaviors needed
to maintain these organizational cycles.
Because all organizations depend on the behaviors that continue
organizational cycles and because of the great degree of specialization
in the process of those input-transformation-output cycles, one of the
basic needs of organization is dependability of role performance (Kahn
and Wolfe, 1964, p. 95). The term role performance or behavior means
those behaviors which are system-relevant (not always in accordance with
the expectations and demands of others) and which are performed by a
person who is accepted by others as a member of the system (Kahn and
Wolfe, 1964, p. 18). (These criteria of course will be reinforced by
the rituals and formalities of the organization such as employment
contracts, rewards and sanctions, status, etc.) For the purposes of
this study these defining characteristics of organizational role were
used to distinguish between what was external and what was internal to
17
the organization.
In order to draw this distinction, both criteria of membership
and system relevance were necessary. For example, take the case of
an alumnus or donor giving money to the university because he is con-
cerned with certain aspects of its development. Although this act
may be system relevant, it is not role behavior. If, a faculty member
happens to bump the car next to him as he is parking his automobile,
this is also not role behavior. He is a member of an organization,
but his action is not system relevant or role-related.
A critical underlying point in this theoretical view is that
the activities (patterned behavior) which define a "role" consist of
the expectations of the members of the organization with whom the focal
person interacts and that these expectations are communicated or "sent"
to the focal person or role occupant.
As has been stated the boundaries of organizations are semi-
permeable. The degree of permeability differs with the type and idio-
syncratic nature of the organization in question. Some organizations
have starkly prescribed rigid boundaries; others do not. A monastic
order or convent would be an example of the former, while the major
political parties would represent the latter. So open are the major
political parties that their boundaries are not clearly defined. How-
ever, during times of crisis boundaries of almost all organizations
stiffen and become more selective to protect their structure and core
technology (Thompson, 1967, p. 39).
18
Logically the organizations that want to be relatively free
from environmental influence yet sensitive to environmental pressures
must have very skillful people who carry on boundary transactions.
Boundary Person Defined
Since the distinction between system and environment is in many
ways a conceptual one, the boundary is in a sense a psychological
concept. It is easily thought of as a border, a setting of limits,
a break point - a break point that separates attitudes, expectations,
and behaviors that are different "inside" and "outside" the organiza-
tion.
A university boundary person is someone whose "principal job is
to link the university organization and the outside world (community
environment)
. He tries to gain support from the outside world but at
the same time fend off pressures, to give the university organization
enough autonomy to pursue its own destiny" (Baldridge, 1971, p. 125).
Boundary people are internal
,
working for organizational purposes yet
constantly interacting with those who are not.
A boundary position is one for which some members
of the role set are located in a different system.
It is a rare person who does not have at least
occasional job-related contact with people outside
his work unit, but positions vary considerably
with respect to "boundary relevance." Two dimen-
sions can be distinguished: the amount of time
a person spends in business contacts with people
outside his work unit and the importance of such
contacts to the person's effective performance
on the job (Kahn, 1964, et. al.
,
p. 101).
Bennis terms boundary persons "variance sensors."
They sense discrepancies between what the organiza-
tion ought to be doing and what it is actually doing.
As a result they are under continual tension. They
make good problem identifiers. This makes them, in
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fact very useful company men although at
times they may seem abrasive to others in
the company.
. .
Properly encouraged they can act as a
scanner for the organization, letting the
household executives know what is happening
on the outside. We must reward these
people, they are intersitial, connecting
several worlds, they can provide excellent
information about social climate. They are
v ita l to the evolution of organizational
goals (Bennis, 1970, pp. 41-42).
There are many such pivotal boundary positions in modern uni-
versities: the Admissions Office, the Registrar, the Development
Office, and in some urban schools, the Office of Metropolitan Affairs,
to mention just a few whose main responsibility is to interact on a
regular basis with people and organizations outside the university.
However it should be repeated that almost every role of the university
at one time or another has some contact with people on the outside.
Summary
In summary this study will examine the boundary position of the
university president in order 1) to describe the nature and extent of
the boundary activity performed by the occupant; 2) to obtain a composite
picture of what major agencies and interest groups constitute "the
environment"; 3) to portray the stresses of the boundary clearly by
identifying the relationship between institutional demands, information
exchanged, and environmental demands, and 4) to examine the coping
mechanisms of the boundary person used to mediate between conflicting
demands
.
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Even though the study has narrow goals, there is still some
room for narrowing its character and results. There could be some
implicit expectations in the reader’s mind as to what may be con-
tained in this study that will not be presented in this study. The
following section should clarify these expectations.
Constraints and Expectations of this Study
In these paranoic times of Watergate buggings and Pentagon papers
it would be easy to expect this study to become something it is not
meant to be: namely an expose, a revealing of sensitive information,
the telling of the real man, the depiction of bureaucratic bungling
and inaptitude. Many people asked the author, when they learned of the
access and candor which the focal person allowed, "what happens if what
you find is not favorable to the President, then what?"
The purpose and style of this study is to explain not evaluate,
to describe not judge. The study is designed to make statements about
what happened and not to make statements as to how effective one man
was in the performance of his duty. It concerns the parameters of the
office of university president not how well one man filled that office.
This is not a study that describes what could or should be. Rather, the
focus is on the expectations and problems that found their way into the
President’s office. The focus is not whether the President should be
educator and caretaker, creator or inheritor, pump or bottleneck, mediator
or initiator (Kerr, 1963, p. 29) but on pressures, the behaviors required
by the pressures, and the President's responses to those pressures. In
this approach something can be said about what the university president
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“hat functlons he ^ves. The study will be more of a role study
and be less concerned with effectiveness, leadership style, and decision-
making. It will focus upon leader behavior patterns, communication
patterns and role expectations in a system context.
The major components with which this study is concerned are,
the individual’s '’location” in the organization, the pressures exerted
upon him by his role "senders”, and the ambiguity and conflict he
experiences in connection with his work (Kahn and Wolfe, 1964, p. 52).
An implication and ramification of this design is that the perceptions
and behavior of the role senders should be gauged independently of the
perceptions and behaviors of the focal person toward whom they are
directed (Kahn and Wolfe, 1964, p. 30). It is not enough to measure
the behavior of the role senders in terms of the perceptions of the
focal person because
we are committed to the hypothesis that his perceptions
are affected by the state of his interpersonal rela-
tions with role senders and by aspects of his own
personality. Indeed we expect that some of his major
defenses against a difficult situation will involve
perceptual distortion (Kahn and Wolfe, 1964, p. 36).
This is a character study of an office rather than of a man. For
that reason it is hoped that this work will be less secular and of use
to a wide range of people. There was an effort to make the study as
readable to as many different audiences as possible by minimal use of
technical terms and jargon, yet retaining rigorous logic and clear
presentation.
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There has always been, and it seems even more so now, a division
of interests and perspectives within the structure and ethics of the
university. Today, faculty, administration, and students are antagon-
istically separate (Lunsford, 1968, p. 93; Baldridge, 1971, p. 65).
The resultant "we-they" attitudes are predicated to some degree on mis-
understanding and mistrust. In the absence of face-to-face knowing,
typification or stereotypes are used as substitutes in explanation of
what each group does to and for the university.
Because of the intellectuals' traditional aversion for bureau-
cracy and initiative stifling "red tape", there is a tendency for the
administration to be understaffed and over-worked. Within the focus
°f this study some statements will be made in an effort to show what
the university president does and if, indeed, he really does need more
staff assistance.
The author's opinion is that the university is in a dormant period,
trying to find its identity among its proliferated goals, a period of
quiet and crippling financial instability because (among other reasons)
the demands of the youth and their elders are not overwhelmingly clear
and evident. This is not the time to mistrust, to be insular and to cling
to parochial interests and stereotypes. Administrator and faculty must
come to understand how the climate and times of the society are calling
for, almost forcing, basic changes in university goals and structure.
The author would hope that the methodological approach of this
study can break down stereotypes generally held of the university adminis-
trator by various groups. The research method used in this study was
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chosen specifically to provide the reader with qualitative information
that would lead to greater understanding of administrative problems and
parameters. The following chapter is an in^iepth explanation of the
method chosen.
CHAPTER I I
METHOD
The impact of any study rests not only on what the conclusions
are but also on how the facts were gathered that led to the premises
and conclusions. To increase the usefulness of this study this
chapter will present the method chosen, the strengths and weaknesses
of the method, some alternative methods used in other studies, the
components of the method used, the pitfalls of response sets, the
author s acknowledgement of some of his own response sets, a rationale
for the choice of the research setting, and the flow of the research
design.
One purpose of this field study was to yield a design in which
role expectations held by all relevant role senders could be specified
for one focal person, the university president. These expectations,
together with the responses of the occupant of the focal office, would
allow for a definition of role conflict in terms of expectations (sent
roles) independent of the representations of these expectations in the
mind of the focal person.
Given the above purpose the following dilemmas needed to be
faced: 1) selection of the office to be studied and the organization
which contained that office; 2) identification of the set of role
senders for the occupant of a particular office; 3) collection of data
from role senders so as to result in understandings and comparisons
among the expectations of individual role senders; and 4) determination
of the hypothetical effects of role conflict and ambiguity.
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The office to be studied Is evident and the reasons for the
choice have been elaborated in Chapter I. The case study was selected
to accomplish the three remaining steps.
Orientation of Approach
It is difficult to substitute for face-to-face knowledge of
people. However, in a rapidly changing technological society it is
often necessary that people know about more people than they meet
directly. Public decisions are often made and stances taken toward
people on the basis of what is known about rather than known directly
.
In the absence of face-to-face knowing, novelists, journalists, film
makers have jumped into the breach to provide vicarious alternatives
(Lof land, 1971, p. 89). Lofland has given some ingredients for what
a reporter's work should contain if it is to give the reader a true
sense of knowing. 1) The reporter should have been close to the
people on whom he reports. By "close" Lofland means close in the
physical sense of conducting his own life in face-to-face proximity
over a significant period of time and in a variety of circumstances
which results in a social sense of intimacy and confidentiality. Also
he should so conduct his recording activities that they give close and
searching attention to minute matters (Lofland, 1971, p. 2). 2) The
reporter should be truthful. 3) The reporter's work should contain a
significant amount of pure description of people's activities. 4) The
work should contain direct quotes from participants (Lofland, 1971,
P. 2).
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The above Ingredients are contained in a case study method or
qualitative approach. This method allows the reporter to give the
reader a chance to know rather than know about
.
The conclusions derived from a study depend on the method of
the study. Was it a qualitative or quantitative type of study?
Lofland writes:
Inquiry or analysis is usefully thought of as
the attempt to answer one or more of only three
questions
:
1) What are the characteristics of a social
phenomenon, the form it assumes, the varia-
tion it displays?
2) What are the causes of a social phenomenon,
the form it assumes, the variation it displays?
3) What are the consequences of a social pheno-
menon, the form it assumes, the variation it
displays? (Lofland, 1971, p. 13).
When the form of the study endeavors to answer question one it will
be of a qualitative nature while if the form of a study tries to answer
questions two or three it will be quantitative in nature.
The qualitative analyst seeks to provide and
explicit rendering of the structure, order, and
patterns found among a set of participants.
Qualitative analysts ask such questions as:
what kinds of things are going on here? What
are the forms of this phenomenon? What varia-
tions do we find in this phenomenon? That ijs
qualitative analysis is_ addressed to the task
of delineating forms, kinds, and types of
social phenomenon, of documenting in loving
details the things that exist (Lofland, 1971,
p. 13).
Both qualitative and quantitative methods examine and depict social
phenomena. Because each asks a different set of questions their concluding
statements are different. The qualitative approach tends to be "here and now"
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oriented and the quantitative approach tends to be past oriented.
The socio-psychological approach asks: What
are the past experiences and characteristics
of participants that foster conflict? But
one can ask, and this is the structural approach:
What are the conditions in the social setting
that promote conflict? Both approaches deal
with the influence of social conditions on
patterns of conduct but the former examines
the influence of past social conditions on
personality characteristics and hence on con-
duct, whereas the latter is concerned with
the influences of present social conditions
on conduct (Blau and Scott, 1962, p. 82).
As the reader can infer from the first chapter of this disserta-
tion, this study examines the office of the university president from
the structural approach. The purpose is to explain observed patterns
of behavior in terms of existing social conditions. Holding in abeyance
"personality" or "social background", the method of this study asks what
features of the current social setting or organizational conditions would
lead almost anyone, regardless of personality, to behave in the particular
ways being observed.
Case Study or Qualitative Approach; Its Form
As has been stated the "case study" method was selected for this
dissertation. There is no set format for the case study, no standard
research design: it is a method established in the field using a
variety of data collection procedures, after considering the system that
it is designed to study and the goals of the study. The main data
gathering procedures used in this study were: interviews, analysis of
records and documents, and non-participant observation. Even though
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the case study does not have an established form but rather a roll-
your -own 1 quality about it, there are some distinguishing character-
istics which separate it from other methods.
The case study method is distinguished clearly from other
scientific methodologies because of a reliance on: 1) the actual
on-site presence of the researcher at the activities of the social
system being studied; 2) the sequential aspect of the analysis; and
3) the absence of quantification.
The on—site, visible presence of the field worker gives the
opportunity for face-to-face knowing referred to previously. It allows
understanding of the milieu in which the subjects being studied
experience their "ups and downs." It provides the chance for the field
worker to come to grips with small, quotidian, mundane details that will
breathe life into his study and humanness into the subjects observed.
During this study the author attended countless informal and formal
gatherings and tried to remember what occurred so it could be recorded
in the quiet hours afterward. Meetings of large and small groups were
also recorded while the meeting was in progress, which, initially
resulted in some apprehensive glances being directed toward the researcher.
This apprehension will be discussed in the strengths and weaknesses of the
non-participant technique.
1A phrase used by Bennis (1973, p. 6) to describe his search for a
method that would combine personal and theoretical insights.
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The second distinctive characteristic of the qualitative approach
is the sequential aspect of analysis. The technique of non-participant
observation results more in the generation of hypotheses than in their
testing. The author "floated" in the system for approximately three
months before a focus was chosen. "Floating" was necessary because to
make a choice of a focus required acquaintance and understanding of the
system, a negotiation of what was possible given the constraints of
access and sensitivity, the construction of a cognitive framework that
would highlight possible areas for study, the building of trust and
credibility, and estimating what would be satisfying and worthy of study.
Dalton says that it "would be foolish and often impossible to
approach a complex or social system with preconceived hypotheses which
seem to have no great likelihood of being verified" (Dalton, 1959, p. 55).
Intimacy with the social system must come first. Strauss et
. al
.
confirm
that field work has a developing character to it by saying "A. .
.
general
characteristic of field work is its temporarily developing character. The
field worker usually does not enter the field with specific hypotheses and
a predetermined research design" (Strauss, et. al., 1969, p. 751). These
are some of the drawbacks of this distinctive methodology which will be
further considered in the discussion of strengths and weaknesses.
The third characteristic previously mentioned is the absence of
quantification. There are some investigations, such as Mintzberg (1971)
that do contain some basic quantifying data but these are exceptions
rather than the rule in non-participant observation techniques. The
absence of quantification does not mean lack of evidence. The evidence
is qualitative in nature with the use of critical incidents and remarks
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to uphold conclusions. Usually the data are drawn from a large number
of sources In order to substantiate possible conclusions; In this study
from correspondence, phone calls, meetings. Interviews, and observation.
At times the study will make use of the critical device known as the
representative ancedote", which Bennis defines as that "singular event
with antecedents and consequences capable of consolidating illuminations
that hold true not only for the described event but for the entire class
of cases for which the ancedote stands" (Bennis, 1973, p. 9). The
"representative ancedote" is quite necessary given the great amounts of
phenomena to be processed and conveyed.
To reiterate, the case study employed in this study used the non-
participant observation technique, interviews, analysis of documents and
records, and reflective analysis to provide contextual information in
portraying the role of the university president. The intent was to gain
a qualitative, realistic assessment of a complex, dynamic process. Some
justification for why this method was chosen is a logical next step.
Reasons for Choice of the Method
The public sees only the product of organizational
decision-making, never the process. Organizational
behavior is typically perceived as monolithic. . .
Into every step taken by the 'administration' goes
a complicated pattern of meetings, disagreements,
conversations, personalities, emotions, and missed
connections. . .the public rarely sees the hundreds
of small tableaux, the little dramas that result in
a policy statement or a bit of strategy. It sees
only the move, or hears only the statement and it
unreasonably assumes that such an action is the
result of a dispassionate, almost mechanical process
in which problems are perceived, alternate solutions
weighed, and rational decisions made. Given human
nature that is almost never the case (Bennis, 1973,
p. 2) .
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Because people and the systems In which they interact are indeed
seen as monolithic, there is a greater need for studies which show more
of the complexity and compassion of the real situation. Purely statis-
tical studies designed for census and survey and laboratory data lean
in the direction of Mnon-humanistic appreciation: they fail to see that
social science itself is produced in a variety of styles" (Lofland, 1971,
P- 5). Statistical order has dehumanizing effects but then again the
goals of these types of studies are not humanistic appreciation. The
goals are instead, "the establishment of reliable generalizations around
frequencies of social events and around associations among them" (Lofland,
1971, p. 5).
The annoyance arises when exponents of statistical studies intimate
their work is the total scope of what individuals need in order to under-
stand another (Lofland, 1971, p. 5).
Webb et. al., maintain that the dominant mass of social science
research is based on interviews and questionnaires (Webb, et. al., 1966,
p. 1). This leads to the second reason for this qualitative method, which
is that reflection needs to be reestablished as a legitimate process of
inquiry for the social sciences. This method of inquiry would integrate
new experience with analysis combining action and examination (Bennis,
1973, p. 6). Although Bennis was using this rationale in defense of
participant observation, it still holds true for the case study method
or qualitative approach.
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The third reason for using the case study or qualitative method
is that it can more adequately depict the development and process of
change, whereas experimental survey techniques accentuate relationships
between static variables and fail to capture the systematic process of
the development of change (von Bertalanffy, 1968; and also, Becker, 1958).
In summary it should be said that what the census or survey method
in representative coverage of a population
is probably of no greater methodological signi-
ficance than the increased depth of understanding
and interpretation possible with participant
observation. This is evident when we contrast
the position of the survey analyst and partici-
pant observer when they both face the problem of
interpreting the meaning of a question. The desk
chair analyst can give at best an intelligent
guess based upon sketchy pretest and tabular data.
The observer.
. . can call upon the wealth of his
experience with the linguistic habits, the atti-
tudes, values and beliefs of the group and provide
a much richer and probably sounder interpretation
(Vidich and Shapiro, 1955, p. 303).
Every method has, because of its characteristics, its own methodo-
logical weaknesses. No research method is without bias (Webb, et. al.,
p. 1). Because no research method is without bias, some acknowledgement
and discussion is necessary concerning the biases contained in the method
chosen for this research.
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Case Study Method
Advantages of the Method
The case study method or the qualitative approach incorporates, for
the purposes of this study, techniques of non-participant observation,
interviews, and document analysis. The approach and the techniques con-
tained therein each have inherent methodological strengths and weaknesses.
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The advantages of the approach have been already described,
such as face-to-face knowing; attempts to overcome dehumanization;
its suitability for adumbrating the dynamic process and character-
istics of organizations; and the restoring of reflection as a legiti-
mate process of inquiry in the social sciences. Bennis makes a signi-
ficant point when he says that "most social science writing about men
in institutions suffers from a sanitary concern with causality, co-
herence, and a search for pattern which rarely exists except in the
mind of the observer. The result is fake, at times, destructively so.
Those elements of confusion, chance, ignorance, stupidity, recklessness,
as well as the many other qualities of man are simply not reckoned with;
they are selectively ignored" (Bennis, 1973, p. 7).
The advantages, however, of the researcher being able to secure
his data within the medium, symbols, and experiential worlds which give
meaning to his subjects, have their methodological shortcomings.
To reiterate, the characteristics of the qualitative approach
were: 1) the absence of quantitative data, 2) the sequential aspect of
analysis and 3) the on-site presence of the researcher in the social
system studied. Each of the characteristics leads to certain limitations.
Disadvantages of the Method
Because there is an absence of quantifiable data, statements con-
cerning cause and consequence are harder to substantiate. Predictability
for all cases can not be established. Hypotheses may be suggested but
rarely tested in any conclusive way. In the words of Lofland:
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It is perfectly appropriate that one be curious
about causes so long as one recognizes that
whatever account or explanation is offered is
conjecture. In more legitimacy-conferring terms
such conjectures are called hypotheses or theories.
It is proper to devote a portion of one's report
to conjectured causes of variations so long as
one clearly labels his conjectures, hypotheses,
or theories, as being exactly that (Lofland, 1971,
p. 62).
The reasons why the hypotheses can not be validated by the qualita-
tive approach are known widely in research circles and are often attri-
buted to a lack of representative samples, bias created by presence of
researcher, lack of breadth of samples and a lack of control of crucial
independent and dependent variables. The purpose of this study is not
the confirmation of general hypotheses. This study seeks to formulate
and suggest hypotheses, not to show their impeccable validity for all
university presidents.
A second characteristic which leads to a disadvantage is that of
the sequential aspect of analysis. The lack of quantifiable data and
sequential aspects of analysis lead to more time and emphasis being placed
on the formulation of hypotheses and not on the critical testing of ab-
stract variables. Strauss et. al., discuss three stages to case study
research: the initial stage requires general observation where specific
problems have not been determined. Toward the end of the initial stage,
the formation of hunches and hypotheses leads to the second phase. This
second stage is marked by greater attention to particular events in the
field and by an emerging set of propositions. The final stage consists
of systematic efforts to pinpoint various hypotheses (Strauss, e_t^ al .
,
1969) . Becker adds another stage which results when those hypotheses that
34
survive tests of daily observation are subject to more controlled
inquiry and then incorporated into descriptive models that explain
the data gathered (Becker, 1958). The advantage of this procedure
is that it allows the researcher to develop hypotheses that will be
well suited to the system studied and that can be modified over time.
The obvious risk is that hypotheses may be suggested but rarely tested
in a conclusive way.
The third characteristic of the qualitative method, the on-site
presence of the researcher, is the one which is the most critical aspect
for this study because it is the greatest source of invalid understanding.
Non-participant observation can be a threat to the credibility of the
conclusions. In other words the reader may wonder if there was "built-
in" bias in the presence of the observer or in the observer’s perceptions.
Threats to the quality of data gathered by the non-participant observer
technique are discussed in the next section of this chapter.
Sources of Invalidity to Non-Participant Observation
Threats to valid interpretation of what is being observed come from
three circumstances. Webb, et. al., 1966 and McCall, 1969 describe the
same three effects.
Errors in observation result from 1) error that may be traced to
those being studied; 2) error that comes from the investigator, and 3)
errors associated with sampling imperfections (Webb, et. al., 1966, p. 12).
McCall claims that such errors may result from 1) the structural features
of the observer’s role relationship with subjects; 2) personal character
istics of the observer, particularly his psychological functioning; and
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3) characteristics of the observer’s frame of reference (McCall, 1969,
P. ID.
The possibilities of these errors are acknowledged by this
researcher and the following is an explanation of the efforts taken
to overcome them.
Errors Resulting from Those Being Studied
The field study was an in-out process 2 in which the researcher
was at times actively involved in watching meetings, hearing people's
problems, watching them succeed and fail within the context of a large
university. There were also times of distance, separation, and reflec-
tion which is not always afforded someone who is actively engaged in a
job. The researcher had no "job" responsibilities other than this study
and toward the end of the study was visible only at meetings thought to
be key to certain mini-cases that would provide representative anecdotal
material. In the first three to four months however, the researcher and
his wife (also doing doctoral dissertation field work) ware present at
as many meetings as possible in order to get acclimated to the system.
This could have created some of the effects set forth by Webb, et. al.
The effects they described are 1) the guinea pig effect (possibly the
Watergate effect), which is the awareness of being watched; 2) the role
selection effect which can be exemplified by ’Who shall I be as I answer
these questions or do these tasks?'; 3) "the measurement as change agent"
^The author is indebted to Mark Karpel for this concept as well as
for a part of the conceptual framework for this chapter (see Karpel, 1973).
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effect, where questions asked by the researcher or his presence at a
specific meeting might lead the respondent to actually change his
behavior; and 4) built-in response sets of respondents - for example,
the preference for a strong statement over moderate or indecisive ones
in an interview (Webb, et. al.
, 1966, pp. 12-21).
How these reactive effects were overcome partly depended on the
method of introduction and image presented to the system upon arrival.
The researchers were introduced by a letter from the Dean of the School
of Education at the University of Massachusetts as two people doing field
work for their doctoral dissertation coupled with a letter by the university
president asking the university community to be as honest and as helpful
as possible. The president would ask those people, both inside and out-
side the university, with whom he was meeting, if they had any objections
to one or both researchers observing the meeting about to begin. Usually
no one objected to the meeting being observed. It should be said that as
the researchers became known around the system access was almost automatic
and was never really an issue. The openness demonstrated by most people
was extraordinary and heartwarming! It seemed as if the academic community
could relate to the research purpose very quickly. The reactive effects
associated with those being studied were more pronounced when the researcher
interacted with people outside the university. This difference however can
also be accounted for because respondents within the university had more
interaction time with the researchers.
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The reactive effects of feeling like ’’guinea pigs”, of role
selection, and of the change agent, were combatted by a number of
strategies on the part of the researcher. One strategy was to
compare interview answers, with actions observed in meetings and with
correspondence sent to and from the President’s office. For consist-
ency and honesty, another strategy was to assure confidentiality for
all interactions. As credibility and trust increased, confidentiality,
combined with constantly explaining and seeking understanding for the
purpose and focus of the study in progress, gradually resulted in candid,
spontaneous answers and behaviors. The procedure of asking for access
to meetings or for copies of documents gradually became taken for granted
as did the researcher’s behavior of jotting down notes during meetings.
A major factor which helped reduce the guinea pig effect was that
the President set the example for allowing the researcher to be visible
and prominent in all but a few meetings. (The meetings were usually
one-to-one, such as between the President and a dean over a resignation.)
He also allowed full access to any and all records and files that came in
and out of his office during the academic year, 1972-73.
The main threat to the credibility of this study was the reactive
effects as to errors resulting from the researcher himself.
Errors Resulting from the Researcher
The observer has "response sets" (Webb, 1966, p. 19) or a built-in
distortion mechanism referred to by Bennis (1973, p. 10) as the "reflexive
dilemma." This, said simply, is the emotional involvement of the observer
in the setting he is studying. It results in the investigator having an
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investment in what happens: he wants certain things to occur so he may
influence or direct his observations which of course changes the data.
Or the researcher's value system may lead him to do or say things that
change the data. As the study progressed, the researcher began to under-
stand more of the subtleties of some of the university problems and
consequently observing became extremely hard to do. There was a desire
to pitch in and help, not merely stand by. The investigator wanted to
share what had been seen in order to aid in possible solutions. This
dilemma of wanting to share yet not wanting to share provided some
interesting conflicts for the researcher.
Emotional investment comes from two sources: from the researcher's
own value structure and from developing a strong attachment for the people
being studied and their problems. The researcher freely acknowledges that
there was an emotional involvement with many people in the system, especially
in relation to the University President who was the center of the study.
The resultant disadvantage of this caring relationship is that the
researcher may lose an outsider's perspective on what he sees. The loss
of the outsider's perspective means in essence that he is susceptible to
whatever subtle influences, moods, or assumptions pervade the system.
This susceptibility, as Karpel says, can work for the researcher as well.
If he (the researcher) can sensitively draw back
and try to understand his own feelings and thoughts,
he may have a valuable phenomenological insight into
the experience of the other members of the system
and into the forces working in that system. Naturally
this sort of data requires careful checks through
observations of others' behavior and interviewing
members about their own reactions but it remains
true that as a participant the researcher can often
use his own emotions and reactions as a clue in
understanding the observations of the system he
studies (Karpel, 1973, p. 23).
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Even though losing an outsider’s perspective can work for the
researcher, it is still a risk. The researcher may feel that his own
freedom to pursue delicate questions and publish his conclusions are
limited by the social relationships he has established.
Two other values held by the researcher that could have dis-
torted what was seen are 1) the author’s opinion that universities
need to change and 2) the author’s opinion that the direction of that
change must be toward community service and solving public problems.
Beside trying to look for as many different perspectives as possible
and trying to present those views equitably there is precious little
that can be done to compensate for values held by a researcher. Experts
in research say that: "Since the investigator has control over neither
his affective responses, nor their effects on his observations he must
contend with his. feelings as part of his data. Only by increasing his
own awareness of them, their basis, and their effects on him, will he
be able to counteract their distorting influences" (Schwartz and Schwartz,
1955, p. 49).
Myrdal says basically the same thing and offers the same corrective
action: "There is no other device for excluding biases in social sciences
than to face the valuations and to introduce them as explicitly stated,
specific, and sufficiently concretized value premises" (Myrdal, 1944, p. 1045).
^Distortion is an unfortunate term because it suggests "objectivity.
It implies that if it were not for these interferences or biases the re-
searcher could see the "real" world. The most we can hope for is inter-
subjective agreement. Yet people do deny, project, ignore, so with this
qualification, the term is used.
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The author has acknowledged and stated what values he feels may
have resulted In selective distortion. How well these reactive effects
were overcome. In observations, Interviews and analysis of documents,
remains to be seen in the presentation of the rest of this dissertation.
Errors In Sampling
The final source of error listed by Webb, et. al., is the error
that results from the samples of the observed phenomenon. In this
study if meetings were not observed, interviews not held, or documents
not read, the results would not reflect all the role senders’ expecta-
tions or all the constraints of the university context. There were
many meetings and phone calls that were not possible to retrieve because
the university President could not be 'shadowed' twenty-four hours a day.
For the period studied, this was not possible because of the constraints
on the President as well as on the researcher. Because of the researcher's
relationship with different members of the groups inside and outside the
university, there was differential access. Also distortion could come in
sampling because of the researcher's inclinations to accept what reactors
said at face value.
The policy of using more than one research technique such as observa-
tion, interviews, and document analysis was used to reduce the chances of
not catching all of the role expectations for the office of university
president
.
The credibility of this study must emerge from the methodology as
well as the data. Considering the qualitative nature of the data the
credibility lies in the research methods and presentation of results. In
order to give the reader the fullest access possible, the next section
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represents an effort to make explicit the
detailed account of role expectations and
thesize those expectations.
relationship between the author's
the primary data used to hypo-
Research Design
The following Is a brief outline of how the data was gathered and
analyzed to meet the purposes of this study. The sources of data were
the observation of meetings, interviews with key role senders, analysis
of all incoming and outgoing correspondence, and the analysis of phone
calls and calendar of one university president.
The purposes of this study are, as have been stated: 1) to analyze
the boundary activity of a university president; 2) to obtain a composite
picture of the environment he interacts with; 3) to analyze the role stress
of the boundary person; and 4) to analyze the mechanisms used to cope with
the stress.
There were six basic steps of the research design used to reach the
stated purposes. Briefly, they are the following: 1) the delineation of
a systems approach; 2) the explanation of criteria used to distinguish
between internal and external; 3) an analysis of documents to reveal what
interactions occurred between the President and external people, and who
those external groups and people were; 4) an analysis of the demands
reflected in the interactions; 5) a description of small cases buttressed
by in-depth interviews, and observations showing role conflict and ambiguity;
and 6) an analysis of the President's reactions to the pressures, his coping
mechanisms
.
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Steps one and two have already been done to some degree in
Chapter I and further description of the university as a system will
occur in Appendix A. ^ Criteria for external vs. internal have been
designated in terms of role theory.
To refresh the reader's mind, a person is said to be internal
when he is seen to perform system relevant behavior and these behaviors
are patterned so as to result in dependability of role performance. A
person is said to be internal if he is perceived by others as occupying
an organizational role, having system membership, and if as a member of
that organization, he is seen by others as performing system-relevant
functions
.
This system's perspective and these boundary criteria lead to
step three which is an analysis of presidential activities or contacts
in the form of correspondence, phone calls, and calendar. The contacts
were analyzed for form
,
i.e. mail, face-to-face meetings, phone calls,
etc.; by function or purpose
,
i.e. appointment setting, information sharing,
acknowledgements, etc.; by flow
,
i.e. who initiates contact with whom; and
by frequency
,
i.e. how often contacts are made. The classification system
used for function and flow are included in Appendix B. The results of the
author's analysis of form, function, flow and frequency are set forth in
Charts I - IV, found in Chapter III.
^The reader may wish to read this appendix before reading the following
chapters, in order to gain a perspective of the university system's problems,
future dilemmas and choices as well as a discussion of the university system s
qualities, flows of communication, and norms, that differentiate it from other
organizations.
Chapter III on boundary activities explains the implications for
the occupant of the role of university president. The form, function,
flow, and frequency of boundary activities place demands on the behavior
of the person occupying the focal position to respond to the contacts.
These contacts "lead” the occupant to perform certain roles or activities
which will also be depicted in the fourth chapter.
Chapter IV portrays a composite picture of the environment with
which the university president interacts by discussing the issues and
problems revealed through an analysis of presidential activities. The
analysis of the flow and function of contacts should disclose the "causal
texture" of the environment. The environmental factors that lead a presi-
dent to act and react, once disclosed and explained, will set the stage
for Chapter V.
Chapter V will achieve the third purpose of this study which is to
analyze the role stress of the boundary position. A number of crucial
incidents will be traced in-depth to show the conflict, ambiguity, and
resulting stress from various conflicting or incomplete expectations of
the groups and individuals involved for the role performance of the
university president. Each environmental group or internal group depicted
in the cases has needs for maintenance, production, and adaptation of their
own norms and frames of reference which may conflict with each other or
with the president’s role.
The content of the information exchange vis-a-vis specific issues and
problems must be delineated to show the potential areas of conflict and stres
Therefore, three environmental groups and associated issues will be analyzed
in depth.
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In order to distill the salient issues or cases of potential con-
flict and stress, a power/dependency 5 model will be used. After the
importance of the cases has been established, the pros and cons of various
actions and the implications of those actions for each issue will be
explored by an historical perspective detailing what universities'
roles have been in the past. Also, interviews with people inside and
outside the university will be conducted to determine what their respec-
tive points of view are for the cases investigated.
A description of how the President copes with the problems, in an
effort to maintain both his own equilibrium and the institution's will
serve to accomplish the fourth purpose of the study. Chapter VI analyzes
the coping behaviors demonstrated by the President and hypothesizes what
other administrators can do to cope in similar situations. Chapter VII
presents a summary of the major conclusions of this study and implications
for further research.
Rationale for Choice of Research Setting
The research described in this dissertation took place at the
University of Cincinnati. The President studied was Warren Bennis. The
-*The model is explained in Thompson (1967). The major premises are
that an institution is dependent upon its environment 1) in proportion to
the organization's need for resources or performances which that element
can provide, and 2) in inverse proportion to the ability of other elements
to provide the same resources or performances.
Dependence can be viewed as the obverse of power. An organization
has power, relative to an element of its environment, to the extent that
the organization has capacity to satisfy needs of that element.
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most important single reason for choosing the University of Cincinnati
was because Dr. Bennis was open and trustful enough to grant the access
needed to do the study. He made his office files and records open to
the researcher as well as paving the way for access to sensitive meetings.
Summary and Conclusions
In summary, the description and analysis of any changing social
system is a difficult and complex procedure. The field worker has to
observe and record the relationships of a large number of factors over
time
.
It is a little like trying to catch a running
stream, freezing it and cramming portions of
it into little boxes to be stacked neatly for
casual perusal at a later date. At this point
researchers most often opt for some form of
organization around major dimensions of the
system settling for somewhat arbitrary but
discrete boundaries between areas (Karpel,
1973, p. 91).
The discussion in this chapter has been presented to sensitize the
reader to the considerations of the method used to research the role of the
university president. The reader should by now understand the dilemmas
perceived by the author and by others who have written about research
methodologies. The reader should also understand the corrective steps
taken to mitigate the potential pitfalls of "catching a running stream."
CHAPTER III
BOUNDARY ACTIVITIES
. . .Nearly all organizational charts and job
descriptions belie the state of affairs regarding
the actual performance of work. Organizational
charts imply that contacts are limited primarily
to the lines connecting the boxes, but the rela-
tionships necessary to get the job done are much
more complex (Sayles, 1964, p. 34).
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the interaction patterns
of one university president over one academic year starting from September
1, 1972, to June 15, 1973. Who are those groups and individuals, inside
and outside the university, that telephone, write to, or spend time with
a university president? What purposes do they have? How often do they
contact him? Sayles is correct in saying that the relationships are com-
plex. The function of this section is to depict how complex they are, and
to show which behaviors, over time constitute the "job" of university
president. The results of an analysis of the communication flow will
show who the role senders are and what their expectations were within
the context of organizational work. An analysis of the communication flow
will also show a set or core of patterned activities, or roles, the Uni-
versity President performed as a boundary person which will be discussed
in the second half of this chapter using the leader behavior models of
Sayles (1964) and Mintzberg (1971)
.
The communication flow within a formal organization is broken down
into three parts. They are the written contacts, face-to-face meetings,
and phone calls. In a sense the modern system is a "flow of
processes."
Decisions are the result of interactions over time on the part of
people.
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It is not just that people are placed in organizational positions but
m a very real sense they are participating in and influencing a series
of relationships.
The university president does not have a neatly bounded job with
clearly defined authorities and responsibilities. Instead he is posi-
tioned in a system of relationships out of which he must implement and
organize to accomplish his objectives. There is no uniform interface;
rather the relationships vary, depending on the objectives and the
position of the "actors" with whom he must achieve a working pattern
of give and take (Sayles, 1964, p. 27).
Mintzberg (1971) and Sayles (1964), in their studies of managerial
work, both confirm that the manager or the executive defines much of his/
her own job. The manager has responsibilities for this or that decision,
for this or that activity "but the dynamic elements of his job are left
unspecified" (Sayles, 1964, p. 34). Dodds says the same thing about the
university president.
He reveals where his heart lies and sets the character
of his administration by the choices he makes between
those functions to which he gives his most personal,
intimate and continuing attention and those which he
more generally leaves to others.
In doing so a university president will have to fight
for time to contend with the public's conception of
him as a sort of "jack of all trades" whose services
should be available on call. Accordingly, certain
answers as to how he can be an educator do not rest
with him alone but with trustees, alumni, the academic
community, and the public generally (Dodds, 1961, p. 2).
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The university president’s position has a great deal of autonomy.
The man, to some degree, determines the role he will play. To what
degree the individual will determine his role is dependent on those
he interacts with and on the demands and needs they have. It is
precisely this unspecified latitude in role behavior that carries
with it the almost intolerable role conflict and ambiguity which is
the focus of this study.
For the sake of perspective, the purposes of this study bear
repeating. In order to understand the problems of a university presi-
dent as a boundary person, the author will 1) examine the "boundary
activities" performed by the president; 2) describe the environment and
hence the role senders with their accompanying expectations; 3) explain
certain role conflict and ambiguity inherent in the position vis-a-vis
those expectations; and 4) outline the coping mechanisms used in particu-
lar circumstances.
The logical place to start in order to accomplish the first purpose
is to examine the acts and activities performed by a university president.
By looking at what a president did, it is possible to understand with whom
he interacted and what expectations they held for him. As has been stated
in the chapter on method, the design included the monitoring of phone calls
correspondence and calendar by form, flow, frequency, and function. Thus
the principle role senders, both external and internal, could be identified
Once the role senders were identified, their expectations could be clearly
delineated not only through subsequent phone calls and correspondence but
also through observations of specific meetings and in-depth interviews.
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This chapter will outline with whom the university president
interacted, the purposes or demands contained in the contacts, as well
as how often, and in what form those interactions took place. All
interactions can be seen as having a content level, the issues or
ideas involved, and a process level, i.e. the form, flow, frequency,
and function of the interaction (such as to inform, to negotiate, to
trade, etc.). When the President receives two letters, one from the
faculty senate requesting information on budget figures and another
from a state legislator requesting medical school admissions figures
the process level of function and form are the same. The content levels
are different in that the information requested is different and in that
the issues and problems those letters represent are different.
Both the content levels and process levels of the President's inter-
actions and activities are needed to understand the role conflict and
ambiguity inherent in his organizational position. This chapter will
discuss only the process levels of that interaction while discussion of
content levels shall be treated in Chapters IV and V. This chapter will
deal with frequency, flow, and form of contacts in the first half, with a
discussion of the prevalent functions contained in the contacts and their
implications for the role behavior of the university president to follow
in the second half.
Form, Frequency, and Flow of the Process Level of Interaction
Six sets of characteristics dealing with 1) the quantity and pace
of the President's work, 2) the patterns in his activities, 3) the rela-
tionship between action and reflection in his work, and 4) his use of
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different media, 5) his relationship to a variety of contacts, and
6) the interplay between his rights and duties, shall be discussed. 1
In this analysis it should be remembered that this study is of
only one university president and that the size, age and type of
university may change what the data of this study may suggest. Since
the main strength of the case study method is a qualitative wholistic
description and not generalizable hypotheses for all university presi-
dents, very few generalizations will be offered except for the President
studied. There have been some studies, in managerial work however, that
tend to substantiate much of what has been found in the course of this
study. Studies by Carlson (1951), Guest (1955), Sayles (1964), and
Mintzberg (1973) will be used whenever possible to show the similarity
of the president’s role as a boundary person to managerial roles in other
organizations
.
Quantity and Pace
The quantity and pace of the university president's activities is
unrelenting. Whyte says that chief executives work four nights out of
five. One night is spent at the office, one entertaining and the other
two nights he goes home, not to a sanctuary as much as to a branch office
(Whyte, 1954, p. 109). Carlson mentions how chief executives have exces-
sive work loads which cut down on their opportunity to see family and
private friends and which result in much travel time and possible
Hluch of the organization of this chapter builds upon the work of
Mintzberg (1973) and Sayles (1964).
51
intellectual isolation (Carlson, 1951, p. 51). Studies of both upper
and middle managers show that they bring their work home with them
while lower and lower middle management studies do not show this to
be the case (Horn and Lupton, 1965). According to this study, the
University President found it was necessary to entertain or hold a
meeting at least three nights out of four and to interact with one
or two groups per night.
This study examined 293 calendar days of which Saturdays were
counted as work days for a total of 229 work days. There were 37
Sundays, 24 of which had scheduled meetings, 12 Sundays having two or
more work—related meetings. There were 27 Holidays and/or vacation
days (see Calendar Time Analysis, Chart I, p. 52). Those work days
averaged between 16 and 17 hours per day of meetings or travel time to
some work-related meetings.
During the day there is no let up in the work pace. Guest (1951)
and Mintzberg (1973) show this to be the case in business, hospital, and
school settings. Mintzberg, who studied the chief executive of a major
consulting firm, the president of a firm that produced technological
defense products, the head of a large urban hospital, the president of
an industrial firm, and the superintendent of a large suburban school
system, showed that there was "no break in the pace of activity during
office hours. The mail (average 36 pieces per day), telephone calls
(average 5 per day) , and meetings (average of 8 per day) accounted for
almost every minute from the moment these men entered their offices until
they departed in the evening" (Mintzberg, 1973 , p. 30). This study shows
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CHART I
CALENDAR TIME ANALYSIS
Work Dav Sunday Holiday/Vacation Total Week Days Trip Day
September 30 4 1 25 4
October 31 5 26 1
November 31 4 1 26 3
December 31 3 13 15
January 31 4 1 26 5
February 28 4 24
March 31 4 27 6
April 30 3 10 17 2
May 31 4 1 26 3
June 19 2 17 3
293 37 27 229 26
37 Sundays - 24 Sundays had meetings. 12 had two or more
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that the mall averaged between 30 and 31 pieces per day, telephone
calls averaged between 6 and 7 per day and formal meetings averaged
2from 6 to 7 per day.
It seemed that there was one meeting after another punctuated
by phone calls and secretarial interruptions (because of the need for
a signature or for some clarification on paper work that had to be
gotten out). There were no specified breaks, not even for lunch unless
the meetings themselves were luncheon meetings. One out of every six
work days had a scheduled lunch meeting; one out of every three work
days had a scheduled ceremonial of "business" dinner. Coffee or coke
were often served during meetings. If any free time should arise this
was as a rule taken up by informal meetings with subordinates or unex-
pected callers.
It cannot be stressed enough that the work day is a demanding one.
The communication and work flow are endless. When the day is "over" in
the formal sense the residue of the responsibilities are ever present.
From interaction with this President over the academic year it became
apparent that he could not escape the atmosphere that was cognizant of
^This study supports Mintzberg’s findings that there were five kinds
of days: 1) "catch-up days" usually aftef trips or heavy schedules, which
required time at his desk with unanswered mail, returning phone calls, and
making appointments; 2) "crisis days" where routine duties are put off to
concentrate on a major disturbance that had suddenly developed; 3) "free
days" in which few scheduled meetings are held and subordinates who have
been long-neglected are seen; 4) "heavily scheduled days" brought on by
the squeeze in everybody’s calendar; and 5) "normal days" with the usual
load of mail, callers, and meetings both scheduled and unscheduled.
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of his status and power nor could he retreat from his own mind which
repeatedly searched for new information that might have some bearing
on the day's problems.
Patterns in His Activities
There is no question that the studies already done bear out the
data revealed in this study. Guest (1955), Ponder (1957), and Mintz-
berg (1973) all indicated that for managers activity is characterized
by variety
,
fragmentation and brevity . The data of this study would
suggest that this is certainly the case for a university president.
These three elements can be documented by the phone calls, calendar,
and correspondence.
The variety is most clearly seen in the correspondence (see
Chart II - Analysis of Correspondence, p. 55). The University President
interacted with 20 separate categories of external groups and 21 separate
categories of internal groups. These categories can then be broken into
individual, constituent organizations and individuals who represent the
organizations. For example, within the category of "industry the office
of the University President corresponded with 76 separate organizations
and sometimes interacted with more than one or two individuals within that
one separate organization. Within the academic year there was inter-
action with 41 separate categories, comprised of over 600 organizations
or subunits and over one thousand individuals inside and outside the
university. This would mean that one out of every five or six letters
would be from an individual or organization with which no previous
correspondence had occurred. The content of the correspondence
was, of
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CHART II
Mall
External
Acknowledgements
Status
Request
Solicitations
Authority
Requests
Reference
Data
General
Reports
Periodical
&
News
Events
Reports
on
Operations
Advice
in
Situations
Problems
&
Pressures
Ideas
Self
Initiated
Mail
Rec
ommend
at
ions
Ouestionnaire
Totals
Percentage
If
of
Individual
Organizations
Other Universities
and Colleges 28 18 1 2 5 65 4 10 10 29 10 1 31 47 15 276 11.
1
72
Students 20 45 6 1 30 31 1 1 42 1 179 7.3
Independ ents 25 52 2 2 2 45 4 24 1 18 175 7.1
Industry 39 36 17 2 4 9 6 3 16 8 15 2 10 6 1 174 7.1 76
Legislators-^^ 25 18 1 1 7 38 3 9 6 6 28 8 4 154 6.2 62
Board of Regents 7 14 1 19 66 4 1 2 6 20 4 144 5.8
Non-Prof it
Organizations 18 65 2 3 5 16 2 13 3 4 3 131 5.3 70
Federal Gov't. 11 16 2 5 17 42 2 1 2 9 1 13 121 4.9 22
Educational
Associations 8 26 4 3 18 14 1 3 4 3 1 8 5 98 3.9 38
Job Seekers 2 2 57 21 1 1 11 95 3.8
Alumni 19 13 1 6 5 4 9 2 25 1 4 89 3.6 5
Media 18 28 1 1 4 2 7 1 4 11 5 82 3.3 21
City Powers
and Agencies 17 19 9 3 8 1 5 4 1 9 2 78 3.2 20
Friends 70 2 72 2.9
Associations 4 32 4 3 1 8 2 3 2 3 62 2.5 23
Donor
8
24 12 1 2 1 10 3
|
2 55 2.2
Speakers and
Consultants 2 In 3 20 1 1 2 1 10 1 54 2.1 20
Religious Groups 5 29 1 2 2 5 1 45 1.8 18
Educational Panels
and Studies 3 3 1 26 1 2 4 2 1 43 1.7 5
Foundations 7 8 4 9 1 1 1 5 1 1 38 1.6 12
Public Schools 1 15 2 2 1 2 26 1.1 6
Anonymous 82 L76 11 276 11.1
Totals External 436 467 98 38 121 526 28 27 187 71 no 7 209 99 43 2467 ioo;
Total Percent L7. 718. < 3. 9 1. 5 4. 9 21.41.2 1. ; 7. 2
.
4. .0 8. 4. 3 1.
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CHART II
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Internal
Acknowledgements
Status
Request
Solicitations
Authority Requests
Reference
Data
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News
cn
u
c
0)
>
u:
Reports
on
Operations
Advice
in
Situations
Problems
a
Pressures
-
O)
to <-
<D -
2 !• : i
*ecommenda
t
ions
Questionnaire
O)
<0
u
O
Percentage
V.P. - Academic Aff. 1 7 8
14-
109 3 47 4 i 47 i 239 7.;
V.P. - Metropolitan Af 3 4 8
15-
18 2 i 17 i 39 L08 3.;
V.P. - Development 3 9 3
12-
8
2 16 i 13 67 2.C
V.P. - Bus. and Fin. 1 1 1 2
15-
24 2 5 i 37 89 2.7
V.P. - Research 2 0-3 2 1 23 31 .93
V.P. - Medicine 1 3 9 2
16-
53
3 i 20 1 9 34 150 4.5
V.P. - Public Affairs 3 6 2
47-
38 2 i 40 3 61 203 6.1
Executive V.P. 1 8
19-
70 2 12 1 48 161 4.8
faculty & Univ.
Senate 109 64 6
19-
20 16 4 76 2 27 51 12 406 12.2
Faculty Senate 8 15 6 5
33-
17 2 1 9 1 1 32 130 3.5
University Council 1 32 6 3 42 1.2
Library 4 2 4 1 2 13 .4
Development 6 22 11-
40
1 5 2 3 1 91 2.7
Physical Plant
and Staff 2 1 1 6 10 .03
Business and
Finance 4 2 2 2-26 4 1 1 47 1.4
Vice Provosts 6 20
17-
?? 2 14 1
4 1 19 1 L07 3.2
ORD 7 16 2
15-
50 4 1 1 7 L03 3.1
PIO 3 9 6 5 2 6 31 .9
Student Affairs 20 38 1
24-
1 37 2 6 25 1 201 6.1
Admission & Records 9 5
13-
18
3 1 11 2 9 1 69 2.0
Ombudsmen 1 4 1 1 2 1 10 .03
University
Media Resources
2 3 1 3 3 1 2 15 .04
Board 3 8 4 18- 1 35 1 84 2.5
Institutes 2 4 1
11-
6
6 4 1 35 1.0
Committees and
Councils 15 4
34-
52
2 13 33 7 16C 4.8
Deans and
Department Heads 35 79 5
30-
88 3 1 54 3 14 62 374 LI.
3
Assistants 6 38 2 2
37-
122 1
65 3 19 2 29' 8.9
AAUP and Jr.
Faculty Assistants 2 10 5-4 1 7
1 3(
Total Numbers 240 385 1 56 31 1305 45 12 470 29 68 1 63f 27 3 330
Total Percentage 7.; 11. ( C 1.6 .9 39. 1 . 3 .03 14.2 .8 2.0 0 19. 3 .08 009
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course, varied; and although not meticulously counted, it is estimated
that over a hundred major issues were "pending" and had to be kept
track of while waiting for the latest developments. Examples of
major issues included affirmative action, long range planning, the
budget review process, a management training program, promotions,
faculty senate resolutions, the subsidy revision, enrollment trends,
the abolishment of football, gay liberation recognition, the seeking
of grants, negotiations of contracts with outside groups, starting new
programs, consultant visits and reports on existing programs, campus
security, and alumni-giving among others.
The phone calls and the formal and informal meetings (see Charts
III and IV) show the same variety. Although the same 41 categories are
represented, the range is not as great within the 41 categories. Because
the range was not as great within the phone calls and face-to-face meetings,
it can be suggested that it is common that most attempts to initially con-
tact the University President come in written form. This varied. While
some groups both outside and inside never contacted the President except
through the mail; most of the "public" chose to express themselves in this
form. The preference for the mail to be the mechanism for initial contact
could be explained because it is economical, saves time and energy, and be-
cause it allows for true feelings to be expressed without the emotion-charged
circumstances of a face-to-face meeting.
The fragmentation of the University President's work day is also
easily seen. It is evident in the charts that have been included in this
chapter. No one group, with the exception of his staff and administrative
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CHART III
Phone Calls
External
Rec.
or
Job
Advice
or
Plan
Getting
Resources
Appointment
or
Date
To
Say
Hello
or
Goodbye
University
Policy
Complaint
or
Compliment
Conduct
Business
Tip-Off
Information
Sharing
Request
Information
Do
Speech
Benefits
Panel
-
Consult
Invitation
to
Formal
and
Informal
Transfer
Make
Decision
Admissions
Write
Article
in
Book
rotal
Purpose
Unknown
rotal
’ercent
Other Colleges
and Universities
19 6 5 7 4 9 5 13 4 1 73 35 108 13.0
Friends 14 2 2 5 28 7 9 1 5 2 1 76 24 100 12.0
Industry 6 6 2 12 1 4 5 5 7 6 9 2 3 68 26 94 11.4
Non-Profit
Organizations 1 8 2 4 13 6 7 4 1 46 29 75 9.1
Legislators and
State Agencies 1 1 2 16 1 4 1 10 8 1 1 46 22 68 8.2
Media 1 1 9 1 1 5 16 1 2 4 3 44 17 61 7.3
Speakers
and Consultants 1 3 18 1 1 3 27 21 48 5.8
Board of Regents 1 5 1 10 2 6 5 2 2 34 11 45 5.4
Student 2 4 2 10 1 2 10 4 1 36 0 36 4.3
Independents 3 1 24 3 1 2 34 0 34 4.1
City Powers
& Agencies 2 3 3 1 3 2 2 4 20 12 32 3.9
Job Seekers 8 1 9 20 29 3.5
Donors 4 1 3 3 1 2 1 15 6 21 2.5
Public Schools 1 1 1 2 1 6 12 6 18 2.2
Educational
Associations 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 9 5 14 1.7
Religious Groups 1 3 3 3 2 12 2 14 1.7
Assoc lations 4 2 1 2 2 11 0 11 1.3
Federal
Government 1 3 1 2 7 3 10 1.2
Alumni 2 1 3 6 0 6 .7
Foundations 1 1 1 3 0 3 .3
Total Numbers 63 28 19 117 38 16 33 5 69 77 Ui 38 20 10 6 58P 239 827
Total Percentages L0.7 4.7 3.2 19.8 6.6 2.7 5.6 .9 11.7 13.0 7.( 6.4 .6 3.4 1.7 1.0
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CHART III
Phone Calls
Internal
Rec.
or
Job
Advice
or
Plan
Getting
Resources
Appointment
or
Date
To
Say
Hello
or
Goodbye
University
Policy
Complaint
or
Compliment
Conduct
Business
Tip-Off
Informa-
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Sharing
Request
Information
Do
Speech
Benefits
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-
Consult
Invitation
to
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&
Informal
Transfer
Make
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Admissions
Write
Article
in
Book
Total
§
o
c
£
0)
Vi
o
c-
t*
3
P-
Total
Percent
Faculty 2 3 6 11 2 8 1 1 2A 7 1 A 6 i 3 80 35 115
— 1
39.6
Staff 1 2 5 3 1 25 10 1 6 2 2 58 9 68 23.4
Deans 3 3 2 12 2 2 2 26 15 A0 13.7
Board 1 6 8 1 3 1 2 22 17 39 13.4
j
Government Leaders 3 6 2 11 3 1A
1
4.8
j
Wife A 1 1 5 1 12 2 1A 4.8
j
Total Numbers 3 A 8 28 5 27 2 2 6A 26 3 12 1 12 6 6 209 81 290 Total
j
Total Percentages 1.4 1.9 3.8 13.3 2.3 12.9 .9 .9 30.6 12.
A
1. A 5.7 • A 5.7 2.8 2.8
Personal 48
Anonymous 11A
1
Total
j
Total Phone Calls Logged = 1,231 Total Phone Calls External “ 827 67.1
Total Days Logged « 187 Total Phone Calls Internal - 290 23.5
Total Days Sept, to June 293 Total Phone Calls Personal 48 3.8
Weekends and Holidays “ 92 Total Anonymous Calls - 66 5.3
Total Days Missed - 1A Total - 1,231
Total Made to President ” 1,054 Total Calls of Known Purpose - 797 or 64$
Total Made b^. President « 177
Average Calls per Day « 6.5
Chances of Completion 1 In 3
Percent of Call with Superior ”3.12
Percent of Calls with Subordinates = 251
Average External A. 5 Internal 2.0
External Chances = 1 in 3
Internal Chances * 1 In 2
20.32 Students Chances = 1 in 10
CHART IV
Meetings
External
/ }
/ 1
/ *
/ i/ w
/ o
/ S
/ s
/ Sf
t s
/ /
/ £ / *.
/„ !' / *
1
Consultants & Speakers 47 3 ii 3 74 16.1
Students 46 1 2 4 53 11.5
Media 41 3 44 9.6
Industry 14 5 7 7 33 7.2
Alumni 14 3 8 7 32 7.0
Non-Profit Organizations 21 4 7 32 7.0
City Powers & Agencies 18 6 2 2 28 6.1
Other Universities & Colleges 21 2 4 1 28 6.1
Job Seekers 23 23 5.0
Board of Regents 21 1 22 4.8
Legislators & State Agencies 14 1 2 3 20 4.4
Donors 12 1 2 1 16 3.5
Government Agencies 11 1 1 1 14 3.1
Educational Panel & Studies 10 10 2.2
Friends and Co-Workers 8 8 1.7
Religious Groups 2 2 3 7 1.5
Educational Associations 5 1 6 1.3
Foundations 4 1 5 1.1
Public Schools 2 1 3 .7
344 30 54 30 458
Total Number of Meetings Held = 1,177
Total Number of Meetings with External Individuals = 458 - 38.9%
Total Number of Meetings with Internal Individuals • 662 - 56.2%
Total Number of Meetings - Personal Miscellaneous * 42 - 3.5%
Total Number of Meetings with Unidentified Individuals » 15 - 1.2%
Total Number of Meetings with Superiors - 68 - 5.7%
Total Number of Meetings with Subordinates « 594 - 50.4%
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CHART IV
Meetings
Internal
/
III
1/
1,1
s *
*1
<u
ill
It
*
1
Ji\
Staff-Admin. & Assistant 195 1 3 2 201 30.3
Vice Presidents 108 3 111 16.7
Individual Faculty 66 7 7 80 12.0
Deans 39 2 2 1 44 6.6
Individual Board Members 22 7 2 6 37 5.5
Athletic Events 6 5 16 27 4.0
Colleges & Dept. Heads 21 1 2 24 3.6
Team Building Seminar 21 21 3.1
Individual Gov't. Leaders 18 18 2.7
Board Meeting-Formal & Informal 16 16 2.4
Board Meeting - Community 15 15 2.2
Miscellaneous Groups 14 1 15 2.2
Committees - Task Force 12 1 13 1.9
Open Hours 10 10 1.5
Government Bodies 10 10 1.5
Faculty Group 1 1 7 9 1.3
Councils 4 2 6 .9
Tours 3 3 .4
__
Faculty and
President 2
2 .3
Totals 484 16 42 45 622
Personal 30 9 3 A2
Anonymous 35
Total 57
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assistants had an overwhelming proportion of contact (in regards to
the percent of meetings held). Fragmentation naturally follows when
a limited amount of time is divided into small amounts of contact with
a large number of interacting groups.
It should be emphasized and understood that Charts II, III and
IV are frequency counts. They represent the number of contacts either
by phone, mail, or face-to-face meetings that occurred during the 229
work days studied. These contacts are the ones that were recorded;
some that occurred on trips or at home did not get recorded and cannot
be part of this study. It is felt that approximately 90% of the contacts
were recorded and, because most of what was found in this study can be
substantiated by other management studies, it is fair to suggest that
these frequency counts are representative of the University President's
interaction patterns.
The frequency count was chosen over the amount of time spent on an
issue or with a constituent group because total time is difficult to
estimate. Because of conversations on other topics, interruptions in a
flow of conversation, and the overlapping of issues, the number of con-
tacts with a constituent group or individual was seen as a more accurate
measure of the significance of interaction patterns rather than the amount
of time spent. There was evidence to suggest that the more salient the
issue or problem that was under consideration the more frequency of contact
was observed until some resolution was reached or the issue "blew over.
This point is exemplified by the issue of medical school admissions. As
different groups saw the need to increase the number of in-state students
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who were accepted into the University's medical school there was a
corresponding increase in the number of letters, phone calls, and
meetings, with different groups on the issue.
Along with variety and fragmentation, brevity of activities was
the third characteristic of the university president's work day. There
were days when there were as many as fourteen different formal meetings
scheduled at thirty to thirty-five minute intervals. These meetings
were punctuated by phone calls either placed by or received by the
President which lasted on the average of eight minutes [Mintzberg (1973,
p. 33) recorded a six minute average] and by short work sessions at his
desk. There were days when the brevity of his activity was not as acute,
yet the rule was "many meetings with many people over a myriad of issues."
The University President's day might be something like this: 8:15
am - a business and finance committee meeting; 10:45 am - the processing
of the mail with assistants; 12:00 noon - Chamber of Commerce Luncheon
downtown; 2:00 pm - meeting with the Faculty Senate Chairman; 2:45 pm -
interview of a candidate for the directorship of the library; 3:15 pm -
meeting with Arts and Sciences Department Heads; 5:00 pm - meeting with
alumni-af fairs director; 7:30 pm - speech to a large local church group.
This kind of a day requires that the chief executive be prepared
to shift moods quickly and often. The salience of his activities are
varied and occur in no particular pattern. Because of these oft-required
shifts in mood, premium was placed on health and vigor with little tolerance
for fatigue or having an "off" day. The office staff was always aware of
how late the President had stayed up the night before or of how tired he
was and how that might effect his mood, his schedule, and therefore
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implicitly, his performance. There seemed to be a peaking sense of fatigue
and anxiety just before long trips and vacations and If a break didn’t
occur in the work load then, the strain was detrimental to the staff and
the President.
Carlson (1951) and Mintzberg (1973) both suggest that brevity,
variety and fragmentation are chosen characteristics of the executive’s
work day. The chief executive studied in this dissertation was protected
by his assistants and secretaries and there is no reason to believe that
this man did not delegate his work properly. By and large, this Uni-
versity President determined the duration of his activities and contacts,
terminated most of them dependent on his schedule, and frequently came
late and left early to attend yet another meeting. He could almost always
determine what interruptions he would acknowledge and what meetings he
would attend.
Mintzberg offers the best hypothesis as to why brevity, fragmenta-
tion and variety are "chosen":
To some extent, the manager tolerates interruption
because he does not want to discourage the flow of
current information. Furthermore, the manager may
become accustomed to the variety in his work. . .
he develops a sensitive appreciation for the oppor-
tunity cost of his own time - the benefits forgone
by doing one thing instead of another. Thus he
takes on much work because he realizes his own
worth to the organization. In addition he is aware
of the ever-present assortment of obligations associ-
ated with his job. . . in other words no matter what
he _is doing, the manager is plagued by what he might
do and what he must do (Mintzberg, 1973, p. 35).
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Relationship between Reflection and Action
In alignment with other managerial studies, this author found
that there was a strong preference for action on the part of the
manager. Reflection takes a "back seat" because of the oppressive
time constraints brought on by work overload. Thirty-one point seven
percent of the correspondence was in-depth reports concerning various
issues and units. In other words careful analysis was already done;
what remained was that it be digested and decisions be made according
to priorities and constraints. In addition, 27% of the formal meetings
held were with staff, administrative assistants, and vice presidents,
singly or collectively. From observation it was established that over
60% of the time was spent in briefing, strategizing
,
or formulating
I
positions to be taken.
In this case, reflection or in-depth analysis was done by vice
presidents, assistants, and subordinates. Prepared reports were reviewed
and rebutted at sometimes lengthy meetings and courses of action often
discussed. The subordinates were many times more knowledgeable in a given
area than the manager who had to make the decision (as was expected) .
These meetings were used to reach decisions that almost everyone could
live with given what was known concerning an issue or a given problem.
Because of the President's need to avoid wasting time, to partici-
pate only when the value of participation was tangible, and to avoid too
great an involvement with any one issue, there was a tendency toward
"having to mouth other people's words." Often there was no time to reflect
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or analyze every detail of a prepared speech or presentation. The
result was that the particulars and internal logic of a given argu-
ment may have indeed felt "foreign" to the President. Superficiality
is, no doubt, an occupational hazard of managerial work. In order to
become effective the university president must, in a sense, "become
proficient at his superficiality" (Mintzberg, 1973, p. 35).
tendency toward action could be seen in other ways. The
mail was considered a chore and many times only those pieces that required
action or response were dealt with, while informational mail got last
priority. In addition just as Mintzberg found, the results of this study
show a proclivity for instant communication, where "hot" information came
frequently by "informal" sources. Sometimes, given the urgency of particu-
lar issues, information which was second-hand was at times accepted in an
effort to reduce uncertainty and ambiguity.
It is easy to understand that in urgent circumstances, under pressure
for a decision without accurate information sources, why "gossip, specula-
tion and hearsay form an important part of a manager’s information diet"
(Mintzberg, 1973, p. 36).
Relationships to a Variety of Contacts
The President develops relationships with three main sets of people:
supervisors (the trustees or board), outsiders, and insiders (subordinates).
The chief executive links these groups in a variety of ways in order to guide
the institution. Past studies have tended to underestimate or neglect the
relationships between managers and outsiders (Mintzberg, 1973, p. 44).
Mintzberg found that 48% of the contacts of chief executives were with
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subordinates, 7% with superiors, and 44% were with outsiders (Mlntz-
berg, 1973, p. 45). In this study It was found that mall, telephone,
and face-to-face contacts over a period of approximately nine months
were somewhat different. Fifty percent of the University President's
contacts were with external people, 43% with subordinates, 4% with
superiors, with 3% personal or undetermined. This varied with the form
of the contact; the phone calls showed the highest number of contacts
with outsiders. Face-to-face contacts seemed to be preferred in the
President's relationships with the Board.
Average Number of Contacts with Three Main Constituents
Phone Mail Meetings Average Contact
Contacts with External 67.1% 42.7% 38.9% 49.5
Contacts with Superiors 3.1% 1.4% 5.7% 3.4
Contacts with Subordinates 20.3% 55.7% 50.4% 42.2
Contacts undetermined 5.3% - 1.2% 3.1
Contacts of Personal Nature 3.8% _ 3.5% 3.5
The highest number of contacts with subordinates come in the mail.
Twenty percent of all the President's mail was carbon copies or copies of
other people's correspondence marked "for your information" to keep him
abreast of issues. A large part of the President's face-to-face meetings
were with his subordinates as might be expected. (This figure does not
include the countless informal, one or two minute interactions with
assistants and staff in large group meetings or briefly with secretaries
at their desks.)
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What is perhaps more important than the proportions is the variety
of contacts with external people or groups. The President's office
corresponded with over 408 different individual organizations and with
over 700 individuals. To gain access to outside information a network
of "sensors" or information relays had to be developed. Trade organiza-
tions, consultants, government people, independents, and hosts of others
were in constant contact with the University President. Not all of these
outside contacts resulted in information-giving. Depending on his own
personal reputation and that of the organization, many times the President
was fed unsolicited information and ideas or asked to provide information.
Almost 2% of the mail consisted of questionnaires, two main sources of
which were other universities and the federal government. Four percent
of the mail dealt with providing or sending recommendations to other out-
side organizations, with over one-half of these requests coming from other
universities. Another 4% resulted from solicitations which required answers.
Job-seekers accounted for 57% of the solicitations. Because of this Presi-
dent s reputation, most of the advice given was to other universities and
colleges. All in all, the total amount of contacts specifically for
information or recommendations was 11% by mail and 19% by phone (see
information requests and recommendations, Charts II and III).
There is evidence that despite the wide variety of contacts and
average number of contacts with outsiders (49.5%) that much of a manager's
time is spent with subordinates and superiors. Over 50% of the face-to-face
contacts were with internal people: namely the Board and subordinates.
Mintzberg confirms that manager-subordinate relations take up the greatest
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amount of a manager's time (Mintzberg, 1973, p. 217). Mintzberg (1973)
and Sayles (1964) found that the manager's average contact with his
subordinates was shorter than his interactions with other groups, yet
he acted more frequently with them (Mintzberg, 1973, p. 47).
Subordinates placed a variety of demands upon the President
largely for authorizations, information, advice, and status requests;
while they sent to him a great amount of variety of information, through
reports, "instant communications", briefings, trade gossip, and carbons.
Subordinates used the phone to interact with the President less but when
they did it was to share information (see Chart III). In return the
President would forward information obtained from the outside and dele-
gate certain tasks to his subordinates
It has been stated in this paper that the university is much more
decentralized and "flat" in its organizational hierarchy than most other
organization (see Appendix A) . The phone calls show an extraordinary
number of interactions with individual faculty members, 39.5% followed by
23.4% with staff and 13.7% with the deans. The meeting frequences show
3
30.3% with administrative staff and assistants, 17.5% with the faculty,
16.7% with the vice presidents and 10.2% with the deans. The mail shows
31.4% with the vice presidents, 17.0% with faculty, 11.3% with the deans,
and 8.7% with assistants. It can be suggested from these figures that the
university is indeed a flat organization because the "top" of the organiza-
tion interacts more with the "bottom" (faculty) of the organization than
it does with the middle of the organization; the deans.
3This figure can be broken down even further:
127. of the President 's
meetings with faculty members were individual faculty
members, 2.77 with
individual governance group leaders, 1.5% with
governance bodies, and 1.37
with faculty groups. See Chart IV.
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This finding is somewhat mitigated by studies Mintzberg (1973)
and Carlson (1951) performed which show a tendency of executives to
by-pass formal lines of authority in order to satisfy the need for
clearer and quick information.
Use of Different Media
By now it is probably evident that different groups preferred
different media for contact with the President. Mintzberg found that
managers have an attraction for the verbal media (Mintzberg, 1973, p. 38),
because documentation requires the use of formal language and long feed-
back delays. Also "verbal messages can transmit, in addition to the
messages contained in the words used, information by voice inflection and
by delays in reaction. . . Face-to-face media carry information trans-
mitted by facial expression and by gesture" (Mintzberg, 1973, p. 38).
It is the position of this writer that while the University Presi-
dent does cement relations, mediate conflicts, and carry on operations,
it is the character of the issue and the groups involved that determine
the medium used. To illustrate this point the author compared certain
groups' use of different media. Consultants were high on face-to-face
interaction and used the mail very little. This is also true of the out-
side press and TV. Independent citizens almost exclusively used the media
of mail and phone calls since both media could be used anonymously.
Industry used all three media showing 7 . 1 / of the total mail contacts,
11.4% of the phone calls, and 7.2 % of the face-to-face meetings. Other
universities and colleges, while using the mail 11.1% and the phone 13.0%,
did not apparently want to give up the time, effort and cost of
face-to-face
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which were 4.4% of the total number of meetings the President held during
the year.
This would lead to the further hypothesis that the urgency and
salience of the issue or problem probably determine the type of medium
used. Much of what characterized the interactions between the President’s
office and other universities and colleges centered around information-
sharing concerning procedures and operations, recommendations for searches
and jobs, and general reports and advice about issues in higher education.
Those meetings that did occur focused on trying to solve a common problem
such as the State budget or discussing and confirming cooperating or con-
sortium agreements. Another example shows that consultants and media
people can only conduct their business on-site which might account for
their high face-to-face contact.
As will be described later, certain groups push for more verbal
face-to-face contact as the issue requiring contact comes to a "boiling"
point. Such was the case with the legislators around the ensuing problems
of budget appropriations and medical school admissions.
Balance between Rights and Duties
It is the position of this study that the university president's
role is long on duties and very short on rights. Many studies confirm that
the executive's role is characterized by reactive rather than proactive
behavior. Neustadt says,
A president's own use of his time, his allocation
of his personal attention, is governed by the
things he has to do from day to day: the speech
he has agreed to make, the fixed appointment he
cannot put off, the paper no one else can sign. . .
priorities are set not by the relative importance
of a task, but by the relative necessity for him
to do it. He deals first with the things that are
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required of him next (Neustadt, 1960, p. 155).
Mintzberg and Carlson also reinforce the concept that the mana-
ger's role is one where he spends most of his time reacting and not
initiating, planning or implementing. ^ One study showed that 32% of
the executive's verbal contacts and 26% of his mail contacts were
initiated by the executive himself (Mintzberg, 1973, p. 49). This
study showed that 24% of mail contact were initiated by the President
himself (see diagram #2, p. 78 ).
It was observed during this study that the University President
could make certain types of decisions such as initial commitments to
his own long term projects; choosing to join external boards of directors
or certain committees; or yet still more ironically, he could set up his
own networks for information. But once these choices were made, activi-
ties were more or less planned for him, making demands on his time and
energy. Once his information networks were set up he did not control the
day-to-day information flow and more often than not those external informa-
tion networks in times of crisis became "nets" of accountability.
The University President could be proactive at those functions or
in those activities that he had to engage in. Many functions that he attended
resulted in opportunities to collect information or to inject his ideas into
the picture, yet these chances do not compensate for the overwhelming pressures
^For a more complete explanation of the phenomenon see Patricia
Zigarmi, "The University President and Organizational Change: Case
Studies." Ed.D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts, 1974.
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brought out in reactive conditions. The expectations held from the
outside often made him responsible for the actions of those inside
the organization. Various outside groups and individuals caused the
office of president to be a centralizing agent or force in the uni-
versity. The external centralizing tendency of the public resulted
in an essentially reactive stance for the President because of the
decentralized, flat, internal authority structure.
Now that the contacts have been analyzed in terms of frequency,
flow, and form, some things must be said about the function of the
contacts: namely what were the demands contained in those contacts,
what acts were called for to respond to those demands?
Function of Process Level of Interaction
The academic year of 1972-73 was filled with many minor and
major issues for this University President. Those issues ranged from
presiding over the alumni-day banquet to testimony before the House
Finance Committee to explain what the University was doing to cut costs
and increase services. In many ways these two issues had a lot in common
despite their apparent differences. There were many other issues dealing
with faculty positions, salaries, and policies; student programs, dis-
satisfactions, and behaviors; and over -all University functions, needs,
and purposes that required presidential action. There were common actions
or roles the President performed throughout the year on various issues.
For example monitoring or auditing behavior could be seen throughout
the
resolution of many issues. Trading or negotiating behaviors
(establishing
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terms of future working conditions) were required on many different
issues
.
The President was required to perform certain acts, the accumula-
tion of which over a period of time can be seen as patterns of behavior
called activities or roles. For example, presiding over an alumni banquet,
testifying before the State Senate and conducting commencement exercises
all have something in common at the process level. It can be said that
the President was representing the University. He was acting in the role
of figurehead. The content or context of the behavior was different on
each of these three occasions yet a common thread running through all of
these acts was one of being a figurehead by formally representing the
university.
In the example of presiding over an alumni banquet the content and
context of the President's behavior was alumni centered while the process
or function he was serving for the University was that of figurehead or
representative. The work of Mintzberg and Sayles are drawn in the second
half of this chapter to depict the patterned activities or roles that were
observed during this study. The patterned behaviors or roles that were
observed by the researcher are best generally described by Mintzberg’
s
twelve roles, and at times more specifically depicted by the leader
behaviors offered by Sayles. Because some leader behaviors are more
prevalent than others and because certain constituent groups
required
only certain types of behaviors the discussion of these two
models will
be brief with more of an emphasis given to the Mintzberg
model. Once
the models have been set forth some examples will
be discussed to
75
particularize the models to the University setting and the University
President
.
The Leadership Behavior Models of Mintzberg and Sayles
From the onset it should be stressed that most studies of leader
behavior are essentially processes of categorizing. The very "phenomen-
ology" of experience would make any categorization of experience some-
what arbitrary since behavior has many levels. The somewhat arbitrary
partitioning of the manager's activities should only be judged in terms
of its usefulness.
Mintzberg Model
Mintzberg' s model is divided into three groups of behaviors - those
concerned primarily with interpersonal relationships; those that deal with
the transfer of information; and those that involve decision-making. These
three groups are further divided into the following ten roles.
Interpersonal Roles Figurehead, Leader, Liaison
Informational Roles Monitor, Disseminator, Spokesman
Decisional Roles Entrepreneur, Negotiator, Disturbance
Handler, Resource Allocator
Because he is the formal authority or head of the organization,
various issues from the outside and inside have a way of
turning up on
the president's desk. The figurehead role is the duty
of the manager
to represent his organization in all matters of
formality. As exemplified
for the university president this would mean
occasions like commencement,
alumni banquets, signatures on grants, contracts
and directives, and various
acknowledgements to donors and foundations.
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The liaison role results from the status of his office and
enables the manager to play a linking role. In the liaison role
the manager interacts with his peers and other people outside his
organization to gain favors and/or information. Often the chief
executive develops contacts in an informal setting that later may
lead to use of those contacts in the formal organization. Presidents
join external boards for contacts that will provide favors and in-
formation; in return they pledge their time and expertise. A network
of status contacts is built for information-sharing by joining boards
and performing public service work, attending conferences and social
events, and by answering simple requests that keep channels of com-
munication open (Mintzberg, 1973, p. 56).
The leader role denotes an executive role with his subordinates
which entails such behaviors as motivating, staffing, and so on. The
executive role is clearly among the most significant the manager per-
forms because it is present throughout all of his activities. Each
time he "encourages or criticizes a subordinate he is acting in his
capacity as leader. Most often, he does these things when he is
engaged in activities that have other basic purposes such as to trans-
mit information or to make strategic decisions" (Mintzberg, 1973, p. 61).
Some activities are considered primarily leadership roles:
staffing, hiring, training, judging, promoting, dismissing, innnovating
(starting new programs), and evaluating. The purpose of the leader's
role in these activities is to effect an integration between individual
needs and organizational goals. Also in this role what "position power
the executive has is clearly manifested.
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The interpersonal roles of figurehead, liaison, and leader
place him in a unique position to receive information which result
in three informational roles. The first is the monitoring role by
which the manager receives and collects information enabling him
to gain a clear understanding of his organization. Analysis of the
mail easily shows that the University President receives information
concerning internal operations and external events, through general
reports and, reference data and pressures through reports on opera-
tions concerning what his organization is doing or should be doing.
With this vast amount of data coming in, information overload
often results. Too much information that can't be digested because
it takes too much time to process and leads to a need for a certain
kind of information. Time and critical decisions necessitate informa-
tion which is current and oftentimes undocumented and transmitted by
word of mouth. Also executives in these circumstances will bypass
accepted channels to get the information they need.
The information that the manager gets is transferred in four
ways which are described by Mintzberg (1973, p. 78) (see diagram //l)
.
This study found that the University President did pass information on
to subordinates in the environment and vice versa (as well, information
was passed from subordinate to subordinate and from environment group
to environment group). In this study approximately 5,770 pieces of
mail were analyzed in nine categories to further document the flow of
information. A nine-way flow of information was conceptualized; pro-
portions for each category were then estimated and illustrated in
Diagram #2.
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DIAGRAM //I
DIAGRAM #2
TO
Outsider
FROM
Insider
Outsider Insider President
37 88 1468
.6% 1.5% 25.4%
1 2 3
232 823 1402
4.0% 14.3% 24.2 %
4 5 6
702 675 343
12.0% 11.7% 5.9%
7 8 9
President
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Category nine contained "aide memories" and student contacts that
were not labeled internal or external. Categories 1
, 2 , 4 and 5 usually
were carbon copies of letters for the President’s information only.
The President would integrate information to develop value posi-
tions for his organization, to solve problems, to gain opportunities and
make decisions that directed the organization in certain ways. While
interpersonal roles were to ensure that information was provided,
informational roles tie managerial work together (Mintzberg, 1973,
p. 71). The two means used to give information are the spokesman role
to the outsiders and disseminator role to insiders.
The disseminator role results, Mintzberg says, in the executive
giving external information to his organization and transferring internal
information from one unit to another (Mintzberg, 1973, p. 71). The
information that is transferred is of two types - factual and value
information. It is the value information, the statements about what
should or ought to be, statements that are neither true nor false, that
apply subtle pressures on the President’s role performance. It shall
be later discussed in greater detail how the value positions of these
groups which seek some control in the process of university decision-
making can be the source of much of the conflict and ambiguity contained
in the job of university president.
The spokesman role results in information being transferred to
external groups on behalf of the organization. The chief executive
keeps two groups of influencers informed: namely, the boards and middle
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management of externally-relevant public and trade organizations such
as governmental agencies, the press, prospective clients, etc. The
manager keeps these two groups informed about the organization's plans,
policies and operating results. This role results in demands on the
University President's time, to make speeches, attend meetings, bene-
fits, and outside ceremonies.
The most important set of managerial activities, according to
Mintzberg, is the decisional roles of entrepreneur, disturbance
handler, resource allocator and negotiator.
One clear conclusion emerges from my study: the
manager takes full charge of his organization's
strategy-making system. To use other words, the
manager is substantially involved in every sig-
nificant decision made by his organization. This
is so because 1) as the formal authority the
manager is the only one allowed to commit this
organization to new and important courses of
action; 2) as the center the manager can best
ensure that significant decisions reflect current
knowledge and organizational values; and 3)
strategic decisions can most easily be integrated
by having one man control all of them (Mintzberg,
1973, p. 77).
In this study things were not quite that clear. Mintzberg almost
gives the impression that the system is leader-dominated which not always
is the case, especially in university systems. Many times it is true
that while the University President did have substantial involvement he
was not able to influence the process as he wanted to. Many times the
President could initiate change in the university but could not implement
it or follow through (Zigarmi, 1974).
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The role of entrepreneur begins with the monitoring role, the
manager’s role of scanning the organization for needs, opportunities,
and problems. The manager then functions as an initiator and designer
of important controlled changes in his organization by delegation,
authorization, and supervision. These changes, Mintzberg says, take
place in the form of improvement projects, many of which are super-
vised directly by the manager and all of which come under his control
in one way or another.
Aside from a team-building or executive training program and an
administrative reorganization not many changes were under the President's
control. In this study many of the major system-relevant issues required
a reactive stand because of the constraints of the office and the forma-
tion of the problem. Long range planning, promotions, the internal
budget process, the external state allocations, affirmative action pro-
grams, and upcoming union negotiations all required more trading and
bargaining behaviors and less directive and supervisory behaviors on
the part of the manager. In times of retraction because of financial
difficulties the University President lost even more of the little control
he had and became less of a resource allocator and more of a disturbance
handler and negotiator.
The resource allocation role is that of making choices involving
system resources such as money, time, manpower, materials and reputation.
The University studied had an operating total expenditures and appropria-
tions budget of approximately $57 million, counting its professional
School of Medicine. Less than 2% of that 57 million was under direct
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control of the President. The rest was either directly specified by
the state as to the purposes the money could be used for, directly
accounted for through bonds, tenure agreements, notes, or interest
on loans to be paid. Most of the budget had to be negotiated with
a maze of faculty committees and administrators having legitimate
reasons for how money should be allocated. In the last three years
the University expenditures exceeded income by $1.4 million, $.6
million and $1.5 million respectively, because of inflation, enroll-
ment trends, and reduced federal funding. Because state laws require
balanced budgets these deficits were made up by borrowing from endow-
ments which mandate repayment.
Because of these deficits the University President found himself
asking subordinates to cut spending by 3% in 1972-73 and 6 / in the
next two years. Instead of allocating resources he was asking sub-
ordinates to do without. The author realizes that resources were
allocated even if limited. The point is that resources were not allo-
cated with the "control" depicted by Mintzberg but under enormous
political pressures and anxieties. These kinds of "decisions" can
result in incremental strangulation, mediocrity, and poor organiza-
tional climate to say nothing of the reactive stance the constraints
of a situation such as this mandate.
The University President in this study was seen more as a nego-
tiator because of circumstances already mentioned. It suffices to say
that many of the year’s activities centered around money and finances.
The executive of this study spent a bulk of his time with external state
budget appropriations, internal budget allocations, and explaining to
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the University's various publics, foundations, and governmental agencies
what the University could do in exchange for money. Negotiations of
course did take place around issues other than budget such as increasing
the number of in-state students accepted into the medical school yet
part of what was at stake even in this case was legislative support for
a biennium budget increase.
The role of disturbance handler did crop up during the year, notably
around the issues of gay liberation, fire regulations, and affirmative
action. Many small disturbances were also dealt with, from comforting
a dismissed employee within a subunit, to accounting to a chagrined public
when a dean, trying to be congruent with his values of "people's" libera-
tion brought his four month old baby to the office twice a week.
All of these disturbances had the quality of being unforeseen,
partly beyond the manager's control, and always requiring immediate atten-
tion.
These ten roles are in some ways arbitrarily divided yet together
they form a gestalt, a whole which gives some picture of the job of a
university president. These behaviors have many levels, they involute,
build upon each other, and have cycles. Mintzberg's work does not how-
ever always show some of the subtleties. It is here that Sayles' work
augments what has been said to more fully explain some of the actions or
roles of the President that he was "asked" to perform.
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The Sayles Model
The strongest aspect of Sayles' work is that rather than putting
labels on a collectivity of observed behaviors such as figurehead role
or disturbance handler, he speaks of the leader's actions in terms of
relationships or in terms of the types of behaviors used. Sayles
describes three main divisions in managerial behavior. They are the
participation in work-flow relationships, the manager-leader relation-
ship, and the manager in monitoring relationships.
The gross quantitative dimensions of a given managerial position
already mentioned in this study, such as average number of contacts with
this or that group or a description of the form in which the contacts
come, do not really describe in behavioral terms the human relations
processes that make up the organization. Sayles' model tries to depict
in behavioral terms those categories already substantiated through the
examples and frequencies presented thus far in this chapter.
Since there is much overlap with what has already been said, some
of the Sayles model will not be fully presented. Only those behaviors
which have consequence for Chapter IV and V will be fully explained in
order to formulate a rich contextual background for what is the focus
of this study: conflict and ambiguity in the President's job.
As has been said, Sayles divides the manager's job into three basic
activities: work flow activities, leader, and monitoring
activities.
Within these there are subcategories of activities. The
monitoring
activities are much the same as what Mintzberg has
discussed. Sayles
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however does distinguish a number of interrelated steps or stages in
the monitoring activity that have not been fully discussed thus far.
Those stages are:
1) Methods of detecting disturbances in the
work system in which the manager participates.
2) Development of criteria for evaluating the
significance of disturbances that are detected.
3) Patterns of corrective action to be applied
and the assessment of their effect.
4) Detection of continuing resistant sources
of disturbance in the work system and their
analysis
.
5) Formulation of strategies of organizational
or structural change to cope with these.
6) Implementation and validation of these struc-
tural modifications (Sayles, 1964, pp. 53-54).
It can be seen that Sayles is much more inclusive of those behaviors
subsumed under the role of monitor than what has been previously mentioned.
There were instances during the year when the University President mani-
fested each and every one of these behaviors. These activities were carried
on and demonstrated in the culminating act of an administrative reorganiza-
tion involving approximately ten upper echelon positions.
These monitoring behaviors were manifested in various issues; and
different mechanisms were used depending upon the information needed. The
President used different monitoring processes when scanning the external
environment then he did when looking at subordinate work flow. The process
of scanning the environment will be discussed in greater length in the next
chapter
.
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Another set of activities Sayles discusses is that of trading
relationships. Trading relationships fall under the role of negotia-
tor, entrepreneur, or liaison as previously explained. The author
feels that trading relationships should be clearly delineated because
this behavior seemed very prevalent throughout the year with various
external groups and helps explain some of the inherent conflict con-
tained in the President’s position.
Trading relationships mean those activities concerned with the
terms by which some future relation is established (Sayles, 1964, p. 60).
Because organizations are not static but are involved in an input-
transformation-output process the manager must at times expand the number
of internal "customers" for the work the organization performs, expand
the number of "buyers" of the service the organization produces, or
"buy" the resources needed to carry on the work process.
In higher education the university president is always involved
with the recruitment of students and faculty and the acquisition of
research grants or contracts with various groups for which services will
be rendered. The president is responsible or accountable for the fulfill-
ment of those trading obligations, especially if he initiates the rela-
tionships through justification of existing services or the readjustment
of a previously established contracts.
Potential "buyers" and "sellers" seek to identify interests by
which the negotiation of acceptable terms of trade can result. There is
a wide variety of terms of trade to negotiate: what, when, how and for
how much, the work will be performed (Sayles, 1964, p. 61). The initial
stages of trading have their roots in the information flow and in contacts
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developed over time.
The early steps may require delicate probing. The "seller"
may encounter indifference, rebuffs or a "let me see you prove it"
attitude on the part of the buyer (Sayles, 1964, p. 62). Somehow
it must be communicated to the buyer that the work will be successful
and enhance the buyer’s prestige in association with it (Sayles, 1964,
p. 62). Also the work must seem feasible, reasonably predictable in
scope, complexity, and completion time, and without a doubt, in the
resource capability of the seller (Sayles, 1964, p. 62).
The later stages of trading find the "customer" spending more
time with the "vendor" in order to understand possible defects, limita-
tions and uncertainties that may arise (Sayles, 1964, p. 63). These
investigatory contacts should also result "in the implicit understanding
that the vendor will gain something extra in the way of improved know-how,
some technical breakthrough, the opportunity to secure work for his people
that they are anxious to do, over and above the ’price’ he receives.
Skilled vendors insist on this extra margin to improve the overall posi-
tion of their groups. . . and the buyer must recognize that need (Sayles,
1964, p. 63).
To recapp, the three sequential stages of the trading relationship
are: 1) the "missionary" work or search activity involving widely dis-
persed contacts to seek various "buyers and sellers"; 2) the confirmation
of the actual terms of the trade contract; and 3) the exchange by the
parties involved of rather than full information about their respective
needs and capacities (Sayles, 1964, p. 65). The third stage enables both
parties to ant icipate problems and make intelligent decisions when
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unexpected problems arise beyond the scope of the original agreement
(Sayles, 1964, p. 65).
It should be said that trading can be a matter of reciprocating
some function or activity or both; and it does not always have to involve
establishing a "service" relationship. As a rule trading relationships
are short-lived.
It can also be seen that trading can lead to politics. Parson’s
model, in which non-profit organizations must gain support for their
functions at the institutional and managerial levels, in some ways hinges
on the "trading" capacity of the institution's function or "product". It
may indeed rankle the heart of the true academician to view behaviors such
as teaching, research, and community service in this way, yet if the ex-
pectations held from the outside are such and outsiders operate on those
perceptions, some consideration of those perceptions are in order.
There is no doubt that external groups view the university as a
service institution; that its purpose is to return functions to the
support source. The purely aesthetic purpose to produce knowledge for
the sake of producing knowledge, to understand phenomenon without the
possibility of use is not what the "public" is paying for. The next
chapter on the environment will show specifically which external groups
viewed the university as a service institution. Examples shall be given
to corroborate the propositions that much of the President’s activity
with outside groups had its roots in trading or service relationships
and that the expectations these groups held for the university president
as a boundary person were often incompatible with expectations internal
groups held for his role performance.
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There is more to the Sayles model than just the behaviors in-
cluded in the categories of "monitor" and "work flow" activities which
include trading and service activities, as well as advising relation-
ships, auditing, stabilizing and innovating relationships. The third
category, that a leader, is very similar to those behaviors already
mentioned in the discussion of Mintzberg's work.
The fact that Mintzberg and Sayles overlap, involute and dove-
tail, shows to some degree the arbitrariness of any division of behavior.
When the university president says to his assistant, "I want you to help
me prepare my testimony to the House Business and Finance Committee so
please get the necessary budget figures to prepare our case", many roles
are being fulfilled. The president is at the same time a monitor in
obtaining information; a leader, in that he sets a model that the sub-
ordinate might later follow; and he is performing the initial steps to
prepare himself for being a figurehead and performing a spokesman role.
Yet there are times when he is fulfilling one role, more than the
other, for example when he is attending commencement, starting a new
program or actually testifying before the House. As has been stated,
to get at the multi-dimensional aspect of phenomena broken down into
possible components is contingent on purpose. The purpose here is to
denote some of the pressures and demands on the office of the university
president. To portray those demands we have examined the communication
flow which shows individual acts of the focal person. These individual
acts were analyzed in terms of frequencies and functions which can depict
a sense of acts over time, better called activities or roles.
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The president s roles such as monitor, disseminator, spokes-
man, negotiator, disturbance handler, liaison figurehead, etc. became
evident through analysis as did the quantity of the President's inter-
actions, the pace of the work flow, the pattern of his contacts, and
his use of different media.
Summary
In summary, this chapter has presented an analysis of presi-
dential interaction by form, frequency, flow and function - for the
purpose of showing the process level pressures contained in the uni-
versity president's job. Other managerial studies were used to place
the statistical analysis of this study in perspective with other mana-
gerial positions in other organizations.
It was asserted that some activities are more prevalent than
others and that groups in the organizational environment held certain
views which necessitate these prevalent activities. It now remains to
be shown through what specific issues these views are reflected, which
mandate certain action and reactions. And it also remains to be shown
what the president's role was in dealing with those specific issues.
CHAPTER I V
THE ENVIRONMENT
What was going on outside the University in 1972-73? How did
the President know what was going on outside? What specific outside
pressures were brought to bear on the President and who were the groups
that manifested those pressures? Around what issues were those pres-
sures reflected? Did the "environment” in any way limit managerial
autonomy?
This chapter examines the scanning behavior that made the
President cognizant of what was going on outside the University. The
chapter will also discuss what the environment looked like as a result
of scanning; what groups leveled what specific pressures at the Presi-
dent’s office around which specific issues; and the conclusions that
can be drawn from the President's interaction with the environment.
Most of the information received by the University President
as well as contacts made, resulted from the organization, with the
President as its recognized head, trying to carry on the input-
transformation-output cycle, trying to fulfill the goals and functions
the University is expected to accomplish. Just as there are expecta-
tions inside a university for what the president should do (internal
role expectations) there are also external role expectations for his
role or job. External expectations for the president's role are
intricately interwoven with expectations held for the university's
purpose.
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People outside the university hold expectations for what the
university’s function should be. The specific categories of exchange,
i.e. products or services, vary from one type of organization to
another, but in each case the exchange rests upon prior consensus
regarding purpose. There is a set of expectations held by members
inside the organization and by those outside, about what the organiza-
tion will or will not do. In order for exchange (input-transformation-
output) to take place over the environment /organization interface,
those people outside must have some expectations, some role for the
organization to play, or some need to be met by the services or product
yielded by the organization. Because there are those expectations, an
organization can carry on its function. It can be said to have an
"organizational role set."
As has been stated much of the President's day, his time, contacts,
correspondence, and thoughts are used to form, enhance, adjust, and clarify
the University's role set to external and internal constraints, though not
so much the latter. Many external contacts are the result of expectations
being held and not being met. Some contacts are the result of satisfaction
and are therefore congratulatory and praising. Sometimes expectations can
be negotiated such as a city governmental unit wanting a training program
or the university vying for a governmental grant.
In order to make decisions, both of routine, operational value and
of a strategic nature, information about expectations must be
obtained.
The chief executive must understand what and whose expectations
will be
met by certain actions, and what and whose expectations
will not be met.
He must know where there is room for negotiation.
The process of obtaining
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information on which to base strategy and action is called scanning
behavior
.
There is very little literature concerned with scanning behavior 1
and none could be found in the context of higher education. Much of
what shall follow will be tentative in the sense that it was true for
one university president. Any attempt to generalize beyond one case
would be hypothetical or speculative.
Scanning Behavior
The information the university president receives is always much
less than what he wants and sometimes more or less than what he needs.
Time is a crucial factor in the process of getting information and using
it for strategy and action. In the office studied there were systematic
attempts to formalize scanning activities in order to keep abreast of
political, economic, social, and technological developments which might
directly or indirectly affect the University's operations.
The difficulties in trying to keep abreast of all those areas and
using them for strategy-making are enormous. Part of the difficulty
comes from the dimensions of the task of strategy-formulation; some of
the difficulty comes from the limitations of human beings as agencies
for data collection, and some from the problems of data—transmitting
and data-interpretation.
If indeed there is a "receptor mechanism" in organizations, in
the final analysis it is people. Sources for external information
include
iThe only two works concerning scanning behavior to be found
were
Aquilar (1967) and Aserios (1971). Both dealt with scanning
the business
environment
.
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people both outside and inside the organization. In fact a majority of
information concerning specific external issues in this case was gained
from internal sources. If a leader gets only certain incomplete informa-
tion, if he only gets hazy, sporadic, piecemeal information, it may not
just be because the information "in reality" is incomplete, hazy, or
piecemeal. If the leader gets poor information from the "sensors" of
his organization, it could be 1) because the leader doesn't give enough
time or emphasis to the quality of information, thereby setting norms
concerning the degree of sensitivity and completeness for the information
he receives; 2) because his "sensors" are not sensitive enough or dis-
criminating enough to pick up information needed, or 3) because the
"sensors" may not make the right choices about what information is valuable
or important enough to be forwarded through the ladder of communication to
the President.
Compounding the problems of scanning with "sensors" is the fact
that the sources of potential data that could be used are many; therefore
the factor of appropriate choice is crucial. The information that could
and should be used for strategy and action is almost limitless. Scanning
requires the tapping of many sources of information often without order
and completeness and is many times constrained by the time it takes to
obtain and process the information. Add to this list of difficulties,
the rapid rate in which the information changes and the fact that some
information can not be gotten because the information needed is strategic
to the "opponent’s" position and it is easy to understand the
myriad of
problems in the scanning process.
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Furthermore, Aquilar wrote that scanning must move farther and
farther away from the organization's immediate surroundings to a search
for basic trends. In other words the emphasis in scanning behavior needs
to shift from immediate areas in which the organization competes to the
industry as a whole and thence to the collective general economic, tech-
nological, political, and social sphere. Each outward step multiplies
the number of salient considerations and also the volume to be considered
(Aquilar, 1967, p. 9). Each outward step also introduces increasingly
tenuous relationships (Aquilar, 1967, p. 9) and complicates the organiza-
tional leader ' s scanning role.
Something should be said about how the President looked for informa-
tion. Aquilar refers to the process of the executive looking for informa-
tion as "modes of viewing" (Aquilar, 1967
,
p. 17). There are four modes
of viewing. They are:
1) undirected viewing which is general exposure to
information with no purpose in mind to use the
information. An example of undirected viewing
would be reading a newspaper.
2) conditioned viewing which is directed exposure
to a specific content area with no purpose in
mind. An example of conditioned viewing would
be listening to a report being given by the
Vice President for Business and Finance on the
financial status of the organization or going
to a Chamber of Commerce luncheon and listening
to the business gossip.
3) informal search which is a relatively limited
effort to obtain more information through in-
formal procedures. An example of informal
search would be going to an event with the
expectation of learning about some undefined
information that would have some bearing on a
particular problem.
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A) formal search which is a conserted effort to
obtain specific information. An example of
formal search would be a report from a sub-
ordinate on the latest federal grant guide-
lines in a particular area (Aquilar, 1967.
P. 17).
All four types of viewing were used by the University President in
this study. Many times choices were made to go to some meeting or other
with the hope that some information could be gained. Often the President
attended a social event with the hope that without really consciously
searching for information, that what he learned might be stored to be
retrieved and used at a later date. It has been said in Chapter III
that the interpersonal roles of figurehead, leader, and liaison performed
by the University President give him excellent opportunities to obtain
some information that bears on the institution’s operations.
For the purposes of this study, the means used by the University
President to obtain information were categorized in four ways.
verbal
unsolicited - i.e. chance encounters, conferences,
visual presentations
solicited - i.e. consultants, other associations,
Outsiders
unsolicited
written
i.e. newspapers, trade journals,
publications, carbon copies
solicited - i.e. regular and general reports and
copies F.Y.I.2
2f.y.i. means for your information.
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unsolicited - i. e
. gossip and "instant" communication
verbal
solicited i.e. verbal reports of meetings, observed
presentations and scheduled meetingsInsiders
unsolicited i.e. general reports, carbons, F.Y.I.'s
written
solicited i.e. scheduled status reports such as
annual reports
The category of "solicited" is self-explanatory. The term
"unsolicited" requires further clarification. Unsolicited would mean
that someone either felt that the information would be important to
the President and therefore "sent" it to him or that some individual
directed information toward the President with the hopes of getting
corrective action, some information, or satisfaction in return. Un-
solicited could also include written sources such as publications and
newspapers. In either case the President had little control to vary
the means of acquiring information from unsolicited sources since he
could not change what was published in journals, newspapers, and reports
nor could he set standards for the "for your information" carbons that
crossed his desk. Examples of unsolicited information would include
the independent outsider who compliments or complains about some facet
of the organization or an educational association which sends some
report or guidelines for policy-making without a request from the
President
.
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The President received two types of information from people
internal to the organization. He received information about the
organization such as cost reports and information about operation
and policy; he also received information from his subordinates about
the environment and its changes. Because units were specialized into
functions like public relations, academic affairs, metropolitan affairs,
and business and finance, the information solicited and unsolicited
was narrowly grouped into areas. The information was specific, unit-
oriented in terms of the unit's specialty, and often concerned with
an immediate issue of operation.
The information received from the outside was concerned more with
the environment and its changes. For example, it included information
on changing federal grant guidelines, information on affirmative action
policies from an educational association, and letters from independent
citizens writing to compliment or complain. Although there was no
official count made, it is judged that external contacts resulted in
more unsolicited information about the environment while the internal
contacts resulted in more solicited information about internal opera-
tions and the environment.
In each case, whether from an internal or external source, the
information that was received was specific, issue-oriented and emphasized
the reporting unit's point of view. Even newspapers and journals con-
tained reports which were limited in scope, time, and analysis. Because
information that came in was specific and issue-oriented, it was incre-
mental. By that it was meant that a wholistic picture of the environment
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had to be pieced together and that data had to be synthesized and inter-
preted in a time span that was appropriate to allow for effective action.
Since role ambiguity is a direct result of the disparity between
the information available to a person and that which is required for
adequate performance of his role, it is easily seen how and why the
ambiguity that is part of the university president's very existence,
is so great. Much of the solicited and unsolicited information the
university receives about its environment, however complete or incom-
plete, converges on his office: it is his task to integrate, synthesize,
and formulate an estimate of existing circumstances and possible courses
of action for the institution in light of those circumstances.
Throughout the year in which this study took place, there were
many issues that were going on simultaneously or that overlapped. In
most cases information was needed before these issues could be acted
upon or resolved. Because information sometimes could only be obtained
in small, specific, incremental pieces, many issues were prolonged, and
resolution delayed. Ambiguity was therefore not only great, but constant
over time.
One further point should be made concerning information in incre-
mental form. Often it could be said that the University President was
in danger of information overload. Overload is the condition that results
when too much information is received, in too short a space of time to be
effectively processed and used to make a decision. Information that
reached the President's desk, especially from his assistants and vice
presidents, often was not analyzed in terms of the total picture, nor
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in terms of the President’s more up-to-date information. Information
provided him therefore required integration and synthesis. If time
to make that integration was cut short because of the urgency of the
issue, the pressure associated with adequate job performance increased.
The President did not always experience ambiguity or overload.
The process of obtaining information was determined by many factors.
Scanning depended upon external environmental conditions, the particular
issue the information was needed for, the time needed to process the
information, the accuracy of the source of information, and the history
of the issue up to date.
ib is impossible to talk about how much time the University Presi-
dent spent in scanning because almost every interaction and contact
resulted in some small bit of information about the environment. Talking
to a vice president about a promotion for a faculty member often resulted
in a discussion of what other universities do in a similar situation and
in an exchange of environmentally-relevant information. In other cases,
formal search procedures were used (see Aquilar above)
.
One formal procedure was to have the Public Information Office
read and clip local and national newspapers for articles that mentioned
the University’s name or were of major concern to the field of higher
education and to submit those clippings to the President's office for
him to skim. The President would also scan the local papers and trade
papers such as the Chronicle of Higher Education .
Another formal scanning behavior on the part of the University
President was to periodically request subunits whose principle activities
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were boundary-spanning in nature to submit reports of their activities
and possible new trends in their fields. This was particularly important
m the area of enrollments and recruiting since enrollments were down all
over the country during the academic year of 1972-73. Subunits such as
alumni affairs, development, research and public relations were constantly
being asked to provide information bearing on the environment.
Two other formal scanning behaviors observed during the course of
this study were 1) the contracting of consultants to report on develop-
ments in higher education at the state and national levels, and 2) the
President s participation on national commissions. For example his choice
to serve on a Panel for Alternative Education might have been prompted by
his need to know more about new models of undergraduate and graduate
education.
One last formal scanning behavior on the part of the University
President was that of making speeches to outside groups in which the last
portion of his talk was devoted to questions from the audience. This
resulted in his gaining awareness of the major concerns on the minds of
the people outside the University other than what was reflected through
the mail.
Information concerning the environment was received from every major
group that the President interacted with (see Charts II, III and IV in
Chapter III), either directly through solicitation or indirectly through
interaction. Formal scanning of the environment resulted from a specific
need to know information about specific issues. In addition, the President
himself was constantly trying to be a "bell weather" for his institution
on changing environmental conditions. He was constantly trying to
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reconstruct the environment from the personal interactions he had with
persons outside the university and from the information contained in
reports, journals, newspapers and letters he received. From these
sources he would try to synthesize and assess "environmental conditions"
and their implications for his actions.
In sum, the scanning behavior of the University President might
be described at times as both deliberate and random, specific and
general, formal and informal, although, for the most part, his scanning
seemed to be connected with specific issues which had some common threads
running through them. There seemed to be five major problems or concerns
at the heart of most of the President’s contacts through his mail, phone
calls, and meetings.
Major Issues of the Academic Year 1972-1973
These issues were identified because more than one external group
showed concern by directing specific information and expectations "toward"
the President’s office. Often these five issues were interrelated. Some-
times one external group showed high concern and involvement in the resolu-
tion of all five issues. All the external groups showed some signs of
trying to influence, in one way or another, the outcome of these issues
by promising support or withdrawal of support if certain actions were taken.
The five problems that were found to be most significant in the
year during which this study was conducted were:
1) Problems related £o budget and costs . Federal spending and
priorities were changing which resulted in cutbacks in funding for higher
education. The State subsidy was not enough to match cost of living or
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inflationary increases. Enrollments were falling off and tuition fees
could not be raised. Costs for fuel, lights, paper, and maintenance
were rising and faculty members wanted a salary increase to at least
match the cost of living increase. In order to balance the budget it
seemed as if the University would have to draw on its endowment funds.
Relationships with internal and external groups had to be carried on
against a backdrop of cutbacks and deficit spending.
2) Problems related to affirmative action . The recruitment and
minorities and women in the University’s work force was a
major concern in boundary spanning activities during 1972-73. Specific
concerns in the area of promotions, job classification, grievance pro-
cedures, salary equity, maternity leave, child care, and admissions to
professional schools were the subject of communications with outside
groups. Affirmative action concerns touched the faculty, students,
administrative staff, and non-academic staff. Specifically, minorities
were being admitted with special needs and concerns, that the University
system had not traditionally accomodated. There were pressures to increase
the number of minorities and women in key administrative and faculty
positions, admit more blacks and women into medical and law school, and
to provide blacks with more financial aid, remedial programs and Third
World courses.
3) Problems related to public services . It would seem logical that
external groups would be concerned with the University’s commitment to
public service. There were communications concerning the dropping of
programs, the starting of new programs, the negotiation of training
programs, cooperation with other schools to provide joint services, and
cultural programs. There were pressures from various groups directed
toward the cost-efficiency and accountability of existing programs.
External groups' demands were manifested and felt specifically in the
areas of continuing education, night school, athletic programs, coopera-
tive programs, and in the area of federal and city training programs.
4) Problems related to enrollment and admissions to Professional
Schools
. Enrollments were tapering off in higher educational institu-
tions because of the expiration of the draft and because employment was
no longer assured through a college education. Hence, prospective
students were seeking alternatives. In addition the baby boom had
passed and the applicant pool was levelling off. Rising tuition costs
also contributed to a decline in enrollment. Open access was now empha-
sized in the State: any student who wanted to go to college theoretically
could do so. The shift from a meritocratic to an egalitarian institution
taxed the University in new ways. Problems of recruitment and accomoda-
tion resulted. There was, however, an unprecedented number of applicants
to medical and law schools; as many as 250 applicants for one opening.
The demand to accept those who had "pull" was great.
5) Problems related with moral or quasi-legal concerns . The issue
of the in-state residency criterion was in question. The House bill which
set up punishments for student rioters was passed, and the question of how
lawful was homosexuality came up during 1972-73. Issues of sex and drugs,
of getting black students to stand for the national anthem, and of safety
and security standards in the dormitory halls are other examples of problems
the University President faced. Research ethics regarding the use of human
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subjects, students' use of profanity on the radio, and the issue of a
dean bringing his four month old baby to work with him caused mail and
phone calls to be levelled at the President's office with very explicit
demands from external groups.
The five major problem areas were manifested in the communications
the University President had with external groups. Each external group
that he interacted with had its own idiosyncratic viewpoint, with its own
subtle trade-offs as the President chose one course of action over another.
These problems or issues were always on-going. They had only brief
incremental explanations and never any lasting resolutions. Wherever the
President made speeches, attended luncheons and banquets, or went to
meetings, he was faced with discussion and explanation of these problem
areas. His phone calls and mail reflected external groups' concerns with
these problems. There also was demands from internal groups and individuals
concerning these issues. How the President dealt with these problems deter-
mined the support he received from both internal and external groups and
ultimately the course of action the University would take.
In order to fully describe the complexity and conflicting demands
that converged on the President's office there must be an explanation of
which specific groups actually made their demands known and what the implica-
tions of those demands were for the President and the institution. There
were 21 groups (see Chart II, Chapter III, p. 55) reflected in the mail
that conveyed certain demands, shared information, and required appropriate
action on the part of the President. The mail (supplemented at times with
interviews and observation notes), since it reflects the greatest range of
external pressures on the President and on the University, will be used as
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the basis for explanation of external demands.
External Groups and Demands
The order of discussion will be in order of frequency of inter-
action by mail (Chart II, p. 55). Since the mail contains the greatest
number of contacts, 5,770 total contacts, in contrast to 1,231 total
phone calls and 1,177 total number of meetings, and since the contents
of phone calls and meetings were not always known, written documents are
the more easily used to obtain a general sense of what groups and what
demands the President was being exposed to. A brief general sketch of
each group’s demands will be presented as well as the range of organiza-
tions or individuals contained within each group in cases where a group's
demands were articulated by several organizations and individuals.
Other Universities and Colleges
The University studied was one of twelve state assisted universi-
ties in the state. There was an inter-university council made up of the
presidents of these twelve institutions. During the hearings on the
passage of the biennium budget the council had agreed to share informa-
tion and to lobby together for an increase in higher education appropri-
ations. Many of the general reports (20% of the mail between other
universities and colleges) had to do with reports on legislators and
on the implications of projected budget figures for each university.
There was also a tremendous amount of information seeking and
sharing by other universities and colleges around new programs and posi-
tions. An estimated 72 higher educational institutions were in contact
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with the President 1) asking information on what his institution was
doing in areas of program evaluation, metropolitan affairs, continuing
education and co-op programs, and 2) asking for recommendations to search
committees for presidents, deans, and provosts. There was a tremendous
amount of "trade talk" exchanged. Ten percent of the mail with other
universities and colleges centered around seeking and gaining advice;
10% concerned acknowledgements for favors or information exchanged; 17%
concerned recommendations; general reports comprised 23%. Formal question-
naires represented 5% of the President’s correspondence with other colleges
and universities.
Much of the mail initiated by the President was concerned with the
formation of cooperative consortia, information on cooperative programs,
and critical analyses of the Regents’ state budget proposals. Eleven
percent of the mail with other universities and colleges was initiated
by the President.
The mail did contain some overt pressures, such as one president
trying to get more of his undergraduates accepted into the University’s
Medical School, demands by other presidents to get the chief executive to
pressure a specific recalcitrant Regent to appropriate new money, a warning
that there would be problems with a possible AAUP — State Faculty Senate
coalition, and an attempt by one president to seek consensus and coopera-
tion on a proposal that would force students to sign a contractual agreement
with the University upon entering, in which the student could be held liable
for creating a disturbance. Two other problems that surfaced centered around
pressure to disclose faculty salaries and the territoriality of continuing
education programs.
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Much of the interaction between the President and other college,
and universities (55%) occurred between the President and the twelve
institutions of the Inter-University Council. It tended to be on-going,
and was somewhat informal as evidenced by hand-written notes. The
remaining 45% of his correspondence with other colleges and universities
was with institutions all around the country. For the most part these
were formal requests that required sporadic correspondence.
Other universities and colleges, on the whole, were formally co-
operative, sharing information readily, although not so much resources
or time. Most of the contacts were by mail; most organizations were
supportive and understanding of the financial squeeze that all institu-
tions of higher education seemed to be facing. Cooperation was tenuous
at best between the twelve state institutions. Each was trying to get
its piece of the pie without cutting into each other’s domain.
Historically, institutions of higher education have been competi-
tive captains in a sea of plentiful governmental, state and local resources
but this is not the case in the 1970's. Independence may change to inter-
dependence, competition to cooperation, as scarce and limited resources
become crucial.
Students
Student contacts came essentially through the mail and meetings.
The President often held ’’open hours” when anyone could come in and talk
with him about any problem or concern he had. Most of those who came were
students. The President also taught a course for honor students entitled
Sociology of the University . These two kinds of meetings accounted for
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most of the student verbal contact time with the President. The student
governance leaders also had easy access to and were in constant contact
with the President. The President interacted with over one hundred in-
dividual students in conjunction with various issues.
Acknowledgements of awards, elections, and various accomplishments
by students accounted for 11% of the mail between students and the Presi-
dent. Twenty-five percent of the mail resulted in students asking the
President to provide more financial aid, to keep the ombudsman position,
to untangle record foul-ups, to free students from dormitory contracts,
to drop the intercollegiate football program, to put a graduate student
representative on the Board, and to give evening college students more
representation and facilities.
The President initiated 23% of the the mail with students and
student groups. His contacts with students were concerned with appeals
to the University Judicial Council, retention of a law school professor,
writing recommendations for students, the ombudsman position, better
financial aid, and the clarification of the in-state classification of
students for fee purposes. Others concerned complaints of poor teaching
and a proposed counseling system.
Problems that specifically resulted in concerted pressure and demands
were focused around the closing of a home economics program, an art history
program, and a textile course. As well, the President was pressured by
students to install more security phones across the campus, to make more
financial aid available, and to appoint a student representative on the
Board. A large bulk of time and energy was spent on black demands that the
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University be more responsive to Third World needs. A task force was
appointed to respond to and resolve thirty-three specific demands and
grievances brought by black students to the President's office during
open hours. The demands covered such points as more black faculty and
administrators, more financial aid, more coverage of black events in
the University press, more emphasis and recognition of black student
programs, and more programs designed to aid blacks to stay in college
once they have been admitted.
Hodgkinson says that his findings show that pressures to accomo-
date minorities will be forthcoming in many institutions of higher
education because "the admission of new kinds of students to higher
education has not been matched by development of programs designed
specifically to meet their needs" (Hodgkinson, 1971, p. 222).
There were only two observed attempts by students to ask the
President to take a stand on national issues. One occurred during open
hours when a student group tried to pressure the University President to
mandate that the food services support the Chavez lettuce boycott. The
other incident involved a student group asking the President to take a
formal stand on the Viet Nam war.
The vast majority of demands manifested by students were practically,
domestically, or locally-oriented issues that required immediate but short
term attention. Students were primarily concerned with issues of programs
and courses, with services and costs and secondarily with issues of repre-
sentation and student rights.
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Independents
Independents were usually private citizens, not representing
any institution or organization. In general they were more interested
in the quality of instruction than the quality of research, the notable
exception being that some independents were concerned with the ethics
of research in the use of human subjects. Independents were constantly
concerned with the institution's image. Most of the complaining and
displeasure was concerned with the "extrinsic" characteristics of the
University's services.
The independents seemed concerned with the questions of sex and
drugs, maintaining football, a dean that brought his child to work, and
with blacks "getting everything." They were also concerned with tuition
costs, the cutting of programs, security and safety in dormitories and
admission, but, less so, than with the other issues identified above.
A good public image for the University meant higher enrollments,
increased alumni giving, a political base for legislative support, and
the ease of decision-making that comes with public goodwill, credit, and
understanding. The correspondence was scrupulously answered with care
not to alienate or displease. Concerted efforts were made to explain all
decision, and to appease all dissatisfactions.
^Prestige or image is based on extrinsic and intrinsic aspects of
the product or service (Perrow, 1961, p. 338). For example, the intrin-
sic aspect of an automobile would be its durability and efficiency while
the extrinsic characteristics might be its desirability as a status symbol
Both extrinsic and intrinsic characteristics are valuable in a tight
competitive market, yet the extrinsic characteristics which do not relate
directly to the quality of service are the only aspects of the University
independents seemed to complain about.
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Twenty-five percent of all correspondence with this group involved
complaints and compliments. The compliments were acknowledged (14%) and
complaints were explained or appeased. Complaints focused around poor
parking facilities, record foul-ups, tuition costs, drugs, sex, commence-
ment ceremonies, profanity, black demands, and the dropping of programs.
The compliments focused mainly on faculty performance and service to non-
profit organizations. The President received letters both praising and
complaining in an approximately 40/60% ratio respectively yet because the
spectrum of complaints were wider, they seemed more numerous.
Thirty percent of the mail with independents required action: there
were requests to attend to record foul-ups, for confirmation of admittance
to graduate school, for explanation of program cuts and requests for informa-
tion on programs and policies. Some letters asked how independents could be
of help to the University.
Direct problems and pressures from this group were the highest of any
group except alumni. Independents pressured the President to retain the
intercollegiate football program, to influence admissions to medical school,
to retain certain academic programs, and to institute a child care center.
They also wanted action to force blacks to stand when the national anthem
was played at public events. They wanted students to adhere to standards
of morality and complained about security in dormitory halls.
The independents were constantly bringing up issues of accountability
and efficiency. They showed concern that faculty were not teaching and
spending more and more time with personal pursuits. They wanted adminis-
trators to show more force in running the institution. They did not like
faculty to be anti-business and socialistic. They held the administration
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accountable for faculty and student behavior.
The tone of most of the letters from Independents that were com-
plaints or that required a response was one of demanding accountability:
what was the President going to do about the Issue that concerned them?
Some letters were unsigned; similarly some of the phone calls were anony-
mous. These anonymous contacts were at times belligerent, caustic, and
personally accusatory towards the President. It can be suggested that
there was a direct Increase in mall and phone calls with an Increase in
the amount of publicity the University received or the amount of exposure
the President received.
Industry
This group had a wide variety of contacts with the University Presi-
dent. There were at least seventy-six separate organizations that inter-
acted with the President's office, and they were more organizationally
astute. Industry's correspondence with the President shows candor and
consideration yet was articulate enough to make its demands clear. This
group s feedback to the President as to how the organization was viewed
in the business community left room for explanations and at the same time
required accountability. The utmost courtesy and protocol was observed
at all times as evidenced by the single largest type of contacts between
the President and this group, namely acknowledgements (22%).
The President received a great many requests for speeches or public
appearances. These requests accounted for almost 20% of the mail contacts
with industrial-business groups. When the President did make a speech,
discussion almost always centered on issues of cost, programs, and admissions.
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Industry seemed extremely sensitive to the trade-offs that could
involved in its interactions with the University. The University
was the second largest employer in the city spending over $9 million
each year. Where the University did its banking, investing, and Insurance
business was always a sore point with the many banks and insurance agen-
cies in the city. The President would intermittently receive offers and
pressures to change the accounts to other firms.
The University was consciously considered to be a resource by
industry. The business community used the University as a lure to draw
talented young executives and technicians to the city by promising that
they could further their education at the University and thereby add to
their chances of promotion. Also their wives and children could get the
education they needed at the University. Industry also made use of the
technical expertise in several University departments, for example,
Chemistry and Engineering.
Not only was the University used as a drawing card by industry for
its employees, it was also used to draw other industry into the city.
The National Institute for Occupational Health and Safety and the Environ-
ment Protection Agency were two other organizations that came to the city
partly because of the research capacity and resources at the University.
These organizations brought more federal jobs and money into the area.
Much of the direct feedback and contact that did not focus on
acknowledgements or invitations was concerned with the cutback in programs,
in night courses, with changes in cooperative work/study programs without
notification, with lobbying for applicants to medical school, and with
recommendations for the appointment of a faculty member or dean.
115
It should be stressed that many of the subtle pressures that this
group applied would not come in written form to the President but through
his meetings, by phone, or indirectly through corporate giving and support
for athletics. If the public image of the University was poor or being
tarnished by bad publicity, a negative reaction from the business com-
munity could be expected
.
Through dialogue the researcher had with some members of business
and industrial groups, it was found that their criticism of the University
was not specific. This group frequently cited that the University adminis-
tration did not care about athletics and could not be trusted to keep pro-
grams if the going got tough, and that the administration was weak and
could not exercise its authority to stop rising costs or to increase
productivity.
The University stood to lose much by not meeting the expectations
of industry. Sixty-nine percent of all private giving resulted from
corporate giving. The University was proud of its private giving record.
It was in the top ten in the nation and second in the State. In addition,
if the University was to branch out into the continuing education field to
widen its student pool and income from tuition, employers in corporations
needed to be convinced that the University was a credible institution.
This would take the cooperation of leaders in business and industry.
Historically, most of the industry in the city has been individually
owned although this condition is changing and giving way to corporate
ownership. Industry, because of its private ownership, has carried the
brunt of financial giving but as this has begun to change more responsibility
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is falling on community organizations. Industry now "coordinates" the
activities of fund-raising through the Chamber of Commerce. For
example, the University's fund-raising efforts have to be timed with
other charity and fund-raising drives such as the United Appeal Campaign.
Finally, there is a strong leaning toward voluntarism in the city as
evidenced by a large number of influential civic organizations and
general public support of cultural institutions (art, music and theater),
charity organizations and social welfare associations on which the
University depends.
In sum, the "economics" of the University was the most important
concern of industrial and business organizations in their relationships
with the University. The University was treated according to its services
and image, its costs versus its returns to the community. These kinds of
economic concerns were also prevalent in the legislative and state agency
group.
Legislative and State Agencies
This group includes the House and State Senate, the Governor, and
agencies such as the state employment agency, state environmental pro-
tection agency, the state auditor's office, the civil rights commission,
and the Governor's business and economic council among others. The
President interacted with approximately 62 separate organizations or
individuals in this group.
The year during which this study occurred was particularly hectic
and required constant interaction between the President and
the State
because of deliberations on the biennium budget appropriation
for higher
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education. In addition, the membership of the House and Senate changed
as a result of the November, 1972, elections which caused the President
to have to interact with many young new Republican legislators who were
unfamiliar with the University's problems or case. The Democratic
Governor’s proposed budget was less than what was needed, not providing
for increased expenditures in some areas. It was seen as a cost-reducing
budget designed to keep public spending down. If there was to be an
increase in higher education appropriations, delicate negotiations and
lobbying with Republican legislators who did not want to be seen as
spendors, would be required. Other areas in the budget such as Welfare
and health appropriations would have to be adjusted.
Protocol was high in the interactions between the President and
legislative groups as evidenced by the number of acknowledgements: 16%
of the mail and frequent contacts by telephone for this purpose. Face-to-
face meetings between this group and the President usually resulted because
of unresolved issues. For example, the President was asked to testify
before the Senate and House Appropriations Committees. The general reports
and technical figures needed to study and plan for the implications of
State appropriations on the University resulted in 25% of the mail contacts
between this group and the President's office.
Most of the mail that the President initiated with this group was in
efforts to increase the State subsidy or to ask United States Senators and
Representatives to lobby for bills that were being deliberated at the
national level to influence the awarding of research contracts from HEW.
An example would be the bill for the education of the handicapped that
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would result in a loss of $26 million for the Office of Education and
consequently a loss in government research contracts for the University.
Other examples include the President sending complimentary football and
basketball tickets to representatives of this group and his response to
a manpower report from the Department of Economic Development.
Contact from State legislators required Presidential actions in
matters which included the recruitment of minorities, the replacement
of a representative to a state PPBS task force, medical school admissions,
and faculty teaching time.
The legislature had control of tuition hikes and of pay raises for
civil service employees. The Governor and the legislature had approved
a 5% pay increase for State employees but because the University was part
private and part public,^ the University has to absorb a majority of the
costs. Legislators were more or less in agreement that there would be no
tuition increases during 1972-73. A subsidy increase or a revision in the
subsidy formula were the only ways the University could bring in new funds
to balance the rising costs of academic programs.
The University had to increase State appropriations and because this
need was apparent, legislators were in a position to "push" for their con-
cerns. Black legislators wanted help for black businesses, more blacks in
professional schools, and more responsiveness to their minority constitu-
encies. Legislators in general wanted more accountability and demonstra-
tions of cost effectiveness as well as increase in productivity in the
Shis will be explained at length in Chapter V.
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University. There was a bill that eventually got defeated which would
have required faculty to put in a set number of hours of teaching and
counseling with students per week.
The situation was compounded because the University was seeking
special appropriations for its Medical School which had expanded through
a federal building grant. The University did not, however, have enough
money to hire the new faculty required by the expansion. It will be
seen in the next chapter how the special medical appropriations from the
State cost the University some internal control and autonomy.
The Board of Regents
The Board of Regents technically was supposed to be the bargaining
and planning agent for the 12 state universities as well as for the two-
year and community college systems in the state. This was somewhat diffi-
cult because individual university needs were not "coordinated." To make
things more difficult, the Regents had an acting Chancellor. While the
search was on for another Chancellor, the Regents essentially lacked the
power to create the groundswell of public opinion that was required to
pressure the legislators to change the appropriations to higher education.
Universities could create this groundswell through their alumni much more
effectively.
In an interview with the Governor's assistant on Higher Education
it was revealed that the Governor did not think enough planning was going
on in higher education. The Regents had not taken into consideration the
change in local and state needs. The Governor felt that faculties were
not "pulling their load" and that universities were not being
responsive
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to changing job markets. Lack of planning had resulted in unused dormi-
tory and physical plant spaces. The Regents had not been anything but a
rubber stamp for the large universities.
The Governor circumvented the Regents when he appointed a task
force to study the problems in higher education, when he tried to get
nine student and faculty representatives on university boards, and when
he backed the proposal to give more financial aid directly to the students
and not to universities. The Governor wanted some tension and dialogue
around the planning and purposes of higher educational institutions as
a platform for his ideas and proposals.
Apart from putting a freeze on further construction, the Regents
could do little except fulfill formal administrative duties such as
requesting enrollment figures, prescribing guidelines for submitting
budgets, and sending out information about budget appropriations.
Forty-five percent of the mail contacts between the Regents and
the President were general reports, agendas for meetings, and guidelines
for budget and operating procedures. Thirteen percent of the mail con-
tacts were concerned with setting policies: for out-of-state student
residency requirements, faculty service, subsidy increases for the two-
year colleges, and with providing information about collective bargaining.
Ten percent of the mail contacts were requests by the Regents to the
President to provide them with information concerning committee repre-
sentation, enrollment statistics, meetings and schedules.
Fourteen percent of the mail was initiated by the President in
order 1) to present his rationale for a special appropriation
for the
Medical School, 2) to seek approval for technical programs, 3) to
seek
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a planning grant for a continuing education proposal, and 4) to answer
charges that the University was "log-rolling" vis-^-vis other uni-
versities in requesting appropriations.
During 1972-1973 the University began to lobby for its own
case independent of the other universities. In an effort to get money
for its Medical School and an increase in State subsidy, the President
launched a program in which alumni would contact congressmen on behalf
of the University. The President tried to get press coverage to plead
his case. He also invited legislators for breakfasts in order to get
the opportunity to forcefully present his case to legislators from
neighboring districts which the University served the most.
However, the Regents were supposed to perform a centralizing and
coordinating function for the universities' lobbying efforts. The Regents
felt that the case for twelve universities was stronger if done together,
therefore there were strong pressures for conformity. When the President
lobbied for special appropriations for the Medical School he was accused
of "budget busting tactics that would destroy the Regents' student based
formula for distributing available funds equitably among all universities"
(Akron Beacon Journal, 4/20/73).
Specific pressures and problems that can be identified focused
around accusations of log-rolling tactics by the Regents; requests to
submit records of faculty time spent in teaching, research, and counseling;
a request for measures to be taken to improve management practices; and
Regent pressures to admit students to the Medical School.
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In summary, between the Regents, the Governor, and the Individual
legislators, the President had his work cut out for him in order to get
an increase in subsidy money and to get the special appropriations needed
for the Medical School expansion. Communication was predicated on poli-
tical and organizational trade-offs: each group trying to get something
in return for actions taken.
Non-Profit Organizations
This group included organizations such as the Chamber of Commerce,
Community Chest, Red Cross, Art Museum, the Playhouse in the Park, Kiwanis
Clubs, and the Junior League of Women in the city. The demands placed on
the President and upon the institution were requests to give time, money,
or expertise to certain charitable causes. Fifty percent of the mail con-
tacts were requests for the President to take part in meetings, to be on
boards (or to appoint a delegate)
,
to endorse a public statement showing
his support, or to actually conduct a campaign on behalf of a charitable
cause. Fourteen percent of the mail contacts were acknowledgements of
work that the President had done or that others in the University had done
for non-profit organizations or answers by the President saying he could
not do what was asked.
He also received reports about how the institution or parts of the
institution were perceived by various non-profit organizations. Ten percent
of the mail was in the form of reports on operations. The problems that
arose from this group concerned the discontinuance of programs, parking,
and record foul-ups.
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Most of the demands from this group taxed the President's and
the University’s resources for charitable donations, in the form of
time, money and expertise, with the notable exception of the Chamber
of Commerce. When the President spoke to these organizations he found
that they were concerned with many of the same things that independents
had on their minds: questions of student morals, faculty accountability,
education for jobs, future costs of education, faculty tenure, and
affirmative action.
In sum, although non-profit organizations could be good for public
image, the production of "ground swell", and information contacts, there
was always some kind of exchange. There were two or three requests per
month from a charity organization requesting aid from the University in
some form or another.
Federal Government and Departments
The impact of the Nixon administration on universities has been
pervasive because it represented a change in priorities that placed higher
education in the unaccustomed position of "oddman out." In the past, money
had literally been there any time universities wanted it. During the 60 's
money was easy to get but this has not been the case in the 70 's. The
President's interactions with governmental agencies reflect this trend.
The President interacted with approximately twenty-two different federal
agencies such as HEW, The Fund for Post-Secondary Education, the National
Institute for Health, the Equal Opportunities Commission, the Department
of the Interior, the Department of the Army and Navy, and others.
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Most of the mail was comprised of general and specific reports,
49% describing changes in agency policies and cut-backs. The govern-
ment applied very few overt pressures of any kind except as it required
compliance with affirmative action procedures. The pressures were
covert in that they were based on the absence of support for all
institutions of higher education.
Most of the meetings and phone calls the President had with this
group concerned ongoing contracts or programs with separate agencies.
The University was involved with a degree granting program with the
Department of Labor personnel. Also the President invited the Deputy
Director of the National Science Foundation (an alumnus of the University)
and the Assistant Director of the Fund for Post-Secondary Education to
speak to the top administrators of the University. On both occasions
federal priorities as represented by both agencies were articulated. For
example, administrators were told at one seminar that National Science
Foundation grants in the future would focus more on applied research and
the use of knowledge to solve some of the nation's social problems. The
National Science Foundation Deputy Director also felt that education should
be uncoupled from research .
The federal priorities that were brought to bear on the University
during 1972-73 included:
- Decentralizing government to regional, state and local levels
in both decision-making and spending of public funds.
- Consolidating, integrating and eliminating federal government
agencies, and cutting "red tape", while upgrading the quality
of people in government, especially top management.
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- Reducing federal taxes or at least holding the line and making
some adjustments in the tax structure.
- Developing more effective cost-benefit criteria for federal
programs and an increased sense at the local level of account-
ability for the expenditure of public funds.
- Reducing the federal budget and cutting federal spending, for
example, by withholding funds appropriated by Congress and by
delaying the implementation of new programs.
These priorities were reflected in various ways in the University.
The President knew that revenue sharing would necessitate closer work with
the state and local governments. NIH and capitation grants would stop as
of 1975 which meant a loss to the University of $3.5 million in federal
funding. A phasing out of traditional student aid programs with an enact-
ment of a program which provides money directly to the student brings market
mechanisms into play at institutions of higher education that are not
meeting consumer needs in that it forces institutions to woo students on
the basis of the schools' program offerings.
Dependence on federal funds is covert in its influence on the uni-
versity because it doesn't lead to the university developing its own
priorities and iong range planning. As patterns of federal funding change
with the expediency of political pressures, the institution tends to try
to keep up, tends to try to keep attracting federal dollars by shifting
priorities to respond to the shift in federal spending.
The effects of the federal grant on universities during the 40' s,
50's
,
and 60's are discussed in Appendix A. In the 70's, the vacuum left
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by the disappearance of most federal money added to the budget crunch
that all institutions of higher education were experiencing.
The only direct pressure the University felt from the federal
government was Executive Order 11246 which in effect said that no
higher educational institution receiving federal money through federal
contracts could discriminate "against any employee or applicant for
employment because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin"
and that the institution "will take affirmative action to ensure that
minority and female applicants are employed" (H.E.W. Higher Education
Guidelines, 1972). Also employees must be treated during employment
without regard to these factors. If a contractor does not comply with
the Executive Order, all federal contracts with that institution may
be cancelled, terminated or suspended in whole or in part and the con-
tractor may be declared ineligible for further government contracts"
(H.E.W. Higher Education Guidelines, 1972). Compliance with this order
was easier said than done. It required a management information system
and staff assistance to say the least, as well as time to change profes-
sional, faculty attitudes and norms that had had decades to form.
The President appointed a knowledgable person to lead the institu-
tion in compliance with this order and the task was just under way at the
time of this study. There is no question that this order caused direct
pressure to be brought to bear on the University. The University had no
real choice but to allocate money, time, and personnel to this task. It
is a clear example of institutional and managerial autonomy being influenced
by direct environmental pressures. The entire "pattern" of hiring practices
in the University is likely to be changed as a result of this pressure.
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Not enough time had elapsed during the course of this study to
significantly assess the impact of this external pressure on the role
of the University President. There is no doubt however, in the re-
searcher s mind, that before compliance will be accomplished, there
will be direct and conflicting pressures focused around the President's
office.
Educational Associations
This group was comprised of approximately thirty-eight organiza-
tions, divided into two distinct types: accrediting associations and
lobbying-information sharing associations. Each type interacted with
the President through different communication forms and held different
expectations for his role performance.
The lobbying-information type organizations such as the American
Council on Education, the American Association of Colleges and others,
did not apply any "real" pressures on the President except in soliciting
his cooperation in support of information sharing and occasionally by
offering him the opportunity to serve on a national panel. In return
for a membership fee these associations sent the University (the President)
information about the state of higher education, the national "picture",
and governmental priorities. This type of organization communicated mostly
by mail and 32 % of that mail was written reports about affirmative action
guidelines, national priorities, and new funding possibilities. Twenty-five
percent of the mail were invitations to serve on panels and requests to
the
President to share information about how the discontinuation of
certain
federal programs and grants would effect his institution.
These organiza-
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tions tried to coordinate and coalesce higher educational inatitutions
to fight across-the-board program cuts at the federal level.
The accrediting associations interacted more with the President
on a face-to-face basis and used the mail only to coordinate and set up
meeting times for the most part. The pressures inherent in this type
of organization are based on the University's need to substantiate the
quality of its services. When the client using the service is not
really qualified to judge the service, yet the institution has a need
to enhance its image, claims to quality can be made through qualified
validating groups who have appropriate experience and resources to
attest to the service's worth (Perrow, 1961, p. 337).
In the case of an accrediting agency the implications are clear for
the President. If the accrediting agency's visit confirms the product's
worth than the visit is mostly protocol. If, on the other hand, the school
being evaluated is in danger of non-accreditation, then the meeting takes
on the aura of a doctor telling the patient he is sick and here is what he
must do to remedy the situation.
In times of budget stringency there is a temptation for adminis-
trators to make the "easy" decision of cutting money cross the board from
all programs and schools rather than trying to evaluate the strong programs
and schools and to maintain their quality at the expense of "weaker" programs.
What results from these types of decisions is mediocrity across the board
and crucial visits from accrediting agencies. When the accrediting team,
made up of professionals in the field they are evaluating, come in to tell
the President that one of his money-making schools is on the verge of not
getting accreditation unless certain steps are taken that usually require
129
the allocation of money and resources, it is easy to see the conflict-
ridden dilemma the President experiences. This was the experience of
the President studied on at least one occasion with the College of
Education.
Job Seekers
This group does not have much leverage and, although treated
courteously, was not given much attention. Sixty percent of the con-
tacts with this group through the mail were concerned with looking for
job openings. Twenty-two percent of the mail was reference data in the
form of vitas. Usually after contact by mail, those who were in the
running for an open position would call or come to the University for
an interview. Over 60% of all contacts with job seekers were from
people randomly writing institutions with the hope of finding an opening.
During the year there were very few openings. This group brought no
real pressure to bear on the President except that it increased his
paperwork.
Alumni
The key factors that lay at the bottom of most of the President's
contacts with this group were money and image. The University needed a
favorable image in order to encourage alumni-giving. Since alumni tend
not to visit the institution through alumni functions (58% had never been
to an alumni function in a survey taken by the alumni office), the image
they have of their institution is formed by media, sports events, and word
of mouth.
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Much of the mail received by the President from alumni was in
response to newspaper articles. Most of the problems and pressures
(25/6) received through the mail focused on the maintenance of an inter-
collegiate football program that the University was thinking of dropping
because of its cost. In most cases the alumni would threaten not to give
money if the program was dropped. Other displeasures voiced by alumni
were around giving minorities "everything they wanted", academic programs
that might be cut, and in one case objection to the possibility of R.O.T.C.
being cut. There were also some letters concerning blacks not standing
when the national anthem was played; other letters concerned the morals
of students.
Phone contacts with alumni were rare with most communications
coming through the mail and alumni club and association meetings at
which the President would make formal speeches. The development offices
after contact with alumni would ask for the President's time and commit-
ment for fund-raising purposes. In an alumni poll it was found that 15 /
of the responding alumni would come to hear the President speak, 13 / to
hear a distinguished faculty, 67% to hear a distinguished alumnus, 43% to
hear another top administrative officer, 31% to hear a student, and 25%
to hear a coach.
The upper middle economic class of alumni would be more inclined
to give after personal attention from the President. Donating alumni set
standards for the President's personal behavior as his image was closely
linked with the University. When the researcher would interview
alumni
at official alumni gatherings it was found that their view
of the President
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varied according to the alumni 's age and view of what the function of
the University should be. This can be confirmed by Spaeth and Greeley,
1970.
After interviewing staff members (7) in the Development Office
who were concerned in one way or another with alumni-giving
,
they all
confirmed that the President's personal presence at alumni meetings
resulted in more alumni energy, enthusiasm and concern for the Uni-
versity and its future than most other speakers that the Development
Office could provide. The President's personal touch on the acknowledge-
ment of gifts, invitations and contact with influential alumni and the
President's conformity with the alumni 's idea of a discrete, conservative,
punctual gentleman would assure steady alumni-giving. The mail and inter-
views with alumni and development people did however show a split in the
type of alumnus attitude. Recent alumni after 1961 showed less commitment
to their University and more commitment to specific colleges, which resulted
in less overall giving, more tolerance of extrinsic image issues, and more
concern for the cost, efficiency, and quality of education.
The total giving rate of alumni amounted to 18% of the private funds
giving that the University received. The national average was 22%. The
University has approximately 70,000 alumni with 50,000 in the State and
local area. Over 22,000 have graduated since 1961. Of that group of recent
alumni only 15% have given gifts to the University. Recent alumni who have
given have clearly specified to what college or department their gift was
to go to whereas older alumni more often give unrestricted funds.
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Most development people felt that the impersonal nature of the
University caused by its large size and complexity, was not gaining
the allegiance that had been built when the University was smaller.
Recent graduates are more concerned with the quality of teaching rather
than with the quality of research, more oriented toward the possibility
of new academic programs rather than toward the continuation of non-
academic athletic programs, and more with the intrinsic value of a
liberal arts education rather than to the projected image the President
sets for the University, which may or may not be an accurate representa-
tion of educational quality.
These differences between the preferences and values of older and
more recent graduates have left the President in the middle. The old and
more recent alumni require programs of different types. Instead of just
building alumni programs around athletic events (homecoming, alumni week-
ends, etc.) more of an effort has to be taken to do something for recent
alumni to gain their commitment and involvement. Often the President
found it difficult to authorize one type of program at the expense of
another in a time of scarce resources. The football program was an
example of the conflict and ambiguity experienced by the President con-
cerning his relations with the alumni group. It created ambiguity
because if the University decided to drop the intercollegiate football
program there was no way of assessing the impact that would have on
alumni giving since students, faculty, and alumni were divided and
lobbying for both positions.
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In sum, the alumni required both the President’s time and his
ability to fit an image of what the old alumni wanted and to provide
the quality services the young alumni were asking for before they
would show allegiance to the large complex organization that they
once were a part of.
Donors
The group called donors should also be included, to a degree, in
what has been said about alumni. The mail the President received showed
that most of the concerns manifested by alumni were also manifested by
donors. Concern for programs being dropped or mistreated, football, and
the moral behavior of students can be seen in the content of the mail the
President exchanged with this group. Forty-four percent of the mail with
this group was in the form of an acknowledgement from the President to a
donor for a gift, a birth, sickness, or death.
The difference between this group and alumni is that more time and
concerted effort was spent by the President and the Development Office to
maintain contact with potentially large donors. Image and status were the
precious commodities of exchange and if large gifts were given, many times
annual reports were made to the donors on the University's growth and on
the use of the money given.
It should be said that interactions between the President and
prominent donors and alumni were often enjoyable social interactions.
Many of the donors were public figures who did much for the institutions
of the city. This description of soliciting funds is not meant to imply
any insincerity or non-authenticity on the part of university personnel.
The negotiations for private giving require delicate probing and under-
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standing with the possible result of mutual benefit for all concerned.
Media
The media can make the President's life miserable or it can be a
tool which he can effectively wield to aid his institution. The media
is the medium in which all organizations transport their ideas through-
out the total environmental system. Media is the main vehicle by which
most people, outside and inside the University, were informed of decisions
and actions that were taken by groups and individuals inside and outside
the University. This transportation system of ideas could be used to
sound the alarm if the University was in financial trouble or it could
be the vehicle through which the University's prestige and image could
be built or destroyed.
As the President once wrote, "The media, particularly T.V., makes
the academic cloister a global village in a goldfish bowl. By focusing
on the lurid or the superficial, the media can disrupt a president's
proper activities, while contributing nothing to the advancement of know-
ledge" (Bennis, 1973, p. 44).
The media took up much of the President's time - 9.6% of his
meetings, 7.3% of his phone calls (usually either to set up appointments
or to request information), and 3.3% of his mail contacts were with the
media. Mail contacts were mostly status or information requests or
confirmation of scheduled appointments. The media had a preference for
verbal contacts which might be accounted for because of the "temporary"
nature of the information they handled.
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Much of the mail that was not information requests or confirmation
of appointments (35%), was acknowledgements (22%) or mail initiated by
the President to correct misinformation in stories that had been printed.
In one instance budget figures were printed that were totally incorrect
and misleading. Misrepresentation was the President's nightmare. It
could create a flood of calls and letters which took many manhours to
straighten out and still the image remained tarnished in the minds of
many community people.
The kinds of pressures the press represented for the President were
concerned with demanding a clear and articulate expression of the Univer-
sity s position on various issues. How could the President accentuate the
positive while forthrightly and diplomatically acknowledging the negative
aspects of a given issue? How could the President get the media to repre-
sent the heart of the matter and not to become fixed on largely peripheral
points or often quoted comments?
A clear presentation of an issue was often difficult because the
situation was complex and because information was not always available,
or it was incomplete. Reporters at times were ignorant of the subtleties
of the issues they were describing, or if they understood the nuances,
they could not take the space needed to explain them. Because problem
description always preceded suggested solutions, more often than not an
image-wrecking dilemma was printed without sufficient follow-up on a
constructive resolution.
There were opportunities for some columnists to make value judge-
ments based on their own biased frame of reference that in turn brought
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pressure to bear on the President. For example, when the University
was considering dropping football a sports writer for one of the city
newspapers blasted the administration with a headline, "University of
Cincinnati Athletics: Does Anybody Really Care" (Cincinnati Enquirer,
February 11, 1973). This article appeared at a time in which the
University community was polarized around budget constraints and
academic program cuts which made the consideration of the football
issue even more volatile. Faculty and students were squarely divided
on the issue of the continuance of the football program and many people
did care. Many people did care about athletics but in the framework of
declining enrollments, inflation, and reduction of academic programs,
felt that the intercollegiate athletic program should be cut first.
The total picture of constraints and pressures operating on the University
around this issue was not presented in media accounts of decision-making.
The President got reasonable treatment by the media for the most
part and was able to use it to promote the image of the University by
making the financial dilemma known to citizens in the State. If people
did care about their higher educational institutions they were told they
could give money or contact their congressman. The media is a double-
edged sword however, ready to make news out of any issue - news that could
either be destructive or constructive to the institution's image. In
this case, because the University was a public institution, it was even
more visible and vulnerable to media pressures.
City Groups
This group contains twenty or so individual departments including
the city solicitor, the city council, the city manager, the parks and
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recreation commission and the city police. The University was at one
time solely supported by a city tax levy. The University still receives
3.2% of its operating costs from the city. The amount has stayed con-
stant over the years while inflation and operating costs have risen
making the city’s contribution to the University diminish in significance.
The city also contracted the city hospital to the University for operation
in conjunction with its Medical School. During the year this study was
conducted that contract was renegotiated.
Most of the mail between the President and city groups, aside from
acknowledgements (22%), was in the form of status reports and requests
(24%). Those status reports concerned the hospital contract, the con-
tinuation of existing programs, and the addition of new programs. During
this year the University decided not to give partial tuition waivers to
city employees because of the financial bind the University was in. The
city government, needless to say, was not happy with that decision.
The President, when he took office two years before, had pledged
to make the University a truly urban university, "the university should
be, along with City Hall, the command post of all the operations to
reclaim, renew, rebuild, revitalize the city. . .this will mean more
adult education and greater emphasis on education at mid-career. It
will mean devising new degree programs to meet changing needs. . ."
(Bennis, 1972, p. 23).
Because of this commitment the President has husbanded two training
programs with city organizations: the city police and the city managers.
Much of the contact with city groups was concerned with the initiation and
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maintenance of programs with these two groups. The hospital contract
and programs for city police and city managers account for a large part
of the meeting time, calls, and mail between the President and city
groups. The subtle pressures experienced by the President from this
group will be depicted in detail in the next chapter.
Friends
This group really applied no^ pressures that were of any signifi-
cance. Most mail and phone calls were of a personal nature, conveying
information about subjects not necessarily related to higher education.
Ninety-seven percent of the mail contacts were acknowledgements sent by
bo the President concerning awards, book reviews, and personal matters.
Occasionally a friend would ask for a recommendation or seek to set up a
dinner. Most of the contact from this group functioned as a brief respite
to other activities in the President’s day. It is also possible that
friendship contacts in some cases may have, resulted in eventual business
contacts
.
Associations
This group was comprised of approximately twenty-three separate
organizations and included associations such as the International
Association of Applied Social Science, the Ohio Academy of Family Physi-
cians, the Blind Veterans Association, the World Health Organization,
the Black Medical Association of Michigan and others. All of this group
had as its purpose the maintenance of a profession or some kind of exper-
tise. These associations served a particular small segment of people not
necessarily connected to the academic community.
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Most of the contact with this group was by mail (2.5%), none by
face-to-face meetings, and 1.3% by phone. Most of the mail was seeking
membership or recommendations for nominees for membership or for elec-
tion to office.
There were some pressures from the medial association on behalf
of existing programs or for starting a new program. There was some help
offered by a few associations to pressure legislators for a subsidy
increase. There were also some invitations to attend banquets or make
speeches. For the most part there were no "real" demands leveled at the
President by this group. There were two notable exceptions, however,
that demonstrate how quickly the environment could change and how politic-
ally egocentric organizations in the environment could be.
The Medical School dean wrote to the Association of Medical Colleges,
through which accrediting teams are drawn that inspect medical school
qualifications, asking the association to pressure the legislators. The
Dean’s plan was to force the legislature to grant the University its
special Medical School appropriations by getting the association to
threaten non-accreditation of the Medical School in the next year's
inspection. The Dean then wrote the President explaining what he had
done to "help". The President’s response was, "you call that help?"
The other example was the Women's Health Project charging discrimi-
nation towards women in the city hospital. In both examples the associ
ations were applying pressures in various ways according to their own
specific interests without really understanding how the pressures will
affect other systems or the entire relationship of systems. It
should
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aiso be stressed that the interaction of this group with the University
is political.
Baldridge expresses the true implications of the above example
and defines the word "politics" in Power and Conflict in the University
.
Pressures emerge from the complex fragmented
social structure of the university and its
publics', drawing on the divergent concerns
and lifestyles of hundreds of minature sub-
cultures. These groups articulate their
interests in many different ways, bringing
pressure on the decision-making process from
any number of angles and using power and force
whenever it is available and necessary. Power
and influence, once articulated, go through a
complex process until policies are shaped, re-
shaped, and forged out of the competing claims
of multiple groups. All this is a dynamic pro-
cess, a process clearly indicating that the
university is best understood as a policitized
institution - above all else the political
university (Baldridge, 1971, p. 20).
Consultants and Speakers
The highest percentage of face-to-face meetings of all the Presi-
dent's interactions were with this group; 16.1%. Mail contacts show 2.1%
while phone calls were 5.8%. This can be explained by a number of factors.
Forty-three percent of the contacts by mail were general reports bearing on
the consultants findings while 42% of the mail was concerned with setting
up client-consultant relationships and meeting times. This means that
consultants had little to say initially except to firm up arrangements in
order to get them to the location where they could do their work. Once
on-site, the President spent time with them so they could come to under-
stand his organization more clearly. The general reports were submitted
by the consultant after he had left to formalize the feedback given to
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the President during the formal visit. Phone calls were used at the
last minute to make adjustments in schedules or to cancel appointments.
The President had two reasons for inviting consultants to the
University: 1) He needed evaluations or outside opinions on various
colleges, departments, and institutes, and 2) he used the consultants
as speakers for management and team building seminars for his top
administrative staff. The pressure placed on the President by the
function was like that of the accrediting agency without the
consequences of non-accreditation. The consultant would provide in-
formation concerning problems in a unit and state what might be done
about it. It was up to the President to act.
It is hard to assess what pressures were invited by the President
through the on-going management seminars. Through them, he was seeking
to built effective management processes. The education of his staff
might have required some behavioral changes on the President's part.
Since the seminars were new during the year that this study was being
conducted, no attempt was made to get at some of the expectations for
the President's behavior that may have resulted.
Speakers were less frequent at the University but operated basic-
ally as consultants except that they submitted no report. The speaker
came in, provided his on-site service, and left (sometimes with an
honorary degree)
.
Religious Groups
The interaction with this group was minimal. There were mail and
phone calls concerned with getting the President to speak or to be on a
committee. The pressures and problems with this group were very much
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like those of the non-profit organizations. Contact with this group
at times resulted in a platform on which the University President
could explain the functions and problems of the University. He could
raise the prestige of his organization by being visible and credible
while in return performing charitable acts by providing time and exper-
tise for committees and panels.
Education Panels and Studies
This group served the function of informing the President about
technological advances in the field of higher education. Sixty percent
of the mail between the President and this group was concerned with
general reports which contained information about innovations in under-
graduate and graduate education. The meetings the President attended
were to serve on panels for recommending alternatives to traditional
graduate and undergraduate programs.
The mail he received that was not reports was concerned with his
reactions to various reports or drafts about innovations or trends in
education. There were no other real pressures from this group except
that the more prominent the President was on national panels the more
contacts he made that might lead to foundation or federal grants. In
exchange he was expected to share his time and expertise in
participating
on the panels.
Foundations
The absence of any long substantive contact with this
group of
approximately twelve organizations was due mostly to the
shift in emphasis
of foundation priorities. In the past foundations
had poured massive
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amounts of money into higher education with the hope of reform - for
example in medical education, urban education, interdisciplinary
studies, and in increasing university involvement in world affairs
(Kerr, 1963, p. 105).
This is not the case in the 1970’s judging from the interactions
the President had with this group. There seemed to be little money and
if there was any money to be obtained, it was won in the face of stiff
competition. Meetings were initiated with various foundations but they
resulted in very few grants. In sum, foundations did not play a great
part in the year's activities.
Public Schools
This group was not of much consequence in its interacts with the
President during the year. Most of the contact with this group was con-
cerned with invitations to attend meetings or ceremonies or to make speeches.
An honors program was initiated by a nearby high school to allow some
juniors and seniors to take college courses for credit in escrow. For
the most part however interaction with this group was minimal.
Conclusions
There are many conclusions that can be drawn from a review of the
President's interaction with the University's environment. In the first
place from the description of interactions in this chapter it is difficult
to understand how internal constituents can maintain the image of the
university as an autonomous cloister. The evolution of the university
and its environment can no longer tolerate the internal mypopia to external
forces that has fed the myth of the Ivory Tower in the past. There were
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many factors that led to that myopia: 1) abundant resources that did
not require coordination because institutions were small; 2) the
expectation of independence that comes from academic specialization;
3) the insularity of departments and colleges; 4) a sense of public
trust that the function of a college education was intrinsically
worthwhile; and 5) rapid growth at economic, social, and technological
levels.
The abundant resources are gone; the growth has slowed down to
next to nothing; and from what has been seen in this chapter faculty/
university isolation and function are being questioned for cost, effi-
ciency, accountability and service. It can be seen that the questions
are not coming from just one or two groups. Numerous groups vie for
the President’s attention to express these demands. The many small
constituencies have their own intricate interests that must be balanced
and coordinated if the total organization is to maintain some semblance
of autonomy and self-direction.
From analysis of the many external groups and the five problem
areas already discussed some general implications can be drawn for the
future of the university. Those implications are focused around two
themes, namely that the "condition" of the environment will continue to
influence the university in more direct ways consequently lessening
institutional autonomy and that environmental influence will lead to
centralization.
Reduction of Institutional Autonomy
The reduction of institutional autonomy will result from three
conditions in the environment: 1) a reactive stance because of change.
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2) possible ineffectiveness because of scarcity and accountability;
3) and further politization because of many funding constituents.
Each of these will be discussed separately in the paragraphs that
follow.
1) From the discussion in the beginning of this chapter it is
clear that the intensity and nature of the President's scanning behavior
is influenced by the environment and by environmental changes. If the
environment is turbulent and rapidly changing as in the cases of enroll-
ments, federal funding, legislatures, and alumni, to mention a few, the
information needed to plan and act is complex and difficult to come by.
Decisions are then made not with certainty or calculated risk, but un-
certainty, beyond risk, beyond even a calculated understanding of what
could result. Lack of information and uncertainty in decision-making
lead the university to be more reactive than proactive and result in
less autonomy and self-direction.
2) A review of the five major problem areas and external con-
stituencies in this chapter revealed a tenor to the environment charac-
terized by a concern for finances and accountability. This climate in
turn influenced the University's exchanges with outside groups. The
processes in the environment itself which are among the determining
conditions of the exchange is called the causal texture of the environ-
ment (Emery and Trist, 1963, p. 220). The causal texture of the higher
educational environment in the 1970' s is one of change, scarcity, and
accountability
.
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The scarcity /accountability syndrome can have a spiral effect.
Scarcity and change prolong reflection on available information and
alternatives which increases inertia. Inertia can lead to lack of
satisfactory responses from the service organization (in this case,
the University) which causes the client to increase his monitoring
activities and his frequency of interaction with the organization in
efforts to direct its services. The net result is more anxiety, more
time lost in providing the service, more accountability, and a reduc-
tion in the effectiveness of the service organization.
3) As we have seen, the contact the President had with external
groups occurred on many levels. Pressures and demands made themselves
known in many issues and areas. Economic, political, technological and
social ideas permeated the President's relations with outside groims.
These ideas and demands resulted in value judgements and interests so
numerous that reconciliation was impossible and displeasure an almost
certain result.
At the same time, the university depends on many external groups.
The dependency is based on a need for clients, for money, and for legit-
imization of its purposes. In order for the university to obtain those
needed resources, organizations outside the university that supply those
resources must have a need for the services the university provides. In
times of scarce resources clear reasons for establishing priorities among
competing demands must be provided to those outside units that grant the
university needed resources. Politicization of the university results
from competition for limited resources of external groups who have special
interests to be served in granting the university the resources it needs.
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A second implication of environmental influence, in addition to
a lessening of institutional autonomy, has been a tendency toward in-
creased centralization.
Centralization
Centralization is encouraged by the environmental conditions not
only internal but external to the university as well. External centraliza-
tion is resulting because the problems of information and alternatives,
scarcity and accountability and politicization are better handled if
universities cooperate with each other rather than compete. External
centralization is bom out of the fact that more and more college con-
sortia are being formed. Consortia result in a wider variety of combined
services at lower costs and reduced uncertainty in shared decision-making.
Internal .centralization results from 1) information converging on
the president s office and from 2) the need for increased responsiveness
to consumer demand.
1) Contacts between the president and other external organizations
result in contacts between the president and usually someone of equal
status from another organization. Neither is the boss. There may be
considerable ambiguity in interaction patterns and in the exchange rate.
Also there is a likelihood that the parties operate on different standards
and have conflicting objectives because the rewards are different within
the different organizations. High ambiguity and different standards can
and often do result in difficult, lengthy, tension-filled negotiations
and relationships. These difficult relationships are only maintained by
the high level of information and concentration that comes from being in
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an administrative position.
In this study, the President received information because he was
perceived by external units as having the power to direct the University
and to change internal dynamics so that they were responsive to outside
needs. It is evident from an analysis of contacts that the President had
with various external groups that their needs must be met if resources
are to be forthcoming. Because those needs were articulated to the
President^ and because internal information concerning the feasibility
of meeting those needs also converged on the President's office it would
seem that he should have the power to make decisions that would result in
the acquisition of vital resources.
Internal centralization also resulted from the need to be increasingly
responsive to consumer demand.
2) As wq have seen, external groups were concerned with the procure-
ment and disposal of functions of the university and not with core processes.
They were concerned with admissions and grades, hiring and grievance proce-
dures, the starting and dropping of programs, and extrinsic characteristics
such as parking and student conduct.
In most cases, external groups were more concerned with the product
of teaching rather than with the core function of teaching. They were
concerned with the opportunity function, production function, and the
service function. They were concerned with education as a means of social
^External groups articulate most of their needs through the President
either because the subunit that can be responsive to the external group’s
needs is not known or because there is not subunit that could be responsive
to the particular need. To whom, for example, would a private citizen write
if he wanted the blacks to stand for the national anthem? With whom would HEW
correspond to assure compliance with Executive Order 11264?
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mobility for everyone. They were concerned with whether or not education
provided the training for professional, technical, and social roles in
society and they were concerned with education as a means to solve social
problems that might lead to a better society.
External groups were concerned with education as a consumer good.
They were concerned with teaching before research and with applied research
before pure research. External groups held the President accountable for
the University's capacity to provide the services they needed and saw as
relevant to their view of the University's function, because resources
were forthcoming to the University only if the University was responsive
to external needs. Because external groups recognized the President as
the "authority" that could direct the University to be responsive,
centralization toward the President's office resulted.
CHAPTER V
ROLE PRESSURES ON THE PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE
up to this point there has been a discussion of the unique
characteristics of the university as an organization and institution
(Appendix A)
,
a discussion of the activities and roles the president
performs and a discussion of some of the issues and accompanying
expectations that external groups hold for the university as reflected
through the President's boundary activities. What remains to be dis-
cussed are specific instances of role conflict and ambiguity that the
President experienced during the year of this study that would be
indicative and representative of the total year. The coping mechanisms
he used to deal with the conflict and ambiguity he experienced will be
discussed in Chapter VI.
Three mini-studies including a University-external group consor-
tium, the University's relationships with State legislators on the question
of budget appropriations, and issues concerned with moral or quasi-legal
matters were chosen as the best representative anecdotes. These mini-
studies contained elements and examples of conflict and ambiguity found
in all the other issues and areas that could have been chosen. The
University-external group consortium was chosen because it was ongoing
throughout the year and at the finish of this study was unresolved. The
appropriations-admissions issue did find resolution by the time this study
ended. Quasi-legal concerns were chosen because of the unexpected nature
of the problems that often required a reactive stance and a tolerance for
high ambiguity.
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Before the discussion of the mini-studies some definitions are in
order to further the reader's understanding of role models and concepts.
From a model of role behavior will come the organization of the mini-
studies
.
Role Theory
The organizational role theory is a prime building block upon which
the organization gains dependency and consistency of behavior from those
people who carry on the input-transformation-output cycle of the organiza-
tion. With turnover in personnel and uncertain environmental conditions,
consistency and stability are necessary between internal unit relationships
or, in the final analysis, between patterned and motivated acts of human
beings, if the organization is to maintain the input-transformation-output
cycle.
Organizational stability and consistency is psychologically achieved
"as long as attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, habits, and expectations of
human beings evoke the required motivation and behavior" (Katz and Kahn,
1966, p. 173). People act on other people in a set of ongoing relation-
ships that result in consistency and dependability of organizational work
or patterned activity. What particular organizational space or office a
person occupies will be determined by a structure of interrelated offices
and the patterns of activities associated with them.
Office is essentially a relational concept, defining
each position in terms of its relationship to others
and to the system as a whole. Associated with each
office is a set of activities or expected behaviors.
These activities constitute the role to be performed,
at least approximately, by any person who occupies that
office (Katz and Kahn, 1966, p. 173).
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The populations with which a person in a particular office inter-
acts in his work activities or role, are called his role set
. The role
set or people with whom the focal person interacts hold certain expecta-
tions for his performance. The key to role theory is that activities
which define a role are maintained by the expectations of other people
who interact with the focal person and that those expectations are com-
municated or "sent" to the focal person (Katz and Kahn, 1966, p. 175).
A role set is made up of many individual role senders who have expecta-
tions for the focal person and who communicate to the focal person certain
prescriptions and proscriptions for his behavior.
The "sent" role expectations may include demands with respect to
specific acts and personal characteristics or styles; they may be con-
cerned with what the focal person did, is doing, or should do, including
how he should relate to others. Not all role expectations are restricted
to job, yet, for the purposes of this study, only job demands will be
discussed. It must also be understood that role expectations can be
communicated but the focal person does not always have to comply. The
focal person will respond to expectations in terms of his perceptions
of these expectations.
Thus, for the focal person there is not only a sent role consisting
of the influential and communicative acts of the role set, but there is
also a received role consisting of the focal person's perceptions and under-
standings of what is expected. The congruency between the sent role and the
received role will depend on the content of the expectations, the clarity
of the expectations and the properties of the senders. It is the received
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role that will be the Mediate source of the focal person's motivation
for role performance or role behavior. Dlagramatlcally what has been
said thus far can be represented as follows.
ROLE EPISODE
(Kahn, et. al., 1966, p. 26)
Feedback
This diagram is, of course, simplistic. There are many factors not
included that would influence sent role, role behavior, and feedback to the
role sender. Influential factors would be past interaction or history
between focal person and role senders; attributes of the persons involved
i.e. motives, values, fears, defense mechanisms; and organizational factors,
such as position of the role sender in organization, the organization's size
and reward system.
This study focuses on sent roles that occur outside the focal per-
son's organization. It has been suggested by the author that there are
some constraints implied in external interactions between the President
and external groups. In Chapter IV it was said that these contacts are
usually between the President and someone of equivalent position in an
external organization and that therefore there is substantial ambiguity
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in his pattern of interactions. It was also said that the relationships
may have conflicting objectives and entail different standards of rewards
and performance. These conditions can result in lengthy, tension-filled
relationships requiring considerable negotiating and communication skills.
In the boundary transactions dealt with in this chapter the role
senders expectations, sent role, and organizational position will be
described. As well, some of the organizational constraints that the
President was operating under and his resultant role behavior will be
discussed. These five factors will be used to depict role conflict
and ambiguity (see Diagram #2 below)
.
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As the diagram shows, sometimes the external role sender is
independent of an organizational position, Figure (A); at other times
he is part of an organization exemplified by Figure (B)
. Sometimes
the feedback to the sent role (Line 1) occurred through the actions
of a subordinate University unit (Line 2) and sometimes the feedback
to the sent role resulted from direct Presidential role behavior
(Line 3).
This study will not focus on presidential or external group
motives, values, fears, defense mechanisms, past history of inter-
actions, or size and rewards of the external system except when it
has direct bearing on the explanations of sent role (Line 1) and
associated conflict and ambiguity.
Role Conflict and Ambiguity
Role conflict is defined as two or more sent roles occurring
simultaneously so that compliance with one makes compliance with others
difficult or impossible. Many times sent roles are in direct contra-
diction. There are four different types of role conflicts: intra-
sender conflict, intersender conflict, inter-role conflict and person-
role conflict (Kahn and Wolff, 1964, p. 19).
1) Intrasender is defined as different proscriptions and prescrip-
tions from a single role sender (Kahn and Wolff, 1964, p. 19).
An example might be the legislature voting a 5% increase in
pay for civil service employees of the University knowing the
University budget is in the "red"; at the same time refusing
to appropriate any new monies while requiring the University
to balance its budget.
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2) Intersender conflict is defined as one sent role in contra-
diction with one or more role senders (Kahn and Wolff, 1964,
P. 19). An example would be the legislature requesting the
President to increase the quota of in-state students admitted
to medical school while the faculty of the medical school see
it as its prerogative to determine admissions standards and
tell the President it will not change the quota.
3) Inter-role conflict is defined as role pressures associated
with membership in one organization in conflict with pressures
stemming from membership in another group (Kahn and Wolff, 1964,
p. 19). For example, the fact that the President spent so much
time at his job that at times he did not get a chance to spend
enough time with his family. In this case university president
and husband and father roles may have been in conflict.
4) Person-role conflict is defined as conflict between the needs
and values of the focal person and the demands of his role set
(Kahn and Wolff, 1964, p. 19). An example was the President
having to officially block recognition of a Gay Liberation
group because of Board pressure even though his personal values
as a civil libertarian mandated that he do otherwise.
Role ambiguity is related to the amount of role-related information
needed to perform the role adequately (Kahn and Wolff, 1964, p. 22). The
focal person must know what kinds of behavior will be rewarded or punished,
what kinds of behaviors will be satisfying or frustrating for the role sender,
what alternatives and opportunities there are to the present situation and
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what the consequences of these alternatives are if acted upon. Ambiguity
may be a condition of existing information that is inadequately communicated,
cannot be gained, or is non-existent.
Expectations have several dimensions to them that will vary and
therefore may result in more clarity and influence on the part of the
role sender. Those mentioned by Katz and Kahn are: 1) the magnitude
of the sent role or strength of the influence attempt, 2) the specificity
or extent to which the expected behaviors are made concrete and detailed,
3) the designation, prescriptive or proscriptive, and 4) the intensity or
extent to which the focal person is allowed freedom of choice in complying
or refusing compliance.
In the following mini-cases these four dimensions and the four types
of role conflict in the analysis of the interactions depicted. The mini-
cases will be discussed in order of background, chronology of events,
analysis of key events, and summary.
University-Police Consortium
Background
The police consortium had been in the works since September of 1971,
the first September of the President's tenure. Preliminary initiation had
been made by the City Police who gave the President two proposals they had
written for the training of top police leadership. The President took
these proposals and circulated them to selected department heads, faculty,
and deans to get their comments on the proposals and on the feasibility of
providing the services needed to meet the proposed requirements.
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The City Police were in a hurry to get some kind of commitment
from the University because they were trying to get the funding for
these proposals from the National Police Foundation. The Foundation's
subcommittee came in March of 1972 and something had to be firmed up
by then. If they moved fast enough there was a possibility of obtaining
a $6 million grant. The President had given major responsibility for
the consortium to the Vice President for Academic Affairs and to a Task
Force of various people from the different schools of law, community,
psychology, sociology, education, and business.
The feedback on the proposals was that they were concerned with only
selected practical aspects of police work such as selection of officers,
training, community relations, and supervision of patrols but did not
deal with organized crime or the causes of crime. The proposals were
also heavily weighted in the area of evaluation. The grant requested
was for $478,600 with an additional $191,500 for evaluation of the pro-
gram. $80,000-$115,000 of that money was to be used for a large scale
survey. The University people responding to the proposal generally agreed
that the University could provide services in the area of selection,
training, evaluation, group dynamics, systems analysis, and operations
research.
There had surfaced in these responses to the proposals, an attitude
of doubt and criticism toward the police, their approach, their attitudes,
and their unwillingness to accept feedback on their proposals. Also,
some members of the University who had given feedback to the President
as to the feasibility of University service were not on the best of terms
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with the City Police. Some of the University people who had done work
with city government or with community service programs had had prior
experiences with the police which were not too rewarding. In sum, the
University's approach in response to the proposals was to do what it
could and to provide what services it could.
The Vice President for Academic Affairs (Provost) and the Police
Chief met repeatedly during the Spring of 1972, to reach an agreement
on services that would be presentable to the foundation, always keeping
the President informed. The urgency of the mutual endeavor made it seem
like a high priority item for both institutions. It was also clear by
September, 1972, that the University would not be able to fulfill all
the aspects of the proposal because of a lack of expertise and that
consequently other universities would need to be contacted. The police
for their part had already set out the norm that they were going to use
other institutions for other services.
As the project developed various members of the Task Force began
to share the Foundation's attitude toward the City Police Force. The top
levels of the Foundation had come to see the City Police Department as
insular and complacent and concluded that if they wanted this money they
would 'have to shape up". On their part some members of the Police Force
had a certain amount of paranoia about "outsiders and eggheads".
The Agreement or Set of Expectations
The goals for the police program that were funded by the Foundation
in April, 1972, were reached by "three weeks of extensive, and at times,
discursive rank and file, command staff and community participation in
departmental self-examination and program planning" (Police Proposal for
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Development of Top Police Leadership). The goals were In the area of
police/community relations, operations, personnel, and training and
education. Specifically they were:
Police Community Relations :
1) To develop a viable and enduring rapport between members of
the Division and the community they serve resulting in a
reduction of police insularity from the community and
increasing police responsiveness to community needs.
2) To develop programs aimed at greater citizen involvement
in crime control.
Operations :
3) To fully develop the neighborhood
-based team policing concept.
4) To maximize the effective use of the police officer's time by
developing alternatives to arrest in certain types of cases,
by using different kinds of people and skills to perform the
different major components of the policeman's job, and by
developing more efficient reporting, information, and intelli-
gence systems at the operating level.
Personnel :
5) To establish standards for selection and employment which are
more closely related to the variety of tasks performed by the
police
.
6) To develop a multi-level system of police employment which can
more effectively carry out the major police functions.
7) To increase the level of minority representation at all levels
in the department.
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8) To expand the utilization of individuals who possess profes-
sional skills.
9) To develop systems of internal communication which increase
the flow of information in all directions, thereby encouraging
greater rank-and-file input in decision-making and the develop-
ment of greater understanding and support for division objectives
and policies.
Training and Education
10) To develop basic training systems of greater relevance and
effectiveness
.
11) To develop comprehensive and functional systems for the
training of first-line supervisors.
12) To devise a model for a university-police division consortium
which is transferable to other communities.
13) To design and implement systems and procedures for the develop-
ment of executive and leadership skills in the management ranks
of the division.
The police wanted the University to develop programs that would
address these goals. The University saw that they had resources that could
contribute to the consortium in the areas of selection, training, evaluation,
group dynamics, systems analysis, and operations research. An effort was
made to pull them together into a coherent, integrated package. The
Provost and the Dean of the Business School worked hard to get a mechanism
made up of police and University people going, that would begin to work out
programs that would meet the needs and goals identified in the police proposal.
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The University for its effort would receive money, practical
areas for research, a chance to develop new programs, and a place
where students could intern. It seemed that both organizations would
benefit. The President was well on his way to fulfilling the promise
made on the day of his inauguration; to make the University a truly
urban university - "the command post of all the operations to reclaim,
renew, rebuild, revitalize the city" (Bennis, 1971, p. 23). As a result
of the consortium arrangement academic theory could be tested against
reality; students could get their training in relevant surroundings;
new populations of students could be included in the University; and a
spirit of cooperation could flourish.
In September, 1972, the Provost, Task Force, and the Police had
reached an agreement as to the type of mechanism and agreement that would
suit both the needs of the City Police Force and tap the University's
resources. The consortium was to be formally announced and the two
groups joined by a formal mechanism including program coordinators and
an advisory board.
Chronology
The chronology is made up of descriptions of key correspondence,
phone calls, and meetings that depict the developments of the consortium
and the goals the University and the police hoped to accomplish in the
year the researcher observed its operation. There were several complica-
tions in the consortium's development - each predicated on the shaky ground
of two different organizational outlooks and norms, the change over of
University personnel and questions of authority. These complications will
become clear with a reading of the chronology and accompanying commentaries.
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September 22, 1972
and
Formal meeting of
program coordinators
University Police Consortium advisory board
- dinner and press release.
Commentary: The advisory board was comprised
of six Lt . Cols, from the Police Force and one
program manager, six civilians, four faculty
members and three deans with the University
President, Provost, Police Chief, and Police
Director of Safety as ex-officio board members.
The program coordinators were one faculty member
from the School of Business and a civilian pro-
gram coordinator from the Police. Also in
attendance was the recently hired Vice President
for Metropolitan Affairs and the Vice President
for Public Relations from the University (see
Diagram #3 - Organizational Chart)
.
October 6, 1972
Memo from the Vice President for Metropolitan Affairs calling
the University half of the advisory board together to discuss "alterna-
tive approaches to the University’s collaboration with the City Police".
Commentary: The Vice President for Metropolitan
Affairs had just been hired. He had not been on
most of the last year’s deliberations. He was
black. He saw the purpose of the meeting to
discuss the function of the advisory board, the
chairmanship of the Consortium advisory board,
policies regarding publications of research
findings, and compensation for University
participants in the Consortium.
October 13, 1972
A Presidential assistant during the mail session tells the
President that there are some problems of "passing the baton" from the
Provost's office to the Office of Metropolitan Affairs (OMA)
.
Commentary: It seems as if the Police and the
University coordinator thought the Provost was in
charge of the Consortium. They did not understand
where OMA which had no power over academic units
was getting the authority to call a meeting of just
the University component of the advisory board.
The Vice President of OMA did not want to meet the
Police Officer in charge of the project; he wanted
to meet the Chief. He called the Director of Public
Safety, an ex-officio member of the board, and set
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up the meeting between the Chief and himself.
om! ^
esident himself was seen as promisingOMA the responsibility of the Consortium yet
Pr0V°st ^ head the negotiations,his had created certain expectations on thepart of the police for the Office of Metro-
politan Affairs. During interviews it was
clear to the researcher that the police were
viewed as racists by many of the University
members of the Consortium. It was said that
the Mayor had threatened to block the Founda-
tion grant unless more minorities were
selected and that police reluctance to meet
with the OMA was more evidence of their racism.
October 13
,
1972
Meeting of the University half of the advisory board
talk about priorities.
and OMA to
Commentary: Reconstruction of this meeting
through interviews reveals that members of
academic departments who were also members of
the Consortium heard the Vice President for
OMA say that the Consortia was his respons-
ibility now. Academic departments saw him
taking people from academic areas with no
authority, expertise, or communication. The
OMA also raised the question of the right to
publish findings. In their agreement with
the University the Police had inserted a
proviso which required their approval on all
research findings to be published. At this
meeting it was also decided that the whole
advisory board would have a University repre-
senative as Chairman to be "elected" at the
first meeting.
October 17, 1972
Memo from the President to the Provost and the Vice President for
OMA advising the two men to decide on what must be done to facilitate the
"passing of the baton".
Commentary: Since the problem was not clear
from the President’s view he asked the two men
to keep him informed but to essentially iron out
the difficulties themselves. The Vice President
for OMA was in the meantime trying to catch up
on the development of the consortia by reading
articles written by the Police Chief and by
getting briefings from the University program
coordinator
.
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October 19, 1972
r chart
board
members
Commentary: One member raised the question
as to whether the advisory board would merely
approve proposals submitted by program co-
ordinators or try to generate their own to
augment whatever proposals were submitted.
This issue was not dealt with. Also the
"statement of understanding" needed to be
discussed discussed further. The University
members felt some items needed to be changed.
In addition it was decided that the chairman-
of the Consortium was to be given over
to the Vice Chairman, a member of the Police
organization after six months.
OMA memo to the President saying that the baton had baen passed
and things were under control.
Commentary: The OMA had given the people involved
a chance to meet with him in order to hear an explana-
tion of his position. He felt that the Provost and
the Dean of the Business School finally understood
the shifting of University-wide responsibility for
the consortium to his office.
Memo to the President from an assistant who attended the Advisory
Board meeting on the 19th. The memo reported 1) that the OMA had decided
to stay in the background because a black man of the helm would be un-
acceptable to the Police, 2) that there seems to be a lack of trust between
the two groups, and 3) that a subtle struggle for control over the consortium
was beginning to rise.
Commentary: Interviews and observations revealed
that the Police felt that 1) the University was only
interested in money to do research and teaching and
did not want to "dirty their hands" in real problems;
2) the University was not a cohesive unit with unity
of purpose, the university is not tight enough with
a true chain of command; 3) the University lacked a
true understanding of the Police and their problems;
and A) the consortium lacked any formal mechanism for
cooperation, communications, and coordination.
October 26, 1972
November 3, 1972
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It was also apparent that the police did not like
the idea of advisory board business being conducted
without them as evidenced by chairman, a university
member, being "elected" before the meeting. The
issue of control also surfaced around the right to
publish. The issue of trust surfaced with the
readiness of the Police to move ahead with specific
projects while the "eggheads" were slower to organize
and move ahead
.
November 9, 1972
Advisory Board meeting of the Consortium — the "statement of under-
standing" was discussed in an effort to clarify the terms of the Consortium
agreement. The Police gave in on the issue of publication but would not
allow the agreement to be changed to substitute OMA for the President as
the chief negotiator
. Also some discussion was held on a new program
proposal.
Commentary: It was clear from interviews and
observation that the Police wanted "equal" lines
of authority: The Chief and the President. The
Police attitude was that if the President thought
that this consortium was one of the most important
things he could do, he should take responsibility.
November 10, 1972
Memo to the President from an assistant. The memo reports that the
meeting on November 9th went reasonably well. The on-going program organ-
ized by the School of Business with the Police is going well because the
people "running it are not becoming embittered against the police." Also
it was reported that the rift between the OMA and the University coordina-
tor seemed to be smoothing over.
Commentary: The University coordinator had been
understanding of the Police position. He had been
trying to mediate between the Police and the Uni-
versity. He had a great deal of credibility with
the police, but not with the, OMA. The coordinator
was seen as taking the Police side in most arguments
or discussions. The one ongoing program highlighted
the different norms of the organizations. Instruc-
tors told war stories of the policeman's conduct.
The fact that the policemen wore their guns while
in civilian clothes always made an impression on
the academician. One anecdote reveals the insensi-
tivity to each others' viewpoints when an instructor
came in with a black power strike symbol painted on
his brief case and placed the briefcase with its
visible sign on the desk in front of him at the
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start of the class. He immediately "lost"his class of policemen as they became quietlyinfuriated with the instructor’s values.
December 12, 1972
Presidential memo to Consortium advisory board savine that- ho
H
he “nfuslon that m*y have occurred over the change in respons-ibility to the OMA for the Consortium. The memo offers th P s
"
ln conducting a seminar in organizational develop! theConsortium if It will help "get the process off the ground "
Commentary: The President’s expertise was in
organizational development. It seemed as if
his intent was to reduce the infighting and
power plays that were apparent in the Univer-
sity’s relationships to the Police and to
"demonstrate dramatically the differences in
the ways that universities and police depart-
ments operate."
December 14, 1972
Consortium advisory board meeting. The President’s memo was read
and it was decided to take him up on his offer of a seminar. The revised
statement of understanding" was approved with the flow chart (Diagram #3)
to express lines of authority. Also the OMA sent another representative,
a woman, in place of the Vice President and a new woman assistant dean from
Education was placed on the board to replace a professor who had suddenly
died. At the December 14th meeting the use of student interns was discussed
as well as a proposal project on women on the police force. The role of the
board in terms of input to ongoing projects was also discussed.
Commentary: The turnover on the board may have upset
the pace of the board's activities. Charges of sexism
as well as racism began to surface towards the police.
An anecdote which represents the difference between the
police and the University people occurred over lunch.
Someone asked the women to begin to eat because the
police wouldn't start until the women ate - consequently
lunch was being held up.
January 30, 1973
University advisory board meeting. Issues discussed are broadly
categorized as 1) board involvement in project development; 2) advisory
structure and reorganization; and 3) contractual arrangements for funding
to be done through OMA.
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Commentary
: It „as evldent £he poUce an<J
oth«
r
TOe
Were beCOmlng seP«ated from eachher h group was large and the process wasnot going well. So far all the meetings hadeen hew at the University. The police under-stood how the University operated but the Uni-
Itvle
7
r
em
!
d t0 ^ Very llttle about P°lices y and mode of operations. The Police feltthat most meetings were not productive. No
WaS being aPProved or implemented. Thismeeting resulted in suggested changes in Consor-
r
tUTe
^
d r°le ^ ln ProPosed Plans forthe educational development of Consortium board
members. The structure changes would assign
responsibility of overall policy questions to
e total advisory board with responsibility
or identification of projects (and of those
who could serve those projects) and for planning
and monitoring of implementation to go to the
project coordinators. The educational develop-
ment suggestions were: a retreat, a meeting atpolice headquarters, consultation with the Uni-
versity President, Police lectures on their opera-
tions, and visits with Police on their own turf.
February 6, 1973
C°n=°“lum advisory board meeting. The Police presented five projects
5
S
r
art
’
°Utllnil>g needs f°r such programs and asking foridentification of University resources to fill those needs. Most of theUniversity members vied for the right to fulfill those needs. It was also
suggested that some other more qualified resources be brought in from other
universities. Some discussion of the reorganization of the advisory board
was discussed. The next meeting was to be held at Police Headquarters. It
was announced that the coordinators were to meet with the President on the15th of February.
Commentary: As the projects were submitted by the
Police the academic departments represented in the
advisory board began to compete for the right to head
the project, staff, and provide the service, which
resulted in nothing getting accomplished.
February 13, 1973
Memo to the President from an assistant describing the poor condition
of the Consortium. The Police have sent a letter to the Foundation expressing
dissatisfaction with the University and threatening not to come to any more
meetings. This memo told of the stereotyping done on the part of the Univer-
sity that the police were basically rigid, authoritarian, hostile, and
racist and that it was the job of the Consortium to change those attitudes
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In addition some of the University people
eeting the expressed needs of the Police,
ave all the expertise to do some of the
Commentary: This memo was designed to brief
the President on the problems of the consortium
before the February 15th meeting with the program
coordinators. Because of low police morale, the
vying between colleges to have the right to con-
trol the projects, lack of sufficient expertise
and refusal to admit it, and negative attitudes
on the part of some of the University people,
the assistant recommended giving most of the’ power
to a steering committee. The President in response
wondered why the Vice President of OMA had not been
included in the February 15th meeting.
Memo to the President from an assistant advising him to call the
Police Chief after the meeting with Program Coordinators and make the
required changes in the advisory board structure. The President was
also advised to tell the Police Chief that he was deeply concerned with
recent developments in regards to the Consortium.
Commentary: It was clear to the assistants, to the
program coordinators and to the police that something
had to be done to get the services the police needed.
Those program coordinators wanted the President's
commitment to change the structure and to give his
support and consultation skills to work with the
advisory board.
Presidential meeting with project coordinators and the advisory
board chairman. In the meeting the President expressed his concern that
the vying for projects was hurting the effectiveness of the Consortium.
He also explored alternatives to the dilemma in an effort to be responsive
to Police needs. Although he did not overtly give his approval to the
power shift from the advisory board to a steering committee he did promise
to call the Police Chief and make a decision. It was almost assumed that
the power to review, plan, set up, and monitor projects would be given to
the program coordinators.
Commentary: During the course of the meeting,
the President asked why the Vice President of
OMA was not at the meeting. The University
coordinator said the Vice President knew the
meeting was being held. The researcher felt
February 14, 1973
February 15, 1973
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that while the Vice President did know this
meeting was going on, he did not know that
the coordinators were going to lobby for apower shift from an advisory board structure
to the project coordinators.
March 6, 1973
Consortium Advisory Board meeting at Police Headquarters. The
lhl
3
t
Ct C °ordinat
-ors made a bri
-ef report of the meeting they had had witht e President. It was decided that the University people would meet toiscuss the alternatives for a reorganization. For most of the meetingthe Police briefed the University people on their operation. The Dean
rom the Business School gave a progress report on a design for a training
Commentary: Not much seemed to be said con-
cerning the proposed shift of power from an
advisory board structure to the steering com-
mittee composed of the project coordinators.
March 30, 1973
Memo to the President from the Vice President of OMA. He tells the
President that many people are pushing for a smaller group to be estab-
lished that would respond to proposal ideas. OMA is therefore polling the
advisory board to reach consensus on how effective the Consortium has been
and what suggestion the members have on making it more effective. He sug-
gests that the President and Police Chief might want to meet with a smaller
group "to endorse and implement whatever changes are suggested."
Commentary: It would seem from this memo that OMA
still saw his role and the role of the board as chief
determiner of what changes were to occur in the con-
sortium.
April 4, 1973
President’s meeting with the Police Chief, a Police Foundation
Representative, and the Safety Director. At this meeting the President
gave his word that he would restructure the advisory board and promised
to offer the new advisory board appropriate training in the area of
organizational behavior. In return the Police Foundation agreed to fund
the Consortium for a second year.
Commentary: This decision on the part of the
President was in the face of the above OMA memo.
It is not known by the researcher if the President
read the memo before the April 4th meeting.
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April 4. 1973
~S1‘
over the "loHr
e
"
Sat
i
0" WaS that the Presldent stop the in-fighting
reward system "in "herSo^rUnS^ritrpeopJrL^ ^St^hiE'™1
Consortia
lntereStS a8 they now defl"e them to the Interests of the
Commentary: This phone call plus the meeting thatday with the Police Chief and Foundation representa-
tive made it very clear that services would have tobe forthcoming or the Consortium would be dissolved.
April 6
, 1973
Memo, the President to the Vice President of OMA in which the Presi-dent says that he may have short-circuited OMA's letter of March 30th bypromising to shift the power of the advisory board to a small steering com-
mittee and to the program coordinators. The President says that he did not
read the letter of March 30th until after the luncheon with the Police
Chief. The decision cannot be changed without some difficulty, he reports.
Commentary: The President did mention in the letter
that he assumed that the Vice President of OMA had
been informed that this shift was coming and that
the program coordinators had consulted OMA on the
matter
.
April 12, 1973
Memo, the Vice President of OMA to the President. The Vice Presi-
dent outlines a history of events by saying that: 1) the Police and Uni-
versity at odds over the role of the advisory board - "Police officers
for the most part, preferring to concentrate on more narrowly focused
result-oriented projects, tended to be impatient with the questioning
and intellectual exploration of the University members."; 2) that just
the University group met on January 30th to suggest ways of improving
relationships; and 3) the University group met again on March 15th and
decided that they should be restructured. The Vice President expresses
displeasure that he has indeed been short-circuited and suggests that
the President consider other alternatives, namely to hold the April 4th
agreement in abeyance to allow the board to work it out.
Commentary: The Vice President of OMA denies that
he knew that the February 15th meeting was being
organized. The minutes of the January 30th and
February 6th meeting would disconfirm this. OMA
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had been informed of the meeting. The Vice
President and the University coordinator were
notion the best of terms so perhaps the purpose
ot the meeting was not clearly communicated
however
.
April iy73
board *A i
President of OMA to the University members of advisory
Mo^e' f°^
h
p
S recedved the comments about the effectiveness of opera-tions of the Consortium and has called a meeting to discuss the commentsana perceptions.
Commentary: Most of the perceptions are shared
by all. The Consortium is not effective. Most
members think that the size should be cut. No
one is in agreement on how to give responsibility
so as to guarantee interdisciplinary cooperation.
Some advocate putting responsibilities for program
development, initiation, and implementation in the
hands of the coordinators, while some say that
responsibility should be in the hands of one academic
department.
April 26, 1973
Memo, the Police Chief to the President. This memo by the Chief
is confirmation of the agreement reached on April 4th. The Foundation will
refund contingent on the Consortium on the restructuring of advisory board
and some organizational development seminars to be conducted by the Univer-
sity President.
Commentary: The Chief does not see the abolishment
of the Board just using the program coordinators to
make the Consortium more product-oriented.
May 7, 1973
Memo, the President to the Chief of Police. The President shares
his feeling that "we can work it out." He writes, "OMA is undertaking
discussions with University members that will result in a statement that
we can discuss." "I would like to but cannot give more time to the Consor-
tium because budget and legislative problems are taking up most of my time
as my first priorities."
Commentary: This letter pledges little direct commit-
ment on the part of the President. It says that some-
thing will be done but leaves that something broadly
defined. There seems to be no firm commitment to the
seminars nor to giving the program coordinators direct
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‘ Tt could be said that this letter has
a holding action to give OMA room to move.(This action may have been taken after Presi-dential communication with University program
coordinators, it is not known.)
May 7, 1973
3 presldential assistant to the President. The memo urgese President to abolish the board completely in favor of a steering
coZitJ;
66 and then do the organizational development seminars with themmittee Those appointed to the steering committee should be peoplenot completely wedded to a college so that vending and in-fighting will
Commentary: The memo also describes the problem
OMA is having trying to control academic units.
The OMA cannot give students credit for intern-
ships. One school in particular has challenged
the position of OMA. What complicates matters
is that the University coordinator is from the
school that is challenging OMA. He is seen by
OMA as not working OMA purposes. Also, since
the University project coordinator did not make
clear his interests for the February 15th meeting
with the President, there is reason for OMA doubt-
fulness
.
May 8, 1973
Memo, the Vice President of OMA to the Police Chief (a carbon copy
to the President). The memo says that the Vice President will appoint a
new member of his staff to assume primary responsibility for coordination
of the University side of the Consortium. The present program coordinator
is expected to work in collaboration.
Commentary: Through interviews it was revealed
that the Vice President had contacted the co-
ordinator and the Dean of the school the coordina-
tor was appointed from and announced that he was
putting his own man as the coordinator of Consortium
activities. The purpose was to move the Consortium
closer to his own shop. All interaction with the
police was to be conducted by the Vice President’s
new appointee.
May 9, 1973
A letter of resignation from the project coordinator to the
Vice President of OMA.
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Commentary: This was a blow to th P k
project coordinator was seen as the only University
oosalhl
° ”aS gettlng annhing done. Most of the
h
p™JecCs "ere done In small ad hoc eroucseaded by him. The project coordinator had developeda great deal of trust and credibility with the Police
and
3
OMA
le
a
t thS P°Uce "lth n° buffer b®tween them
and competing schools.
June 18. 1973
people at
6
this “Lm*
me"berS °f the Consortlu'"- Both Police and University
arrangement. OMA ha^llfVthV TT * T*’ thought out organizational
e£ ; ss: s^pSx^r
fifteen projects and activities to be implemented in the next academic year.
Commentary: The President at this meeting tried to getboth groups to realize some of the basic conflicts thathe had seen and to convince each group that there was a
need to cooperate
What is included here is the speech the President made to this group
after a year of problems expressing some of the conflict he has seen and felt
It was, from the author's viewpoint, a skillful speech. It was recorded by
note taking so that some of the words and phrases are paraphrased.
I want to reaffirm and provide my blessings to this Con-
sortium. I want to also show my concern, commitment, and
respect for the City Police Department. They are the heroes
of society, the urban heroes. Society does not understand
the police. It is a tough thankless job. Americans have
always had land to run away from their main societal problems.
Police cannot be ignored because now the middle class are
coming into contact with them because of drugs, riots, etc.
Before nobody cared why police were underpaid and under-
appreciated, but this is changing.
The University has much to learn about working together.
To be blunt, the University is not very good at working with
external groups. We get threatened by the prospect because
the knowledge we spent all of our lives getting may not be
useful. Excuse them because they are insecure. We must fuse
action and theory. When I was teaching at M.I.T. businessmen
would come back and grill me. 'Have you ever met a payroll?
Nice idea but...' I got more defensive and more abstract,
then I got cynical. It's hard not to be defensive and insecure.
All my knowledge would not be useful and they told me that.
The University is not geared for this work. We are close
to anarchy. The locus of decision-making is with the individual
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6 to do something; something damnp ^ t I have been low profile but I would like to helpin the fall. You ve got to face those questions. If you wantan omelet you’ve got to break the egg. You can do it.
Analysis
From the mini-case study just presented it can be seen that three
types of role conflict could have been experienced by the President: namely
intersender conflict, interrole conflict, and person-role conflict. Examples
of these three types of conflict are discussed in the section on analysis
that follows.
Person Role Conflict
The norms of the University and the police are different. The
police are a para—military organization with top down, hierarchial decision-
making and are used to deliberations only at the top echelons, conservative
in values, and authoritarian in outlook. In this circumstance they were
product-oriented with low tolerance for deliberation or debate. They had
a need to solve problems familiar to the police such as community relations,
communications, etc.
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On the other hand University people are subject to norms of
abstract debate, deliberation of the smallest details, and democratic
decision-making. Rather autonomous development of expertise and
programs in narrow specialities is the rule not cooperation across
interdisciplinary lines.
In the case of Police/University Consortium, most of the know-
ledge the University people had was organized in the specialized areas
of sociology, psychology and law. Cooperation to solve social problems
was something that had to be learned. To make matters worse the way
that rewards were to be distributed was unclear. A precedent had been
set by the first program. One individual school proposed and conducted
the first program and received the "soft" money in return. This prece-
dent may have set the competitive, vending tone that prevailed.
In general, the ethos of the University ran counter to the Presi-
dent s need to make the University a truly urban university. Person-
role conflict is defined as the conflict between the focal person’s
needs and values and the demands of his role set. In this case of
person-role conflict the University was, in a sense, working against
the President’s needs and values. The conflict, though indirect,^
was none-the-less felt by the President.
^By indirect, the author means that the University people never
disagreed with the President’s goal of making the University a truly
urban university yet the results of their behavior worked against
the President’s goals.
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Intersender Conflict
It was clear from the chronology of events that questions of
authority created other problems for the President. The academic
units did not want a non-academic unit, (OMA) taking responsibility
for coordinating programs in the academic area. The police had a
preference for clear and direct lines of authority. Because the
initial agreement for the consortium was set up by the President
and Provost before the OMA was formed the precedent was set. The
precedent was set that was seen by the police as the lines of
authority being direct from the President to the Provost and then
to the academic units. A shift in authority to the OMA was a shift
to an indirect staff unit. This shift to OMA became less desirous
by the police when the academic units themselves began to challenge
the authority of OMA.
These problems set the stage for intersender conflict. Inter-
se nder conflict is defined as one sent role that is in contradiction
with one or more sent roles. There was intersender conflict for the
President from February through May. On one hand the OMA was asking
for room to negotiate with the advisory board, to get it to produce
the services and projects needed to get the Consortium going; on the
other hand the assistants and the program coordinators were demanding
that the President abolish the advisory board and give the power of
program implementation to a small steering committee.
Even more intersender conflict can be seen on April 4th and 6th
when the Police and the Foundation met with the President and said that
either the advisory board must be restructured or there would be no
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refunding for £he next year. At the name time DMA was asking for time
through the restructuring of the advisory board by taking steps
such as polling the University members of the board, conducting meetings,
and eventually reappointing a new man to be project coordinator.
The President was caught between the external demands for authori-
tative, top-down decision-making and the academy's ethic of autonomy and
democratic decision-making. He was caught between Police demands for the
services he had Initially traded and negotiated for, and the anarchistic,
specialized, insular characteristics of the institution that had to produce
those services.
Interrole Conflict
The third type of role conflict is expressed clearly by the Presi-
dent’s statement concerning his priorities of budget and legislative
relationships. He was trying desparately to get a special medical subsidy
and an increase in the general subsidy to enable the University to balance
the budget for the coming year. Also the President had asked units in the
University to cut their budgets by 3% for the academic year to balance this
year's budget. The University budget process was reaching its culmination
and key decisions had to be made at the same time that the University-
Police Consortium was breaking down.
Interrole conflict is defined as pressures associated with member-
ship in one organization being in conflict with pressures stemming from
membership in another group. There were definite time and commitment pres-
sures associated with the budget and legislature that may have interrupted
the President’s participation in this case and ability to monitor the
developments in regards to the Consortium.
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Summary
The University and the police were engaging in a difficult process
of trying to blend two distinct institutions with almost opposite norms
into a collaborative effort to solve pressing social problems. The project
was still underway at the conclusion of the study year. Some conclusions
that might be drawn from this example are:
1) External groups view the university as a service institution.
2) External groups view the president as having control and
authority over the university.
3) The university organization into subject matter fields may not
be the most appropriate for solving society’s problems.
4) If the university is to compete for outside funds to solve
societal problems, university people will have to learn to
cooperate across departmental and interdisciplinary lines.
Long and Groskind have captured the lesson that can be learned from
this case study:
Rousseau said of philosophers that they loved the whole
world in general in order not to have to love anyone in
particular . It might also be said of the university
that they have served the whole world in general in order
not to serve anyone in particular. Small wonder if they
have ended up serving no one but themselves, and in doing
so, perpetuated a methodology that is radically incorrigible.
But only by recognizing a constituency other than the faculty
and by making their activities accountable and corrigible
through the enlightened service of that constituency can
the university escape the trap of prestigeful self-service
(Long and Groskind, 1972, p. 6).
Medical School Admissions
Medical school admissions was a tough issue for the President in
1972-73. It was complicated by the fact that applications to the professional
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schools of law and medicine were swelling to unprecedented numbers and
yet there was still a shortage of doctors. The demand for physicians
has resulted from more Americans today being covered by health insurance,
Medicare, or Medicaid and from an awareness of the progress being made
in treating diseases so that they expect the best medical care as their
legal and moral right.
Background
Figures show that in 1973 there was an estimated 346,000 doctors
in the United States, or, in other words, one physician for every 636
potential patients (U.S. News and World Report, 1973, p. 53). Govern-
ment goals are to bring that ratio to 500 to 1 by the end of the decade.
The basis on which these doctors are spread throughout the country
depends more on the physician's speciality, but by-and-large
,
doctors
are needed in rural and inner-city areas. Dispersal of doctors to urban
and rural areas that need medical care is a problem because of a lack of
good educational and cultural opportunities for the physician and his
family and partly because the isolation from colleagues and new sources
of professional information.
Students are applying to medical schools in record numbers because
medicine is where the desirable jobs are. With the glut on the elementary
and secondary school teacher market and job opportunities for engineers
and professors fluctuating in a downward trend, students are understand-
ably turning to the medical and legal professions.
Students want the economic security, sense of craft, independence
and mobility that is associated with the practice of medicine (Cohen,
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1973, p. 20). Also because the medical vocation is so widely known and
promoted by a variety of role models found on T.V. "everybody feels
that they know what a doctor is" (Cohen, 1973, p. 20). There is a
sense of social concern or commitment associated with medicine that
draws the young student of today as never before.
Between 1961 and 1971 the number of people applying to medical
schools in the United States had doubled, while the number of places for
medical students has increased only 50%. In 1971, 29,172 students
applied and only 12,361 were admitted (Cohen, 1973, p. 19). in 1972,
more women and minorities were admitted to U.S. medical schools than
ever before. Women represented 16.8% of the 1972 entering classes in
all U.S. medical schools, an increase of 34.9% over 1971. Minorities
showed a 24.3% increase over 1971 (Journal of Medical Education, 1973,
p. 293). With more women and minorities applying and a general increase
in total applicants, colleges should "prepare for a horrible wailing
and gnashing of teeth from rejected applicants to medical schools as
undergraduates in unprecedented numbers declare themselves" (Cohen,
1973, p. 19).
The President was well aware of the problem of medical school
admissions because of mail and phone calls from all sectors of society
that contacted him in the fall of 1972 to lobby, push, cajole, and
otherwise influence him on behalf of a favorite son or prospective
candidate. Because of the tremendous numbers applying to medical
school more students were being turned away. Before the year was out
the President was to become thoroughly versed in what was once a faculty
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prerogative, namefy the process and criteria of medical school admissions.
University Budget Problems
During this same year the biennium budget was passed by a new State
legislature. The twelve State universities worked for a 6.5% increase in
State appropriations which was tough given that the Democratic Governor
had recommended only a 3% increase and given that the new majority in the
Republican legislature did not want to be seen as the spenders in a finan-
daily tough, inflationary year.
The universities and Regents had begun to organize through an inter-
university council which had agreed to pool resources and information to
lobby for the 6.5% appropriations increase. The strength of numbers of
a large block would help to insure that the increase was possible and
equitable. There were, however, special needs for individual institutions
with particular circumstances that mandated special appropriations.
For example, the University studied by the author did have its own
individual needs that mandated special appropriations. The University is
both public and private. Supporting funds come from private giving, city
taxes, and State taxes. The University is in the unique position of being
one of the nation's only municipally-sponsored, state-affiliated universities.
The city's support for the University is guaranteed by the 1926 City Charter
and subsequent amendments. The financial support from the city grows more
or less with the tax base. In the decade of the 1960 's the city annual
tax grew from $3.1 million dollars to the current $3.85 million dollars.
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In 1967 the University became a state affiliated institution.
Through state affiliation it receives support for all lower division
(freshman and sophomores) students, except for Nursing and Pharmacy
courses under the Community College Act. The University has an affil-
iation agreement with the State Board of Regents which provides sub-
sidy at the same level as other state universities for courses in
Pharmacy, Nursing, Law, Medicine, and Graduate Programs. There is no
subsidy for upper level undergraduates. The state subsidy jumped from
under $1 million dollars in 1967 to almost $20 million in 1972.
It had been said before but needs repeating, that the University
was having difficulty balancing the budget because of enrollment drops,
cutbacks in federal subsidies and grants, inflation, and the rise in
cost of books, fuel, and electricity. The present biennium budget had
prohibited tuition increases. The University anticipated a $4,500,000
deficit through inflationary costs alone in the next two years. While
the average state supported university received 45% of its general funds
from state subsidy the University studied receives only 29% of its
general funds from the state. In and of itself that discrepancy created
problems for the University even if additional state subsidy was awarded.
There was another problem for the President in that his medical
school needed expansion funds. The University had constructed a new
medical science building that was financed by both federal ($34.6 million)
and state ($17 million) funds and by some University contributions ($2
million). The building was scheduled for completion in the spring of
1974 and the University was expanding the freshmen enrollment the next
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fall 63% fro, 118 to 192 students. Each year for a period of four years
this expansion would continue until by the Fall of 1978 the total roster
will have risen from the present number of 462 to 768 students. The
University, to recruit new faculty and operate the new building, sought
a supplemental grant of $1.2 million from the State for the biennium
1973-75.
The issue of admissions arose because most state schools had
restricted their enrollments to medical school to 90% in-state students
and 10% out-of-state students. In some states such as Illinois and
Indiana they had reduced out-of-state admissions to below 5%. (Since
the University was state affiliated and not totally dependent on State
funding, it retained its privateness" and its autonomous prerogative
to accept many more out-of-state students.) The University had 56%
in-state and 44% out-of-state students. Because the wailing and gnashing
of teeth could be heard all the way to the legislature this 56-44% ratio
was destined to change sooner or later.
Chronology
There were many meetings, phone calls and letters concerning the
problem of getting a subsidy increase and for obtaining a special appro-
priation for the medical school during the academic year 1972-73. The
two appropriations were different yet required a delicate balancing of
legislative strategy. In the chronology most of the mail, phone calls
and meetings directly concerned with the subsidy increase will be left
out except when they have a direct bearing on the request for a supplemental
medical appropriation. There were other external groups, besides the
legislature, pushing for change in medical school admissions policies
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and decisions: their interactions with the President will be lncluded
but no commentary will be made in the chronology that follows.
There was some discussion of a supplemental medical appropria-
tion before December, however, the pressure began to really build up
in February. The President had written to the Chancellor of the
Regents in the beginning of the academic year to present a picture of
the University's financial problem. It's at that point that the
chronology begins.
October 24, 1972
President to the Acting Chancellor. The President in plain and pain-ful terms explains the financial conditions of the University and pleads
Tl alS° exPlains that he ™*y not be able to open the new Medicalbcftool building unless a special appropriation is forthcoming.
Commentary: The University received federal
capitation grants for every medical student
that was admitted however the grants came
a fter the school was in operation. Once the
school was open and operating, federal money
would be forthcoming but the school had to be
opened first. The University had to have the
money to hire new faculty to open the school
to get the federal money.
January, 1973
There had been many reports by various vice presidents, assistants,
and others through the first four months of the year that the subsidy and
medical appropriation increases were going to be tough to get. The Uni-
versity had mounted a campaign to gain legislative support by having
breakfasts for legislators at the President’s house to explain the problems
the University was having. Also the Alumni Office had launched an informa-
tion sharing effort with its alumni throughout the state by telling the
alumni about the University’s financial problems and asking the alumni to
contact their congressman for support for the University. This alumni
campaign was effective as reports began to come in from the alumni office
that showed alumni were reaching legislators.
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it was also announced that rh^ VV
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support of medical students who come from^t-of-sLte!
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Commentary: The Regents were responding to a
state consuitant report that showed the high cost
mfnted rh
students from out-of-state and docu-e t e fact that the State was not retainingthese students once they finished th^ir schooling,he President realized then, as he wrote to one
of his vice presidents; "there is no question but
•k? Y
e/re going to have to make the most incred-ible defense of our request for a subsidy revision
and medical school expansion. If We are to move
rough the barage of questioning without incurring
the wounds that were opened up today we will have
to be very compelling."
February 23, 1973
th„ n
Acting Chancellor to the President. The memo announced
e possibility of limiting the number of spaces available for out-of-state
students in professional schools which would increase the number of spacestor in state students. The reason was a cost saving motive. The Board ofRegents is exploring alternatives but the "Board will want to consider
amendments limiting State subsidy to State residents within the entering
classes in medicine with a view to sharply increasing spaces available
or state applicants and hopefully to an increase in the number of physi-
cians eventually establishing permanent practices in the state."
Commentary: After it was apparent that there were
going to be problems with the University Medical
School admissions of 56% in-state and 44% out-of-
state, the President wrote to the Medical School
Dean and Vice President asking for information.
March 5, 1973
Memo from the Medical School Dean to the President. The Dean tells
the President that the University’s access to the national pool of medical
applicants allows recruitment from the largest possible base. "Restriction,"
he writes, "will make more heterogeneous classes with regard to social-
economic, racial and cultural background." Also studies show that geographic
restriction of admissions will not ensure an adequate supply of physicians
in the State. "There is a high correlation between location of residency
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Commentary: It is quite evident that the MedicalSchool faculty was reluctant to have State inter-ference. They were aware of the growing national
tendency of public schools to limit enrollment,by legislatively limiting the entering class size
or limiting State subsidy to just in-state students.
March 6, 1973
Meeting the Board of Directors
A board member raises the question of
further information on the admissions
to out-of-state students, comparisons
changes.
of the University and the President.
Medical School admissions and wants
process. The ratio of in-state
to other colleges, and on proposed
Commentary: Board members were reacting to a
Regents press release concerning the efficacy
of medical school admissions and state subsidy
for the education of out-of-state students.
Also there was some question of how many minority
students were being admitted. The President asked
his Vice President for the Medical Center and the
Medical School Dean to prepare the information the
Board members wanted.
March 7
,
1973
Phone call to the President from the wife of an Alumnus industrial
executive in behalf of a young friend of hers. She wants to know the
status of her friend’s Medical School application. Her husband has been
a corporate fund supporter of the University for years.
March 13, 1973
Memo the President to the Medical School Dean. The President wants
a meeting with the Dean, the Vice President and the Director of the hospital
to review and acquaint himself with admissions procedures. The President
feels that unless the University's policy is intelligent and reasonable,
another policy might be developed by the Regents and the legislature.
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tions.
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A new Chancellor was elected at^hat ^
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Commentary: The Regents were very concerned
with both minority admissions and out-of-state
admissions. The proposal for two new medical
schools, if pushed might mean no expansion of
existing medical schools.
March 20. 1973
Memo to the President from the Vice Mayor of the City. The Viceyor wants an explanation of medical admissions procedures in responseto letters he has received from citizens and in order to present a report
o the city council. The President responds by saying the University is
now reviewing the admissions procedures and the Vice Mayor should contactthe Medical Center Vice President and Medical School Dean for further infor-
mation.
March 23, 1973
Memo to the President from State Representative //I saying that he
is receiving mail from throughout the State concerning the University’s
medical admissions policies. Would the President provide him with infor-
mation on procedures and percentages on in-state/out-of-state admissions?
March 23, 1973
Memo to the President from an assistant. The assistant has been
checking on various applications the President needed to know about.
The assistant advises the President to answer to all those personal
inquiries concerning applications and say that all applications have
been put through the proper process and to wait and see the outcome.
The assistant advises the President not to become involved in the
admission process more than is absolutely necessary.
March 27, 1973
Memo to the President from State Representative //2. The Senate
representative asks for more information on Medical School admissions -
the procedures, admissions ratio, number of minorities admitted, and
number of graduates of the Medical School. This representative also
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Commentary: This representative was black and
naturally showed an interest in minorities. He
was also on the Senate Education and Health
Appropriations Committee.
March 27, 1973
Memo to the President from State Representative //3. The repre-
sentative sends the President some figures that have been sent to con-
cerned citizens and legislators that compare University admission ratios
to other state schools
. The accompanying letter with the statistics
advise the recipient to write to his city councilman, state representa-
tive or senator.
March 28, 1973
Memo to the Dean of the Medical College from the Vice President
of the Medical Center (cc: President). The Vice President says that he
will be going to the Regents tomorrow to discuss the admissions issue.
He feels that the University has no alternative but to propose to increase
in—state student admissions to a 70—75% level. There may be a compromise
between 70% and the absolute maximum of 80%. The University’s trade-off
will be to obtain the special supplemental appropriations for the Medical
School expansion.
March 29, 1973
Meeting between the President and Medical School personnel regarding
the process of Medical School admissions. The President was informed that
the criteria used for examining candidates were grade point average, extra-
curricular activities, college of origin, personal interview, AMCAS and a
counselors’ letter of recommendation. This year there had been 6,500
applicants for 120 positions. A minority goal was set at 24 (or 20%)
and women would make up 20% of the next year's class.
Commentary: The faculty and medical group were
reluctant to give up this traditional prerogative.
They argued that it would reduce the applicant pool
from 6,500 to 1,400, that geographic restriction
would not be an effective way to maintain physi-
cians in the State, that the restriction would lower
the quality of minority applicants, that the state
budget only makes up 19% of the Medical College
budget, and that financial support should be corre-
lated with control.
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March 29, 1973
Memo - Westwood Civic Association to the Chairwoman(cc: the President) - urging that the out-of-state medical
sions be limited to 10%.
of the Board
school admis-
Aprll 2, 1973
Memo to the President from a United States Senator (Legislator //A).He asks the President for more information concerning alleged unfair
admission practices so he can reply to his constituents.
April 2, 1973
Memo to the President from the Dean of the Medical School. He pleads
with the President to do what he can to allow the admission standards to stay
as they are for the sake of tradition, academic excellence, and competition,
but says that if Nixon’s budget cutbacks which could cost the University a
loss of $3.5 million in federal grants places the President in a position
where he must bargain then the President should ask for appropriate compen-
sation from the legislature to change admissions ratios.
April 4, 1973
Phone call to the President from a physician alumnus representing
an ad hoc group of physicians from the southwestern part of the State.
He says that the State medical academy wants a change in the University’s
admissions procedures. He is a friend of the Regents and wants action.
April 5, 1973
Memo, the President to the Regents. He presents the University
rationale for the Medical School special supplemental appropriations.
The President asks for $1.2 million in the 1973-75 biennium budget.
April 6, 1973
Meeting, the vice presidents meet with the Acting Chancellor to
request a special appropriation of $1.2 million for the Medical School
expansion.
April 12, 1973
Memo to the Dean of Medical Admissions from a State Senator
(Legislator #5) recommending a student for admission.
April 13, 1973
Memo, the Vice President to the Medical Center to the Dean of the
Medical School. The Vice President describes a conference with the
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wY YY ent WaS thinkin8 that after the agreementth the Regents that information would get to the
egislators in a position paper. The position paperwas prepared without faculty participation. Facultymembers attitudes, according to the Vice President
7
were that they did not want the change and were
waiting until it was forced on them.
April id, 1973
,
Mem0 t0 Y PyeSident from an assistant. Report of a meeting among
d . .
P6^ 01111
^
1 related to the admissions process.- The chairman of the
:
onth^:ee is reiuctant to up the admissi°n ° f in-stapa
legislItoY Y SOmt SUCC6SS preparin« a Position paper to present togislators, the assistant reports.
April 17, 1973
Memo to the President from the Vice President for Public Relations.
a report °n the House Bill #86 which Is the biennium budget for
,
75 ‘ He phen reports on the inter-university council meeting with the
c ng Chancellor of the Regents and the University presidents. The ActingChancellor stated his displeasure of special appropriations for three stateinstitutions. The Chancellor spoke for unity in the inter-university
council. The council members were mad at those institutions that went for
special appropriations and threatened to try to turn some legislators against
the increase. When the Acting Chancellor was asked whether he knew of those
special purpose items he said absolutely not.
Commentary: The Chancellor was denying knowledge
of documents that had been sent to him, i.e. an
April 5 memorandum requesting special appropriations.
The legislature had also by this time tacked on an
amendment to House Bill 86 requiring faculty in
undergraduate schools to teach a minimum of twelve
hours and those in graduate school, nine hours.
Also they were urging that sabbaticals not be sup-
ported by subsidy money.
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April 20. 1973
Press Release "Regents Rap Special Aid for PollDenounce Special Aid" (Akron Beacon Journal Z
***'' Regents
censored the University for nor o-t i
The Reeents publicly
university request! SneM^ n ! P 7 8° ing along with the inter-
the total amount of dollars possibl^^The"! m
th® ReRents may erode
that he had heard that those "special al^ron^ Said 3galnaround" but had had no chance ro at P oposals were being kicked
sity representatives.
discuss them in hearings with Univer-
Commentary. This charge of log-rolling may havebeen unfair in the sense that the University hadbeen working with the Chancellor to get the
appropriations. Also this attack meant that the
niversity wouid have to work over the opposition
of the Acting Chancellor and the newly appointed
ancellor in getting the special appropriations.
It was not clear whether this public censure actu-
ally represented the feelings of the newly-
appointed Chancellor.
April 20. 1973
he is ™h t? th! Preside"t from a state Representative #6. He sayscontinuing to get mad about the University's admission policies.The House has passed House Bill #86 with the appropriations tor the
medical appropriations, yet the University has done little to show thatit wants to serve the citizens of the State through its Medical School
admissions policies. The representative said that citizens of the state
would rather have an excellent university open to them and their children
than a prestigious university that is closed to them.
Commentary: The representative also said that
excellence comes less from a varied student body
and more from a varied faculty.
April 23, 1973
Press release in which State Representative //6 blasts the University
f°r -^s admissions policies - "University Medical School Admissions Policies
Criticized (Cincinnati Enquirer, April 23, 1973). He also criticizes those
legislators who pushed the appropriations bill through the House. The
article contained some rebuttal remarks from the Medical School's Chairman
of Admissions.
April 23, 1973
Memo to the President from an executive of an industrial firm
threatening not to participate in the corporate fund drive unless the
Medical School admissions policies are changed.
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April 27 T 1 97 *3
He reports that the Facult^cfuncil^/Jhe
^
r
^
ldent of Medical Center,
change the practice of admission and d m °u
^ ° f Mediclne voted to
students for the ^0.1^1^0^19^ "T^ ZuU f ln-8tateacrimony now being leveled at the College." should lessen the
Commentary: This action represents a big stepIn that the faculty have come to feel thl heightof external pressures. They were afraid that
since over 1/2 of the In-state students elect to
fvo?Vah°01 °“tslde the state . if the Universityxciuded out-of-state students, this action wouldtouch off retaliation from other out-of-state
schools resulting in a chain reaction of majorproportions.
j- iay
sentative"^'
0 ASSlStant Bean of Medi“l College from State Repre-
brthe Issl^anrLa
r
n
PreSen
?
atlVe 18 mad beCaUSe ° £ the atcusatlons made
cLf.!, i
D ln a letter Printed in the newspaper. The repre-
Regents^o so
V°Wed t0 St°P the medlcal appropriations and help the
May 17, 1973
Memo to the Medical School Dean from the President. The Presidentasks the Dean to contact Representative #6 and walk him through the admis-sions process. The Dean should contact the representative and discuss with
m the issues he has raised and explain the new admissions policy. This
must be done before House Bill #86 goes to the Conference Committee.
May 17, 1973
Memo to the Executive Vice President from the President. The Presi-dent advises the Vice President to get out a press release stating the
resolution of the admissions question. "People should know about the
increase of in-state student admissions to 70% in 1974 and 75% in 1975."
May 17, 1973
Memo, the President to an assistant. The assistant had drafted a
letter to an executive of an industrial firm telling the executive that
a particular applicant to the Medical School had been rejected. The
letter which did not contain any information about the applicant’s short-
comings, was caught by the President and ordered to be redrafted. The
President felt that it was important to indicate what the applicant’s
deficiencies were that resulted in his rejection.
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May 21. 1975
that the : iiiini t h - ^
intelligence and feels that the TH?
°U
,
sta“ stlc = that insult his
to cut off funds and enUst In ^ l
±ty ls stalling. He will move
meeting but not if it "is full of the
* can helP hlm - He wants a
sobbly gook as in the plst!"
Seneralittes and a bunch of
May 23, 1973
Press release: the University will
admissions to 70% in 1974 and 75% in 1975.
increase in-state student
May 24, 1973
tions
M
?he vire^p
Pr
^
lden
!:
frOI“ the Vlce Resident for Public Rela-
,
Vlc President has set up the meeting with the legislators
vTrl p L
SSUe f Medlcal Sch°o1 Emissions. Those present wfu be rteVice President for the Medical School, the Dean, the President as wellas epresentatives #2, if6 and two other area legislators. The Regentshave approved a special subsidy request.
Commentary: The President seemes to want to
clear the air, get the figures that had been
circulating around the state straight, and
appease the legislators. He is willing to go
to 85% in-state students if need be. The
legislators expressed the desire for a no
nonsense meeting. There was a dry run the
day before with the rationale of admissions
increase to be based on the "clear wishes
of the citizens of the state, not because
of expanding Medical School costs."
May 26, 1973
The meeting - a press release termed the meeting "useful." A joint
statement revealed that the University was to increase the number of state
and city students with an added emphasis on increasing the number of
minority students in each entering class.
Commentary: The meeting between the President
and the legislators resulted in the legislators
coming to understand that in some ways the faculty,
not the President, had control of the admissions
procedures. The medical people in some ways felt
the direct pressure of the legislators. There
were no percentage figures given in the press
release but the legislators came away from the
meeting understanding that 90% in-state student
admissions was the University's goal.
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June 6. 1971
that while the legislators came away with the d
V1S6S the Presldent
quota is an official university coal tbp f
“n erstandin
* that a 90%
are thinking in terms of a 70-75% otota orkin n’ ’ !
lumnl and Regents
President for the Medical Center hp
g * ly ne^otiated by the Vice
the admissions policy with his faculty^nlTth
8 letting the Dean explore
that are likely to be achieved.
7 ^ report back the £°als
Analysis
Commentary: The President allows the facultyto seek the medium partly for faculty autonomy
and partly to leave well enough alone while theGovernor signs House Bill #86 that had gottenpast the Conference Committee.
The case just presented exemplifies that managerial autonomy is
difficult to maintain in the face of turbulent environments and organiza-
tional dependency on many outside groups. This example shows that outside
groups pressuring for change are more likely to increase the chances of
internal change occurring. In this case, private citizens, alumni,
industry, the Regents, and several legislators intensely and specifically
made their demands known. Since the University was in need of the subsidy
appropriations pressure was even more acute and choice on the part of the
University.
The author’s view is that the University could not have remained
unresponsive to the public will even if the biennium budget had not been
in doubt. Why is it important to maintain institutional autonomy if not
to allow the institution to be more able to serve the people that give the
institution its legitimate function? External groups were operating on
the assumption that if they were legitimizing and subsidizing the Institu-
tion's function then it should cater to their needs. It was quite apparent
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that the ill-will and backlash engendered by the refusal to adjust
the admissions ratio was not worth the dubious distinction of having
a pluralistic student body.
Again, this case illustrates two kinds of role conflict on
the focal person, the University President. Intersender and intra-
sender role conflict will be discussed in the next two sections of
this chapter.
Intersender Conflict
Many groups stated what they wanted the President to do. The
overwhelming majority of external groups wanted the admissions ratio
changed. Legislators wanted them changed because they wanted the school
to be responsive to the constituents the University served who were
going to shoulder the cost of the next approved appropriations bill.
Alumni, industrial executives and private citizens wanted the ratio
changed so that their sons and daughters would have a better chance
to be admitted in the competitive circumstances of the seventies.
Other state universities wanted the ratio changed because it would give
more of their graduates a better chance to be admitted.
The faculty, Dean, and Vice President judiciously guarded the
time-honored tradition of guild expertise of the medical faculty having
the prerogative of determining what was best for the art of medicine.
This group felt that the wider the applicant pool, the tougher the
competition the better the applicant they would get to train and hence
join the ranks of the guild. At the start of the year the faculty had
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the prerogatlve to decUe the ratlo Qf ln .state/ouc _of _state gtudente
and the President could only defer all pleas for applicant acceptance
to the faculty admissions committee.
When the year ended the prerogative lay in the hands of the
legislature which had set it at a fixed ratio. The pressure from out-
side pleas directed at the President especially pleas on behalf of out-
of-state students, from now on can only be deferred to the legislature.
There may not be as many in-state students however who will be turned
away. One interesting thing is that the President has always had very
little influence on the process of admissions and although this admissions
Issue is resolved, with influence changing hands, the President still has
very little power on the process of medical admissions.
The intersender role conflict is quite evident. The President
was expected to protect faculty autonomy. With what, it is not known.
All the power to make academic decisions lay in the hands of the indi-
vidual faculty member and specialized departments. What did the
President have to offer to those who subsidize the institution?
Accountability? The legislature had already passed the amendmend
requiring faculty to teach so many hours a week. Quality of service?
There were precious little measure of quality beside a prestigeful job
and those were getting fewer. Socialization of the young? In loco
parentis has been substantially weakened during the past decade?
Failure to protect faculty autonomy could result in loss of
administrative credibility. Failure to meet the demands of external
groups would result in financial loss and institutional debt.
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Intrasender Conflict
There was not too much evidence for intrasender conflict. The
Chancellor's vascillation and eventual reversal of sent role is one of
the few striking examples that could he found during the year of this
study. Most of the external and internal groups remained fairly con-
sistent with their demands even though those demands resulted in inter-
sender conflict.
Summary
It is evident that some of the problems associated with the
admissions ratio stem from the fact that the University is in the
transition between being a city and state institution. The term
transition is used because the University will have to become totally
public supported and state affiliated to remain solvent in these times
of financial scarcity. It is difficult to sit on the fence being both
private and public because it requires the defense of both positions and
weaving both into a course of action. Many times, trying to be both
private and public may result in irreconcilable differences. Certainly
this point is exemplified by the medical admissions case.
It seemed evident that the Vice President for the Medical Center
was not communicating to the President or the legislature what the
Medical College was doing. This lack of communication caused the legis-
lators to keep the pressure on even though some decisions had been
reached to change the ratios as early as March. It seemed appropriate
at least to have let the legislators know earlier what they were to find
out in the May 26th meeting, that the faculty had independently decided to
change the ratios and the President could do little to order that change.
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greater the intensity of sent rnl e tuhere was no question that the
President was going to have to change the tatio if it was within his
power since all of these groups - alumni, industrial executives, the
Regents, legislators
- had placed co^on de^nds on the President.
allowed very little choice in compliance if the state subsidy
and special appropriations were to be passed.
also be said that external groups view the University as
existing to serve the public and expect it to be responsive to public
demands. Furthermore the President is viewed as having the cbntrol
and authority over the institution to direct the University to he
responsive to those demands.
Ouasi-Legal and Moral Issues
There were some small issues that surfaced during the year that
centered around issues of legality and morality. For example, a gay
liberation group pushed for official recognition as a student group by
applying through the proper student and administrative channels for a
student organizational charter. Another issue that required immediate
attention arose when the Dean of the School of Education began to bring
his four month old baby to the office with him. A third example involved
the city building inspector declaring one the University's dormitories a
fire trap.
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In each Instance there were no tell-tale antecedents to the Issue
that showed up in the process of "scanning" for information. Each one
of these issues resulted from actions taken by others that resulted in
a small crisis or "brushfire." The President had to react and deal
With each issue in an ad hoc fashion. Most of these types of issues
engendered outcries from the public, from independent citizens, and
groups, and were induced by media exposure. Each of the three examples
mentioned also involved ambiguous legal decisions and hinged on legal
technicalities for solution.
The "Dean’s baby" issue and dormitory safety will be discussed
just briefly to show some of the characteristic ambiguities associated
with the issues. Some of the other quasi-legal and moral issues that
cropped up during the year were: the decision to disclose faculty
salaries, student in-state residency requirements, mandatory regulations
that required students to live in the University dormitories, and the
request to make students stand for the national anthem at public events.
Dormitory Safety
On February 14th a group of city officials from the City Building
Division inspected a twenty-six story dormitory operated by the University.
This inspection was different in that it was done by some of the top offi-
cials of the City Building Division, it was unannounced, and did not leave
any report of findings with the University Physical Plant officials. On
February 22nd the City Official returned to conduct a tour with university
officials and members of the press which revealed the violations found on
February 14th.
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The City Press and University Press carried headlines saying
University Dormitory: The State’s c,foofs Safest, or Fire Trap?" (Cincinnati
Post, February 22
, 1973, p. 24) andF Building Inspectors Point Out
ral Violations of Sander Hall" (The News Record, February 23, 1973
,
p. 1). The publicity caused student and parent concern, reflected In
a barrage of phone calls and mall In the President's office.
The President was quoted as saying, "I really don’t think there
is anything more than a human error here, but I Intend to put out a
letter to parents because I am quite concerned about them" (The News
Record, February 23, 1973, p. 1 ).
After some Interviews with University officials and the press,
it was revealed that the City Building Division was having Internal
troubles, squabbling over jurisdictions, which resulted In sanctions
from the State Board of Building Standards. The State Board had given
the City Building Division 120 days to "get its house in order and
properly enforce the city-state building codes or go out of business"
(Cincinnati Post, February 22, 1973, p. 24).
The violations found in the dormitory were vaguely specified
and had resulted from wear and occupancy and were not a result of
architecture, wiring, or inadequate fire protection. The City Fire
Chief said, "the University can’t be bigger than anyone else, most of
the things that we are talking about are people violations, but a
violation is a violation" (News Record, February 23, 1973). The
architecture and physical plant people said the city people were nitpicking.
Violations were cited such as a severe draft which came from an open door
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in the trash chut
installed within
e, several outlet receptacle boxes which had not been
one-fourth Inch of the finished wall as required, and
a lack of firestopping material around pipe
The fire officials were not able to find the
rooms to demonstrate this last charge.
casings in two toilet rooms,
access panel in the toilet
The role ambiguity and conflict demonstrated by this example Is
evident in the need for the University to maintain a credible Image.
Ambiguity arises from the fact that there Is very little the President
could do to gain the proper information to prevent this incident from
happening. If indeed there was a "head-hunting" expedition being con-
ducted by the City Building Division, there seemed little that could
be done to prevent the controversy.
The faculty and Board, parents and students. Regents and legis-
lature hold the President responsible for the organization's image and
behavior. Conflict comes when the President strives to meet role senders'
expectations, yet through no fault of his own or with little control over
image factors, as exemplified by the above example, role expectations
are not met. The above example is an isolated one, but the image of
the institution is formed by several of these "brushf ires" or small
issues occurring frequently over a period of time.
The above example demonstrates how the President can become the
victim of intrasender conflict. The City Building Division had been
operating in a standard way for many years yet because of its internal
struggles it changed its style of operation. The University therefore
204
suffer the consequences of a relaxed then rigid Inspection pro-
cedure with no warning that there has been a change in inspectors’
attitudes. In the long run, the President and the University officials
are seen as not doing their job in meeting public expectations.
The "Dean’s Baby" Issue
On October 12th the President's secretary received a phone call
from an anonymous mother of a secretary who worked for the University.
The woman complained that the School of Education Dean had brought his
baby into work and was thereby neglecting other important things that
had to be done. The woman was angry saying something should be done
about it and that other people were going to complain. The President
sent a note to the Dean to inform him of the phone call, accompanied
with a box of "Pampers.”
On the 17th of October the Dean wrote a memo to his secretarial
and clerical staff taking a stand on the issue by explaining his reasons
for taking his son to work. The Dean felt that "somehow the way in which
work is defined in our society needs to shift to incorporate far more of
the human, the humane and the family." In present society, work is most
often separated from play with the result being the separation of values,
needs and activities which reward people emotionally and aesthetically.
Also, because he was working at night, many times the child was not
awake during the hours his father was at home. The issue of sex roles
socially defined proscriptions prevent a man and a woman from enjoying
various aspects of their lives." The Dean did not want to thrust on his
wife "the role of full-time and unrelieved day care specialist" just because
he "had chosen to accept a heavy, time consuming, and emotionally demanding
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professional responbility. » By bringing his son to work a couple of
mornings a week, the Dean would get to "participate in the magic of
my son's growth and my wife would have brief opportunities to do her
own thing."
The Dean closed the letter by saying that the child's world
ought to extend beyond his home, and that the chances were that more
work would be the result because he did not want to run the risk of
anyone raising complaints like the one that had been phone into the
President’s office.
On the 24th of October a city newspaper called the President
seeking a statement concerning the President's view on the "Dean's
baby" issue. The newspaper had done a human interest story and
wanted the President's rejoinder. The story was covered by the UP
and API and received national and international coverage. The Dean
was also on CBS national T.V. news.
On October 24th the President's office began getting phone calls
and letters from enthusiastic and outraged citizens and the controversy
was on. In the President's office the mail and calls were running 2:1
against the Dean’s actions while in the Dean's office the mail and phone
calls were 16:1 in favor of his actions.
Before the story broke presidential assistants advised the President
to be cautious. It would look bad that a Dean was babysitting at the tax-
payers' expense and this could set a precedent for other University person-
nel to follow.
206
The President initial reaction was to consider treating the
matter with humor and to put a plug in tor day-care. However it was
evident that the issue could result in a no-win situation. Even though
the President disliked anonymous callers and felt that this was a local
Issue that needed to be worked out between the Dean and the complainers,
the President was quoted by the press as saying that as long as the Dean
was giving the taxpayer his money’s worth, and as long as the baby was
ot interfering with institutional work or competency, bully for the Dean.’
President s office for the next two weeks had to deal with
the letters and phone calls that came in blasting the University and
the President for not doing something about the Dean. Most of the
Phone calls and letters to both the Dean and the President that were
not in favor of the Dean’s actions were from men who had sons or grand-
sons in college. The majority of contacts showing approval and encourage-
ment for the Dean were from women and mothers. None of the contacts to
the President were from organizations but rather from independent citizens.
The conflict in this small example is evident. Intersender conflict
is present in that some people saw the Dean’s behavior as refreshing,
endearing, and valuable while others saw it as a dangerous precedent,
threatening men's roles and a waste of taxpayers' money. The press saw
it as newsworthy and did "slant" the story in favor of the Dean. Ambi-
guity was present in that there was very little information available as
to how the "public" would respond, and because the Dean did not consult
anyone before acting, the dilemma was in the President's Ian before in-
formation or policy could be formulated.
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There also may have been sene possible person-role conflict In
that If the President wanted to back the Dean wholeheartedly, If the
President’s values were congruent with the Dean's on this particular
issue. It seemed as If there was very little choice for the President
to voice that approval. In a way, it was expected that the President
would provide a sobering statement about taxpayers’ money and account-
ability.
Chapter Summary
The academic year was filled with many more issues and problems
similar to the ones described in this chapter. There were many more
examples of conflict and ambiguity piled upon each other, some related,
some not, all requiring information, all resulting in demands for the
President's time and energy and thoughtful analysis in order for resolu-
tion to be reached.
In Chapter III the reader can easily see the amount of activity
and the type of activity that is required of the President in the process
of trying to solve the problems and resolve issues that directly influence
the institution's course of action. In Chapter IV expectations, in general
form, were described that characterize certain pressures experienced through
interactions with external groups.
This chapter described through particular examples, how general
pressures are manifested in specified, sequential, contextual interactions.
The role of the boundary person is unique. It is different than just inter-
acting with internal constituents. The central elements or themes that
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were reflected In these examples were power and the President's lack of
it, misunderstanding, and non-communication. U can he suggested that
many outsider groups may not know or understand the true "conditions of
authority" in the University.
Authority Is diffused. It Is decentralized, lying somewhere be-
tween the plethora of ad hoc committees of the University and Faculty
Senates and the individual faculty member and his department. The
administrator has very little leverage to force faculty members or
departments to make certain decisions or to cooperate in certain pro-
jects. The President is now left with cajoling, persuading, negotiating,
and pleading for support.
Also, because the President lacks formal power over role senders
outside the University, his ability to guarantee that the external groups
will provide the resources for which internal units hold him responsible
is reduced. To compensate for this lack of formal authority in a linking
pin role, the boundary person must rely heavily on bonds of trust, respect,
and caring that he develops with outsiders.
These bonds are difficult to maintain as examples have shown:
outsiders too easily associate the failings of the University with the
failures of the President. Also the failures of outside units to provide
internal units with resources are often blamed upon the boundary person,
namely the President. In both instances trust, affection, and caring
that oil the wheels of administrative decision-making, become scarce and
usually make the process of directing a large complex organization diffi-
cult and painful for the administrator.
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The ability to disengage personal faults fro™ organizational
responsibilities and to distinguish both fro™ events in which the
boundary person is an innocent and powerless spectator are the results
of the role senders' inadequate understanding of boundary conditions.
The President in a boundary position is faced with a sizable
number of role senders whose demands are hard to oredict and even more
difficult to control, shifts in role expectations result from dynamics
idiosyncratic to the external groups themselves, which makes it doubly
hard for the boundary person to diagnose. Perhaps what makes the
situation even more tragic is that the boundary person has only limited
power or authority with which to deal with external expectations.
CHAPTER VI
COPING MECHANISMS
An underlying premise of role theory is that an organization
is made up of a variety of overlapping roles and role sets each con-
sisting of the individual focal person and those other people with whom
the focal person must interact in the organization's input—transforma-
tion—output process. Chapters III, IV, and V described the roles and
role set of a University President, in other words the activities and
behaviors of the President and those people and organizations he would
generally interact with in the course of performing those activities.
Also described were the five thematic problems that seemed to characterize
the academic year of 1972-73 and the resultant four types of role conflict
that could be seen through those problems for the President's role.
The emphasis of this study has been confined to variables of
role conflict such as sent role expectations, organizational position
and constraints on the focal person, the organizational contexts of the
role senders, the behavior of the focal person, and feedback to the role
senders. Influential factors such as past interaction or history between
the focal person and his role senders, attributes of the persons involved
such as motives, values, fears, defense mechanisms, and style were not
considered in great length except when these factors had a direct bearing
on the issues discussed.
The influential factors listed above were described only when
absolutely necessary because the purpose of this study was to explain
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observed patterns o£ behavior in terras of existing social conditions.
Holding in abeyance "personality" or "social background", the method of
this study asks what features of the observed social setting or organi-
zational context would lead almost anyone occupying the role of presi-
dent to behave in the particular ways being observed.
In some ways, however, coping mechanisms are more personal, more
contingent on past behavior, values, and personality, than on the condi-
tions of role conflict and ambiguity. The focal person can have little
effect on "objective" role forces, but his personality influences
received role and consequently the coping mechanisms he uses. No
coping mechanisms can be fully understood without considering both the
factors this research studies such as sent role, role senders, organiza-
tional context, and the behavior of the focal person, and the factors
which this study did not directly consider such as the focal person's
style, personality, and past interpersonal relations with role senders.
An in-depth study of coping mechanisms in stressful conditions is
not a study of neat, self-contained role episodes and one-to-one relation-
ships. In the previous chapters, however, the author has considered role
episodes and relationships in this way, in full realization that the
emphasis taken oversimplified a dynamic and complex problem.
The stresses of role conflict and ambiguity are not equally
damaging to all who experience them because the extent to which the role
conflict produces stress is mediated by the focal person's individuality
and his relations with his role senders (Kahn and Wolfe, 1964, p. 337).
If the coping mechanisms are successful for the focal person, the strain
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and stress is reduced; if the coping behaviors are not successful, the
conflict and stress can be intensified.
The general emphasis and style of this dissertation has been to
focus on one President and his problems; in keeping with that approach
the author will discuss a sample of coping mechanisms observed by
watching one President work through his problems. There will be no attempt
to describe the personality characteristics of the President that mandated
certain coping mechanisms over others or to explain the motives for certain
choices over others.
It is the author's belief that people, because of certain person-
ality characteristics, are limited in their choices of appropriate coping
mechanisms. It is not the purpose of this study to do an in-depth study
of coping mechanisms which would necessitate a study of personality and
style. Rather, this study intends to describe what was observed, to
depict the varient forms without trying to link cause and effect and with-
out making judgements as to the appropriateness of the behavior in terms
of the President's personality or style vis-a-vis the system's needs.
An in-depth study of coping mechanisms would not necessarily be
confined to a study of rational solutions of transient issues. Ultimately,
coping must be depicted within a context which includes the problems or
issue, the personality of the solver, and the cost of the solution to
the intra-psychic, interpersonal, and organizational systems of the
solver (Kahn and Wolfe, 1964, p. 340). Also an in-depth study would not
be confined to successful coping behavior, because not all coping
mechanisms result in reduced conflict.
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The criteria for what Is a "successful" coping mechanist, Is
defined In terms of a reduction In tension, stress, conflict, or
ambiguity for the Individual focal person rather than in a reduction
of tension for the system. It is possible to argue that if system needs
are met and at the same time stress and tension are reduced for the
focal person then the coping mechanism is effective as well as success-
ful. For the purposes of this study effective coping mechanisms are
defined as behaviors which result in a reduction of both individual and
system stress and will not be discussed.
The purpose of this study is to delineate some of the coping
mechanisms observed that seemed to reduce conflict and ambiguity for
the focal person. Whether or not the focal person's coping mechanisms
are, in the long run, effective In reducing systemic conflict and ambi-
guity will not be treated in this work.
Coping Mechanisms
The major organizational determinants of conflict and ambiguity
that have been depicted in the examples in Cahpters III, IV, and V were
the requirements of overseeing and crossing the organization's boundaries,
the requirement of producing innovative solutions to non-routine problems,
and the requirement of being responsible for the work of others. All
three of these factors or determinants resulted in constraints on the
President's actions and almost always resulted in role conflict.
There seemed to be three basic ways of dealing with the conflicting
role pressures: 1) the President could comply with the demands or try to
persuade the role senders to modify their expectations; 2) he could
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avoid stressful situations; or 3) he could use defense mechanisms
that would put reality In a personal frame of reference and lessen
anxiety. All three options were observed during the year of this
study.
There were examples, such as the safety issue concerning dormi-
tories or the "dean's baby" issue, about which little could be done.
In many small issues that leave little reaction time or that arise because
the President has little power to change the role senders’ actions there
is not much he can do but "bite the bullet" or "grin and bear it". When
role senders could not distinguish between the President’s actions and
the institution's characteristics, or when the role senders held the
President responsible in those cases in which he had not control, the
President could only acknowledge that he was a casualty of his role.
It did not good to protest or explain.
This chapter will contain two sections. The first portion of
this chapter will describe the coping mechanisms that were found to come
under the three options mentioned above. The second portion of this
chapter will contain suggestions of possible, generalizable coping mechan-
isms for university presidents.
Defense Mechanisms that Put Reality in a Personal Frame of Reference
This group of mechanisms seemed the widest in repetoire not
because they were preferred but because the opportunities for the other
two, persuading role senders to change and avoiding stressful situations,
were less likely possibilities. The types of coping mechanisms observed
in this regard were behaviors such as 1) humor, 2) writing, 3) a focus
on change and innovation, and 4) keeping some psychological distance from
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Interactors
.
1) Humor
Humor was a key ingredient in the President's administration. It
was cyclic. There were periods when it would be dormant yet always
return to the surfact in memoranda and in meetings. The humor was subtly
expressed, for example, by sending a box of "Pampers" to the Dean who
brought his baby to work or by sending a memo to the Long Range Planning
Task Force that described in satriical terms how Moses might prepare his
long range plan for leading the Jewish people out of Egypt. The humor
was most prevalent just before or after long vacations. And it seemed to
be less prevalent during periods of sustained crisis.
The humor did serve to put things in perspective and cause Deople
to release a little of their anxiety. There were times, however, when the
President would use humor to show displeasure. A remark would carry a
double edge to show that he had noticed some deficiency, yet was willing
to poke fun of it. The recipient was left to determine which was more
important to respond to first.
2) Writing and Publishing
The emotional cost or stress of role conflict for the President
resulted in job dissatisfaction, low-confidence in the present structure
and style of the organization, and in a high degree of job-related
tension. These three manifestations of stress could be seen in a number
of ways, the most prominent being in the President's published writings.
In 1972 he wrote of the frustration he felt, how he needed more time to
do the things he felt a president should do, how the university must
adapt if it is to survive in the seventies because the great flow of
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resources of the sixties had stopped, and he wrote of the high degree
of energy the job demanded that resulted in soul-tiring hours at his
desk trying to keep up with his work (Bennis
, 1972, p. A3).
A major coping mechanism observed by the researcher was that of
the President using his writing as a form of catharsis and analysis to
mitigate role conflict. It is the author’s opinion that writing was a
self-initiated, self-rewarding process that enabled the President to
think out, to analyze and to externalize something that otherwise would
remain inside. Writing would reduce the ambiguity by allowing for self-
definition and analysis. It would reduce some of the President's role
conflict by placing phenomena in his own frame of reference. Through
writing he could rationalize his own perspective and through analysis
explore possible alternatives which might result in some future solutions.
Because of the high rate of incremental information that "scanning”
produces and because of the need for informed decision-making the President
spent a lot of time attempting to clarify an ambiguous environment. Part
of the clarifying process was done by writing about the insitution, its
contexts, and the problems the President’s office was concerned with
because of the institution and its environmental contexts.
3) Focus on change and innovation
There was a tremendous amount of administrative change and emphasis
on change during the year this study was conducted. The President spon-
sored a series of administrative seminars directed toward changing
attitudes, increasing skills, and providing ways that the top echelon
of administrators could cope more fully with their problems. There was a
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great deal of turnover of Vice Presidential and Presidential assistants
during the year this study was conducted.
The emphasis on change and the eventual personnel turnover at
the end of the year may have created a sense of rising expectations and
optimism that conflicts could be resolved and that change was possible.
On the other hand, a sense of hopelessness or powerlessness on the part
of the President in relation to internal groups makes role conlict and
ambiguity even more difficult to bear, increases tension and anxiety, and
decreases the President’s ability to influence interaction with external
groups
.
4) Keeping Some Psychological Distance from Interactors
It was established in Chapter III that the President chose the
unrelenting pace of meetings, phone calls, and mail. The question is
why did he tolerate this pace? Why did he continually cause the expan-
sion of his sphere of activities? In Chapter III one reason given for
this expansion was not to discourage the flow of information needed to
do his job in that the President is sensitive to the opportunity cost of
his own time. It can be said that this expansion also allows for breathing
room on pressing issues and spreads out the time between interactions that
are particularly tense and touchy.
The President at times did not get a chance to interact with
external groups because of other pressing priorities. The long time
between interactions, either by mail, phone, or face-to-face meetings,
served to put "psychological distance" between the President and his role
senders. The long interaction time gave both the President and the role
senders a chance to think out and weigh alternative actions and their
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consequences
.
A result of psychological distance and unrelenting pace was that
the feedback the President gets about his errors is greatly delayed and
he can never really call anything finished. He seldom gets direct
positive feedback; in fact, he is likely to get feedback only when some-
thing goes wrong. The lack of feedback results in very limited guidelines
to assess which of his actions are effective, and therefore there is
always the urge to do more.
Psychological distance and unrelenting pace are compatible in that
they allow for a rapid information flow and time to pass that may allow
the tension and anxiety around a specific issue to ease. They can
become defeating when the unrelenting pace is used as a rationalization
for not coping with a problem that without immediate and sustained
attention will result in a full-scale crisis.
Avoiding Stressful Situations
There are times when it was more profitable to avoid confrontations.
It was better not to voice any opinion and to let conflicting units deal
with the problem and work out the solution themselves. This could only
be done in cases which appeared to be inconsequential. Issues and people
were often assessed in terms of their volatility and importance to
organizational purposes and handled according to that assessment. In order
to avoid a stressful situation, the President would 1) give a subunit
responsibility to see that the problem was resolved or 2) have his staff
of assistants filter, coordinate, and prioritize problems letting only
those that could have important consequences for the University get to
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the President's attention. One coping mechanism, that needs little
explanation yet served to release tension, was the practice of going on
vacations of a week or more. Needless to say, the vacations were wel-
comed, almost mandatory, respite to his incessant role overload.
Subunit Responsibility
There were times during the year when the President would forward
a letter of complaint or praise to the subunit that was resoonsible for
the written contact. Record foul-ups were a common example. A student
or citizen would write wanting some satisfaction and the President would
request the subunit, in this case the Registrar's Office, to look into
the matter while keeping the President's office informed. There were
numerous incidents of the President's office forwarding letters, and to
a lesser extent phone calls, to appropriate responsible subunits for
action and resolution.
A slight variation on this theme would be to have the subunit
that was responsible for the acrimony being directed at the President
draft the letter of response that would go out under the President's
signature. This forwarding of contacts served two purposes. It served
to make environmental demands more visible to internal units and nut
the responsibility of resolution on the subunit. This procedure gave
the President a way to monitor a subunit's performance. Some times the
contacts that came from external groups and people, especially with requests
for survey information, resulted because the individual was not able to
discern which University subunit could solve his problem. In those
cases it was very appropriate for the President's office to forward the
contact to the subunit that could answer the request.
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Staff of Assistants
The President had an executive constellation comprised of
Vice Presidents and Presidential assistants. Many times these people
were responsible for a particular policy or issue being handled in a
particular way because they knew more about that policy or issue than
anyone else. The President was kept informed of how projects or problems
were progressing but the assistants did much of the day-to-day work.
In this way the assistants and secretaries acted as a buffer or
screen for the President. They would direct phone calls and letters
from people that could be answered by a routine explanation away from
his attention. An excellent example was when the "dean’s baby' episode
broke, one of the office secretaries recorded all of the in-coming calls
and did a lot of the explaining to private citizens. When a person
would come in to see the President unannounced, the President’s appointments
secretary usually would give some excuse for the President’s not being
able to see the visitor.
There were times when the secretary would say the President would
be out-of-town when an appointment was requested or that the President's
calendar was not firmed up yet. In the case of anonymous phone calls by
irate private citizens, the President ordered no phone call to be
recorded and forwarded to him if the caller did not leave his name.
If the President could not do something about the call, or in some way
respond to it, he did not want to know about it.
The constellation of assistants, of course, served a dual purpose.
They helped lessen the incredible work load by drafting letters.
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receiving visitors, forming preliminary policy statements, and
monitoring specific projects while at the same time fielding ptessures,
putting out brushf ires, quieting irate citizens, and running inter-
ference for the President by helping him to avoid stressful situations.
Compliance or Persuading the Role Sender to Change
There were many times during the year when there was little that
could be done except comply to the external demands. Examples already
discussed, such as the Police Consortium or the Medical School admissions
cases, demonstrate how little leeway the President had for negotiation.
In the case of the Police Consortium, once the initial agreement was set,
the University had little choice but to provide the service or suffer
the resultant embarassment of not being able to live up to its promises.
In the case of the Medical School admissions, there was little that
could be done to assuage the public attitude that the University was not
serving those who were paying the bills, except to increase in-state
admissions
.
Persuading the role senders to change expectations was not easy.
There were cases in which role senders did change their expectations but
these were usually when the role sender was speaking for himself and not
as a delegate representing some group or formal organization. The
strategy most often used was cooptation, which is the process of absorbing
new elements into the leadership or policy defining structure of the
organization as a means of averting threats to the organization’s
stability or existence.
There was ample evidence of the use of this strategy with
222
internal units but there seemed to be very few attempts at cooptation with
external organizations. There were however plans to get prominent
public citizens to serve on"visiting committees" for various colleges and
there was, by the end of the year, an Affirmative Action Commission that
was comprised of prominent citizens and University people. The Commission's
task was to recommend policy considerations for review and action, working
closely with the President in developing affirmative action programs
designed to eliminate the friction generated by the existence of such
areas of concern.
Cooptation results in a sense of comity or "a basic willingness to
see the ’other side' as human - if wrong-headed - and without a basic need
to destroy them for your own survival" (Bennis, 1973, p. 391). Most
of the attempts to get role senders to change their positions were
basically attempts at establishing comity. The President always tried
to explain the constraints that he was operating under, with the hopes
that the role senders would help look for solutions that would allow the
needs of all who were involved to be somewhat met by the actions taken.
It should be restated that the chances for changing role senders'
expectations are not good. If expectations were easily changed, there
would not be much conflict between the University and its environment.
However, the University can easily be seen as a political organization
with decisions made in the midst of competing demands. Most of the
time, decisions resulted in someone or in some group being displeased.
The political nature of the University necessitated that the chief
executive make certain final administrative decisions, thus making the
Office of the President a "hot seat". Any man who considers occupying
that hot seat had to expect that he will never please
at times, no one.
everyone, and
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Suggestions for Coping Mechanisms
Most of the job activities, problems, and job constraints
described in this dissertation are commonly experienced by presidents
of large universities. The literature in administration and higher
education will substantiate that. There have been various coping
mechanisms described and prescribed in that literature. Some of those
mechanisms are worth mentioning.
One way of mitigating the exhausting work load is to create
a dual system of administration, on the grounds that a great deal of
power is lost in a unitary administrative system which places an
excessive burden on one person. One form of dual system is to designate
a president and a chancellor: the president handles external affairs, the
chancellor, internal affairs. Another form divides administrative
responsibility between a president and a provost with very substantial
authority.
^
Team Management
The concept of the lone chief atop a pyramidal structure should be
questioned. When a man is alone at the top, he is in the position of
viewing abnormal and corrupting communication patterns. The "pyramidal
structure weakens informal links, dries up channels of honest reaction
1 This idea is taken from a memo from a Presidential assistant,
William Meyers, to the President, May 26, 1972.
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and feedback, and creates limiting chief-subordinate relationships which
can seriously penalize the whole organization" (Greenleaf, 1972, p. 73).
A self-protective image of omniscience can evolve from these
filtered communications. This distorts the leader's
.judgment which is
often best sharpened through interaction with others who are freer to
challence and criticize. Filtered communications make honest criticism
difficult to come by and there is often a sense of real loneliness
because the leader "cannot be sure of the motives of those with whom he
must deal. Most of what he knows is what other people choose to tell
him. He often doesn't know what everybody elso knows informally"
(Greenleaf, 1972, p. 14).
Because the President is at the top, problems tend to centralize
around his office. If he is the only one who can make crucial decisions
he often becomes grossly over-burdened. Not only is there the strain of
creatively making appropriate decisions but the overload can often
result in indecisiveness which is subtle, hard to detect, and sometimes
injurious to the institution. The incapacity to make decisions because
of too much responsibility, too much to do, and too many factors to
consider, becomes more costly to the institution than a few wrong
decisions made decisively.
Also, because of the work load the chief executive has to rely
on concentrated briefings and the support of ghost-writing which makes
him an actor, having to mouth other peoples' words. The overload does
not allow the man to draw on and use his own creative powers.
The structure of a pyramidal or hierarchical organization with one
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man at the top only allows a few men to emerge as leaders, causes
a major Interruption when the leader leaves, and gives 'control-
priority over leadership and cooperation (Greenleaf, 1972, p. 15 ).
Corporate management or team management may be a solution for
universities to consider. With a team management concept the principal
leader Is a £rimus Inter £ares - the first among equals" (Greenlead,
1972, p. 12). There Is still a leader, a "first" but he Is not seen
as the chief. The £_rlmus constantly tests and proves his leadership
among a group of peers. There Is, however, mutual problem-solving; there
is trust and mutual sharing of responsibilities in the decision-making
process
.
The man who has the greatest team-building ability should be
£rimus. He is the strong person who is able to facilitate the process
of primus inter pares . The key to this concept is that the role set
(or senders) of the group would see the "first" as a leader only to
facilitate the functioning of the group as a team and not because it is
leader-dominated
.
This alternative model has within it its own inherent friction
points or problems as does the "one man at the top" model. The primus
inter pares model is suggested to cut down on the tremendous individual
role conflict that centers on the President from external and interanl
groups. With group management some other problems arise but the number
of psychologically "shell-shocked" chief executives could be lessened
with the primus inter pares model.
Visibility as a Coping Mechanism
There seems to be a norm in the leadership and management
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literature which says that a successful leader is one who can serve as
a buffer for his subordinates. This may not be the realistic or
feasible leader behavior for the circumstances of the university
president. Part of the problem, as described in the examples of the
Police Consortium and the Medirai a •c l School admissions cases, was that
the internal units were not aware of the pressure put on the President
by the intensity of the dissatisfaction of the external role senders
until the situation had reached crisis proportions.
In both cases, it is the author's opinion, that it would have
been appropriate for the President to act as a mirror rather than
buffer. It would have been appropriate for the President to reflect the
true conditions of inside units to external role senders and to reflect
the true implications of external dissatisfactions to internal role senders.
By making visible to external and internal constituents all that is
transpiring, there would be a greater chance for comity. External
groups must begin to understand the true nature of the strengths and
weaknesses of the university. Internal units on the other hand must come
to understand that there is an external world to which the university
must hold itself accountable.
By the inside and outside role senders seeing things as they
really are and not through a buffer, the role senders can come to
understand the role pressures on the boundary person. They could come
to see that he is not omnipotent nor a "flunky." He is not someone
who is always to be blamed for the behavior of the people who work for
the university
,
nor is he to be thought of by those who work for the
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university as an adversary who is plotting for more authority or
trying to consciously or unconsciously reduce the facultv's academic
freedom.
The boundary person is someone who can aid in the solution of
issues by the nature of the unique position he is in. Because he is
in the position of receiving up-to-date and comprehensive information
he is often able to synthesize and suggest alternative methods of
operation. He can operate more as an arbitrator and third party
consultant rather than as the leader who is seen as a shrewd, slippery
politician with an axe to grind or interests to be served.
Third party consultants or arbitrators do have interests to be
served but those interests are in favor of justice and fairness, in
mutual benefit and mutual problem-solving, and in the conceptualization
of a better functional relationship for the parties involved. This
would be the president’s interest, too. If visibility of the university
is increased, perhaps understanding of the president's function will be
understood in light of the present constraints on his role.
Summary
Coping mechanisms are essentially individual in nature and
limited by personality characteristics. The basic cooing mechanisms
observed in the course of this study were concerned with changing role
senders expectations, compliance, avoidance behavior, or placing the
problem in the President's own personal frame of reference. Others
that were mentioned by the author concerned the possibility of team
management and of making interactions between external groups and the
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President more visible.
Much of the role stress and ambiguity contained in the office of
university president is the result of spanning the university boundary
to interact with outside groups. The president often times has very little
leverage to influence outside groups nor do outside groups understand the
internal constraints on the president’s actions. The president, in the
boundary position, has in reality little power to influence external groups
and is constrained by a number of internal role expectations. Together
these expectations and constraints result in high role conflict.
It is the author's opinion that there seemed to be very little
that could be done to mitigate most role conflict that was observed.
The university president can do little to change the role conflict
experienced unless the office can regain some of the stature and authority
it once had. Perhaps external pressures will create the clear cut reasons
for why the chief executive must have the authority and control to make
more key decisions that shape the direction and fate of the university.
CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Summary
The reasons the university president as a boundary person was
chosen as the focus for this study were: 1) this roie has not been
Studied in-depth; 2) the external environments of universities are
placing increasing demands upon the university to adapt and respond
in ways that are different from the past; 3) a boundary position is
important because it represents a break point in organizational pur-
pose and may constitute a major arena for intergroup conflict; and
4) administrators need to know about how boundary people handle the
conflict inherent in the role in order to become and train more effective
administrators
.
The purpose of this study was 1) to describe and analyze the
functions that the university president carries out; 2) to construct a
profile of the major agencies and interest groups outside the university
with which he must interact in the course of performing his duties;
3) to describe and analyze the demands or expectations of the people with
whom he interacts; and 4) to describe and examine the coping mechanisms
of the president in mediating between conflicting expectations and demands.
The case study method employed in this research used the non-
participant observation technique, interviews, analysis of documents and
records, and reflective analysis to provide contextual information in
portraying the role of the university president. The intent was to gain
a qualitative, realistic assessment of a complex, dynamic process.
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At times the study made
representative anecdote
use of the critical device known as
that as Bennis defines it is that
the
"singular
event with antecedents and conseque„ces capable of consolidating
illuminations that hold true not only for the described event hut for
entire class of cases for which the anecdote stands" (Bennis, 1973,
P- 9). The "representative anecdote" is quite necessary given the
great amounts of phenomena to be processed and conveyed.
Summary of Chapter III
Boundary Actvities
Chapter III presented an analysis of presidential interaction
by form, frequency, flow, and function - for the purpose of showing
the process level pressures contained in the university president's job
Other managerial studies were used to place the statistical analysis of
this study in perspective.
The president's roles of monitor, disseminator, spokesman, nego-
tiator, disturbance handler, liaison, and figurehead became evident
through analysis as did the quantity and pace of his work flow, the
patterns in the activities and his use of different media, the relation-
ships between action and reflection in his work, his relationships to
a variety of contacts and the interplay between his rights and duties.
Pace
This study examined 293 calendar days of which Saturdays were
counted as work days for a total of 229 work days. There were 37
Sundays, 24 of which had meetings, 12 Sundays having two or more work-
related meetings. There were 27 holidays and/or vacation days. Work
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days averaged between 16 and 1
7
u7 hours per day of meetings or traveltime to some work-related meetine TMc «. ,,8* his study shows that the mall
averaged between 30 and 33 pieces per day> ^ _
per day.
.......
..
.... ». „„
individuals Inside and outside the University This ,ad . would mean that
one out of every five or six letters would be from an Individual or
organization with which no previous correspondence had occurred. The
content of the correspondence was, of course, varied; and although not
meticulously counted, it is estimated that over a hundred major issues
were pending and had to be keDt trark of u-i06 R p c of while waiting for the latest
developments
.
It cannot be stressed enough that the work day of a university
president Is a demanding one. The communication and work flow are endless.
When the day Is "over" In the formal sense the residue of the respon-
sibilities are ever present. From interaction with this President over
the year it became apparent that he could not escape the atmosphere
that was cognizant of his status and power nor could he retreat from his
own mind, which repeatedly searched for new information that might have
some bearing on the day’s problems.
Patterns in Presidential Boundary Activities
There is no question that the studies already done bear out the
data revealed In this study. Guest (1955), Ponder (1957), and Mintzberg
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(1971) all indicated that for managers, activity is characterised
^ ^Station, and BrevU*. The data „ f tM, study^
suggest that this Is certainly the case for a university president.
these three elements can be documented by the phone calls, calendar,
and correspondence.
The variety is most clearly seen
Chart II - Analysis of Correspondence).
in the correspondence (see
The University President
interacted with 20 separate categories of external groups and 21
separate categories of internal groups. These categories can then
be broken into individuals, constituent organizations, and individuals who
represent the organizations. For example, within the category of
"industry" the office of the University President corresponded with 76
separate organizations and sometimes interacted with more than one or
two individuals within that one category.
The fragmentation of the university president's work day is also
easily seen. It is evident in the charts contained in Chapter III that
no one group, with the exception of his staff and administrative assis-
tants had an overwhelming proportion of contact (in regards to the percent
of meetings held). Fragmentation naturally follows when a limited amount
of time is divided into small amounts of contact with a large number of
interacting groups.
Along with variety and fragmentation, brevity was the third
characteristic of the University President's work day. There were days
when there were as many as fourteen different formal meetings scheduled
at thirty to thirty-five minute intervals. These meetings were punctua-
ted by phone calls either placed by or received by the President which
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asted on the average of elght mlnutes (Mlntzberg>^ p _ ^
a .» minute average ) and by short Kork sesslons ^ ^^ ^
were days when the brevity of hls activity was not as acute, yet the
rule was "many meetings with many people over a myriad of issues."
Use of Different Media
It is the position of this writer that while the university
president does cement relations, mediate conflicts, and carry on
operations, it is the character of the issue and the groups involved
that determine the medium used. To illustrate this point the author
compared certain groups' use of different media.
A further conclusion that the author reached was that the urgency
and salience of a particular issue or problem determined the type of
medium used. The study described how certain groups push for more verbal
face-to-face contact as the issue requiring contact comes to a "boiling
point." Such was the case with the legislators around the ensuing
problems of budget appropriations and medical school admissions discussed
in Chapter V.
Relationship between Reflection and Action
As other managerial studies have found, this author found that
there was a strong preference for action on the part of the President.
Reflection takes a "back seat" because of the oppressive time constraints
brought on by work overload. 31.7% of the correspondence was in-depth
reports concerning various issues and units. In other words careful
analysis was already done; what remained was that it be digested and
decisions made according to priorities and constraints. In addition,
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27% of Che formal meetings held were with staff, administrative
assistants, and vice presidents, slncly or collectively. From
observation It was established that over 60% of the time was spent
in briefing, strategltlng, or formulating positions to be taken.
Because of the President's need to avoid wasting time, to
participate only when the value of participation was tangible and to
avoid too great an Involvement with any one Issue, there was a tendency
toward "having to mouth other people's words." Often there was no
time to reflect or analyze every detail of a prenared speech or presenta
tion. The result was that the particulars and Internal logic of a
given argument may have indeed felt "foreign" to the President.
Superficiality is, no doubt, an occupational hazard of managerial work.
In order to become effective the University President must, in a sense,
become proficient at superficiality" (Mintzberg, 1971, p. 35 ).
Relationships to s. Vcnristy of ContHctis
The President needs to develop relationshios with three main sets
of people: supervisors (the trustees or board), outsiders, and insiders
(subordinates). The chief executive links these groups in a variety of
ways in order to guide the institution. In this study it was found that
over a period of approximately nine months that 50% of the University
President s contacts through the mail, phone calls, and face-to—face
meetings were with external people, 43% with subordinates, 4% with
superiors, with 3% personal or undetermined. The phone calls showed
the highest number of contacts with outsiders. Face-to-face contacts
seemed to be preferred in the President’s relationships with the Board.
What is perhaps more important than the proportions is the variety of
235
Lon
contacts with external people or gruops. The President's office
corresponded with over ,08 different Individual organisations and with
over 700 Individuals (Chart 111 T„ •II). To gam access to outside informatic.
‘“ ° £ "SenS °rS " ln ““ environment had to he developed.
It has been stated In this paper that the university is much more
decentralized and "flat" -inln ltS or8anlza tional hierarchy compared to most
other organizations. The phone calls show an extraordinary number of
interactions with individual faculty members! 39.5% followed by 23.4% with
staff assistants and 13.7% with the deans. The meeting frequencies show
30.3% with administrative staff and assistants, 17.5% with faculty, 16 . 7%
with the vice presidents and 10.2% with the deans. The mall shows
31.4/ with the vice presidents 17 fi7 Tt-ii-v.P bxa
,
l/.OZ with faculty members, 11.3% with the
deans, and 8.7% with the assistants. It can be suggested from these
figures that the university is indeed a flat organiztion because the "top"
Of the organization interacts more with the "bottom" (faculty) of the
organization than it does with the middle (the deans) of the organization.
Balance between Fights and Duties
It is the position of this study that the University President's
role is long on duties and very short on rights. Many studies confirm
that the executive's role is characterized by reactive behavior rather
than proactive activity. It was observed during this study that the
University President could make certain types of decisions such as
initial commitments to his own long-term projects, choosing to join
external boards of directors or certain committees; or yet, still more
ironically, he could set up his own networks for information; but once
these choices were made, activities were more or less planned for him.
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making demands on his time and energy rw 0 v • - eis information networks
were set up he lost control over the UnH c •kinds of information he received
and more often than not those ext-er-n.i • *t nal information networks in times
of crisis become "nets" of accountability.
Summary of Chapter TV
The Environment
This chapter examined the scanning behavior that made the
President cognizant of what was going on outside the University. The
chapter also discussed what the environment looked like as a result of
scanning; what groups leveled what specific pressures at the President's
office around which specific issues, and the conclusions that could be
drawn from the President's interaction with the environment.
Scanning
Compounding the problems of scanning with "sensors" is the fact that
the sources of potential data are voluminous; therefore, the appropriate
choice is crucial. The information that could and should be used for
strategy and action is almost limitless. Scanning requires the tapping of
many sources of information often without order and completeness and is
many times constrained by the time it takes to obtain and process the
information. Add to this list of difficulties the rapid rate in which the
information changes and the fact that some information cannot be obtained
because it is strategic to the "opponents'" positions and it becomes easy
to understand the complex problems the President faced in the scanning
process
.
The President received two types of information from people internal
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to the organlzaclon. He recelved lnformation about the organtzation
such as cost reports and inflation about operations and policy and
also received Information from his subordinates about the environs
and changes in the environment. Because units were specialised into
functions like public relations, academic affairs, metropolitan affairs
and business and finance both solicited and unsolicited information
was narrowly grouped into areas. The information was specific, unit-
oriented in terms of the unit's speciality, and often times concerned
with an immediate issue of operation.
In each case, whether from an internal or external source, the
information that was received, was specific, issue-oriented and empha-
sized the reporting unit's point of view. Because information that the
President received was specific and issue-oriented, it was incremental.
By that it is meant that a wholistic picture of the environment had to be
pieced together; data had to by synthesized and interpreted in a time
span that was appropriate to allow for effective action.
In sum the scanning behavior of the University President might
be described at times as both deliberate and random, specific and
general, formal and informal, although, for the most part, his scanning
seemed to be connected with specific issues around several common themes
There seemed to be five major problems or concerns at the heart of most
of the President's contacts, through the mail, phone calls, and meetings
Specific Issues
The five problem areas that were found to be most significant in
the year during wich this study was conducted were: 1) problems related
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to cost and budgets; 2) problems related to affirmative action;
3) problems related to public service; 4) problems re lated t0 enroll.
ment “d admiSSi°n t0 Professional schools; and 5) problems related to
moral or quasi-legal concerns. The five major problem areas were mani-
fested in the communications the University President had with external
environmental groups. Each external groun that he interacted with had
their own idiosyncratic viewpoint, with their own subtle trade-offs
as the President chose one course of action over another.
These problems or issues were on-going. Lasting resolutions
were never reached. Whenever the President made speeches, attended
luncheons and banquets, or went to meetings, he was faced with discussion
and explanation of these problem areas. Kis phone calls and mail
reflected external groups' concerns with these problems. There also was
demands from internal groups and indiviuals concerning these issues.
How the President dealt with these problems determined the support he
received from both internal and external groups and ultimately the course
of action the University would take.
In order to fully describe the complexity and conflicting demands
that converged on the President's of f ice
,
an explanation of which specific
groups actually made their demands known and what the implications of
those demands were for the President and for the institution was also
presented in Chapter IV.
External Groups
Since the mail contained the greatest amount of contacts, 5,770
total contacts, in contrast to 1,231 total phone calls and 1,177 total
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meetings, and since the content of phone calls and meetings was not
always known, written documents are more easily used to obtain a general
sense of what groups and what demands the President was being exposed to.
A general thumbnail sketch of each group's demands was presented as well
as the range of organizations or individuals contained within each
group, in cases where a group's demands were articulated by several
organizations and individuals
.
Twenty external groups (See Chapter III, Chart II) used the mail
to convey demands and share information: their demands required appropriate
action on the part of the President. The mail (supplemented at times with
interview and observation notes) since it reflected the greatest range
of external pressures on the President and the University, was used to
explain the substance and nature of external demands.
The twenty categories of groups were other universities and colleges,
students, independents, industry, legislative and state agencies, the
Board of Regents, non-profit organizations, the federal government and
federal departments, educational associations, consultants and speakers,
religious groups, education panels and study groups, foundations, and
public schools
Conclusions
There were many conclusions that could be drawn from a study of
the President’s interaction with the environment. From the description
of his interactions in this chapter it is difficult to understand how
internal constituents can maintain the image of the university as an
autonomous cloister. The evolution of the university and its environment
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can no longer tolerate internal myopia to external forces that has
fed the myth of the Ivory Tower in the past. The abundant resources are
gone; growth has slowed down to next to nothing, and from what has
been seen in this chapter faculty/university isolation and function are
being questioned for cost, efficiency, accountability and service. It
can also be seen that the questions are not coming from just one or two
groups. Numerous groups vie for the President’s attention to express
these demands. There are many small constituents that each have their own
intricate interests that must be balanced and coordinated if the total
organization is to maintain some semblance of autonomy and self-direction.
In sum, the implications that could be drawn from a description of the
President s interactions with the University's environment centered around
two themes, namely that the "condition" of the environment will continue
influence the University in more direct ways consequently lessening
institutional autonomy and that environmental influence will lead to
centralization.
Reduction of Autonomy
A reduction in institutional autonomy results from the insti-
tution’s reactions to three conditions in the environment: 1) a reactive
stance because of change; 2) possible ineffectiveness because of scarcity
and accountability; and 3) further politicization because of many funding
constituencies
.
1) It was clear that the intensity and nature of scanning is
influenced by the environment and by environmental changes. If the
environment is turbulent and rapidly changing as in the case of enroll-
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to come by. Decisions then are made not with certinty or calculated
rlSk> UnCert3lnly
’
bey0"d^ ^youd even a calculated understand-
ing of what could result. Lack of information and uncertainty in
decision-making lead the University to he more reactive than proactive
and result in less autonomy and self-direction.
2) A review of the five major problem areas and external
constituencies in this chapter revealed a tenor to the environment
characterized by a concern for finances and accountability. This climate
m turn influenced the University's exchanges with outside groups. The
causal texture of the higher educational environment in the 1970's
IS one of change, scarcity, and accountability.
It was found that the scarcity/accountability syndrome can have a
spiral effect. Scarcity and change bring on greater reflection on
available information and alternatives which increases inertia. Inertia
can lead to a lack of satisfactory responses from the service organiza-
tion (in this case, the University) which causes the client to increase
his monitoring activities and his frequency of interaction with the
organization in efforts to direct the service. The net result is more
anxiety, more time lost in providing the service, more accountability,
and a reduction in the effectiveness of the service organization.
3) The contact the President had with external groups was on many
levels. Pressures and demands were articulated around many issues and areas.
Economic, political, technological, and social concerns permeated the
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President's reiations with outside groups. These ideas and demands
resulted in value ludgemenfs and interests so numerous that reconcilia-
tion was impossible and displeasure an almost certain result. In times
of scarce resources clear reasons for extablishing priorities among
competing demands must be provided to those outside units that grant
the University its resources. Politicization of the University results
from the competition for limited resources with externa! groups who have
special interests to be served in granting the University those resources
Centralization
Centralization is encouraged by environmental conditions not onlv
internally but externally to the University as well. External centrali-
zation results because the problems of information and alternatives,
scarcity and accountability, and politicization are better handled if
universities cooperate with each other rather than compete. External
centralization is born out by the fact that more and more college con-
sortia are being formed. Consortia result in a wider variety of combined
services at lower costs and fewer environmental variables with reduced
uncertainty in shared decision-making.
Internal centralization results from 1) an increased amount of
information converging on the President's office from a number of sources
both internal and external to the University, and from 2) the need for
increased responsiveness to consumer demand.
1) The President received information because he was perceived by
external units as having the power to direct the University and to change
internal dynamics to be responsive to outside needs. It is evident from
an analysis of external groups' demands that their needs must be met if
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resources are to be forthcoming to the University. Because those
needs are focused on the President and because internal information
concerning the feasibility of those needs focus on the President it would
seem that he must have the power to direct, to make decisions that will
result m the acquisition of vital resources whether he has that power
in reality or not.
2) External groups were more concerned with the product of
teaching rather than with the core function of teaching. For example,
they were concerned with education as a means of social mobility for
everyone. They were concerned with whether or not education provided
the training for professional, technical, and social roles in society
and with education as a means to solve social problems that might lead
to a better society.
External groups were concerned with education as a consumer good.
They were concerned with teaching before research and with applied
research before pure research. External groups held the President
accountable for the University’s capacity to provide the services they
needed and saw as relevant to their view of the University’s function.
Because resources were forthcoming to the University only if the
University was responsive to external needs and because external groups
recognized the President as the "authority" that could direct the
University to be responsive, centralization toward the President's
office occurred.
Summary of Chapter V
Role Pressures
This study focussed on sent roles from outside the focal person's
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organization. It was suggested by the author that there were con-
straints implied in the interactions between the President and various
external groups. It was also shown how these relationships may have
conflicting objectives and entail different standards of rewards and
performance. These two conditions can result in lengthy, tension-filled
relationships requiring considerable negotiating and communication skills.
In the boundary transactions discussed in this chapter only the
role senders expectations, sent role, and organizational position were
described along with some of the organizational constraints influencing
the President's role performance. These five factors were used to depict
role conflict and ambiguity.
Role Conflict and Ambiguity
Role conflict is defined as two or more sent roles occurring
simultaneously such that compliance with one makes compliance with others
difficult or impossible. Many times sent roles are in direct contradic-
tion. There are four difference types of role conflict: intrasender
conflict, intersender conflict, interrole conflict, and person-role
conflict (Kahn and Wolff, 1964, p. 19).
Role ambiguity is related to the amount of role-related information
needed to perform the role adequately (Kahn and Wolff, 1964, p. 22). The
focal person must know what kinds of behavior will be rewarded or
punished, what kinds of behaviors will be satisfying or frustrating for
the role sender, what alternatives and opportunities there are to the
present situation, and what the consequences of these alternatives are
if acted upon. Ambiguity may be a condition of existing information
that is inadequately communicated or result when information cannot be
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gained or is non-existent.
Mini-Case Studies
Three mini-studies concerning a University-external group
consortium, budget appropriations, and cases concerned with moral or
quasi-legal matters were chosen as the best representative anecdotes.
These mini-studies contained elements and examples of conflict and ambiguity
found in all the other issues and areas that could have been chosen.
The University-external group consortium was chosen because it was
ongoing through the year and at the finish of this study was unresolved.
The appropriations/admissions issue was resolved by the time this study
ended. Quasi-legal concerns were chosen because of the unexpected
nature of the problems that often times required a reactive stance and
a high tolerance for ambiguity.
University-Police Consortium
From this mini-case study it can be seen that three types of
role conflict could have been experienced by the President: namely,
intersender conflict, interrole conflict, and person-role conflict.
Person-Role Conflict : Pressures on the University ran counter
to the President’s need to make the University a truly urban university.
Person-role conflict is defined as the conflict between the focal person's
needs and values and the demands on his role set. In this case of
person-role conflict pressures on the University were in a sense
working against the President's needs and values. The conflict, though
indirect, was none-the-less felt by the President.
Inter-sender Conflict : The President was caught between external
demands for authoritative, top-down decision-making and the academy
s
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ethic of autonomy and democratic decision-making. He was caught
between demands for services for which he had initially traded and negotiated
and the anarchistic, specialized, insular characteristic of the
institution that had to produce those services.
Inter-role Conflict : A third type of role conflict was
expressed clearly by the President's statement concerning his priorities
of budget and legislaive relations: he was at the time trying desparately
to get a special medical subsidy and an increase in general subsidy to
enable the University to balance the budget for the coming vear. Also
the President had asked units within the University to cut their
budgets by 3% for the academic year to balance this year's budget. The
University budget process was reaching its culmination and key decisions
had to be made.
Inter-role conflict is defined as pressures associated with member-
ship in one organizatoin being in conflict with pressures stemming from
membership in another group. There were definite time and commitment
pressures associated with the budget and legislature that may have
interrupted the President's participation in and ability to monitor
the developments of the consortium.
The University and the Police were engaging in a difficult process
of trying to blend two distinct insitutions with almost opposite norms
into a collaborative effort to solve some of the pressing social problems.
The project was still underway at the conclusion of the study year. Some
parting conclusions that might be drawn from this example are:
1) External groups view the University as a service institution.
2) External groups view the President as having control and
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authority over the University.
3) The University organization of subject matter fields may
not be conducive to the solving of society’s problems.
A) If the University is to compete for outside funds to solve
societal problems. University people will have to learn to
cooperate across departmental and interdisciplinary lines.
Medical School Admissions
This case exemplifies the fact that managerial autonomy is
difficult to maintain in the face of turbulent environments and organ-
izational dependency on many outside groups. This example shows that
change is more likely to occur if there are a large number of external
groups pressuring for change. In this case private citizens, alumni
industry, the Regents, and several legislators intensely and specifically
made their demands known. Since the University was in dire need of the
special supplemental appropriations, the President was almost forced
to comply with their demands.
Intersender Conflict : There were many groups stating what they
wanted the President to do. The overwhelming majority of external groups
wanted the admissions ratio changed. Legislators wanted them changed
because they wanted the school to be responsive to the constituents the
University served who were going to shoulder the cost of the next approved
appropriations bill. Alumni, industry, and private citizens wanted
the ratio changed because their sons and daughters then would have a
better chance of being admitted in the competitive circumstances of the
seventies. Other state universities wanted the ratio changed because
it would enable more of their graduates to be admitted.
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The faculty. Dean, and Vice Present of the Medical College
judiciously guarded the time honored tradition of guild expertlse of
the medical faculty having the prerogative of determining what was hast
for the art of medicine. This group felt that the wider the applicant
pool, the tougher the competition, the better the applicant they will
get to train and hence Join the ranks of the guild. At the start of the
year the faulty had the prerogative to decide the ratio and the President
could only defer all pleas for applicant acceptance to the faculty
admissions committee.
As events unfolded the intersender role conflict the President
experienced was quite evident. The President was expected to protect
faculty autonomy. With what it is not known. All the power to make
academic decisions lay in the hands of the individual faculty member.
What did the President have to offer those that subsidize the institu-
tion? Accountability? The legislature had already passed an amendment
requiring faculty to teach so many hours a week. Quality of service?
There were precious little measures of quality besids a prestigeful
job and those were getting fewer. Socialization of the young? In loco
parentis has been substantially weakened during the past decade. Failure
to protect faculty autonomy could result in loss of administrative
credibility. Failure to meet the demands of external groups would
result in financial loss and institutional debt.
Intra-sender Conflict : There was not too much evidence of
intra-sender conflict. The Chancellor's insulation and eventual
reversal of sent role is one of the few striking examples that could
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be found during the year of this study. Most of the -7 °S ° f external and internal
Stoups remained fairiy oonsistent in their demands on the President and
the University even though those demands resulted in inter-sender
conflict.
Quasi-Legal and Moral lRS„p g
There were a number of small issues that surfaced during the
year that centered around issues of legality and morality.
One example that required the immediate attention of the
President was when the Dean of the School of Education began to bring
his four month old baby to the office with him. A second example
involved the city building inspector declaring one of the University's
dormitories a fire trap.
In each instance there were no tell-tale antecedents to the issue
that showed up in the process of "scanning" for information. Each one
of these issues resulted from actions taken by others that resulted in
a small crisis or "brushfire." The President had to react and deal with
each issue in an ad hoc fashion. Most of these types of issues
engendered outcries from the public, from independent citizens and
groups, and were induced by media exposure. Each of the three mentioned
examples also involved ambiguous legal decisions and hinged on legal
technicalities for solution.
Dormitory Safety : The role ambiguity and conflict demonstrated
by the dormitory safety example is evident in the need for the University
to maintain a credible image. Ambiguity arises from the fact that there
is very little the President could do to gain the proper information to
prevent this incident from happening. If indeed there was a head-hunting
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expedition being conducted by the City Building Division, there seeded
little that could be done to prevent the controversy.
The faculty and Board, parents and students. Regents and legis-
lature hold the President responsible for the organization's image and
behavior. Conflict comes when the President strives to meet role
senders' expectations yet through no fault of his own or with little
control over image factors, as exemplified by the above example,
expectations are not met. The above example is an isolated one, but
the image of the institution is formed by several of these "brushfires"
or small issues occurring frequently over a period of time.
The dormitory safety example also demonstrates how the
President can become the victim of intra-sender conflict. The City
Building Division had been operating in a standard way for many years
yet because of its own internal struggles it changed its style of
operation. The University therefore must suffer the consequences of
a relaxed then rigid inspection procedure with no warning that there has
been a change in inspectors’ attitudes. In the long run the President
and other University officials are seen as not doing their job in
meeting public expectations.
The Dean's Baby Issue : Intersender conflict was present in this
mini study in that some people saw the Dean's behavior as refreshing,
endearing, and valuable while others saw it as a dangerous precedent,
threatening to men's roles and a waste of taxpayers' money. The press
saw it as newsworthy and did slant the story in favor of the Dean.
Ambiguity was present in that there was very little information available
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as to how the
-public” would respond and KP , because the Dean did not
consult anyone before acting the d-n8 Ue""',a ”as i" President
's lap
6 ° re lnformati°n or Policy could be formulated.
There may also have been some possible person-role conflict
if the President wanted to back the Dean wholeheartedly, if the
President's values were congruent with the Dean's on this particular
Issue, there was very little choice for the President to voice that
approval. In a way, it was expected that the President would provide
a sobering statement about taxpayers' money and accountability.
In sum, this chapter described through particular examples, how
general pressures are manifested in specified, sequential, contextual
interactions. The role of the boundary person is unique. It is
different than just interacting with internal constituents. The central
elements or themes that were relected in these examples were power and
the President's lack of it, misunderstanding, and non-communication.
It can be suggested that many outside groups may not know or understand
the true "conditions of authority" in the University.
The President's authority was diffused. It was decentralized,
lying somewhere between the plethora of ad hoc committees of the Univer-
sity and Faculty Senates and the individual faculty member and his
department. He had very little leverage to force faculty members or
departments to make certain decisions or to cooperate in certain projects
The President was left with cajoling, persuading, negotiating, and
pleading for support.
Also, because the President lacked formal power over role senders
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outside the University, his abiHty to guarantee that the external
groups will provide the resources for which internal units hold
hi. responsible was reduced. To compensate for this lack of formal
authority in a linking pln role> the boundary ^
on bonds of trust, respect, and caring that he develops with outsiders.
These bonds are difficult to maintain as examples have shown:
outsiders too easily associate the failings of the University with the
failures of the President. The failures of outside units to provide
internal units with resources was often blamed upon the boundary person,
namely the President. In both instances trust, affection, and caring
that oil the wheels of administrative decision-making, became scarce
and usually made the process of directing a large complex organization
difficult and painful for the President.
The ability to disengage personal faults from organizational
responsibilities and to distinguish both from events in which the
boundary person is an innocent and powerless spectator are the results
of the role senders' inadequate understanding of boundary conditions,
it was found. The President in a boundary position was faced with a
sizable number of role senders whose demands were hard to predict and
even more difficult to control. Shifts in role expectations resulted
from dynamics idiosyncratic to the external groups themselves, which
made it double hard for the boundary person to diagnose. What made
the situation even more tragic was that the boundary person had only
limited power or authority with which to deal with external pressures and
expectations
.
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Summary of Chapter VI
Coping Mechanisms
general emphasis and style of thls dlssertatlon has^
to focus on one Present and hl
. problems; ln keeplng^ ^
approach the author dlscussed a sample of coping mechanisms observe,
by watching one President work through his problems. There was no
attempt made to describe the personality characteristics of the
President that mandated certain coping mechanisms over others or to
explain the motives for certain choices over others.
The major organizational determinants of conflict and ambiguity
that have been depicted in the examples in Chapters III, IV, and v
were the requirements of overseeing and crossing the organization's
boundary, the requirement of producing innovative solutions to non-
routine problems, and the requirement of being responsible for the work
of others. All three of these factos or determinants resulted in
constraints on the President's actions and almost always resulted in
role conflict.
There seemed to be three basic ways of dealing with the conflicting
role pressures: 1) the President could comply with the demands or try
to persuade the role senders to modify their expectations; 2) he could
avoid stressful situations; or 3) he could use defense mechanisms that
would put reality in a personal frame of reference and lessen anxiety.
All three options were observed during the year of this study.
Defense Mechanisms that Put Reality in a Personal Frame of Reference
This group of mechanisms seemed the widest in repetoire not
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because they were preferred bur because rhe opportunity for rbe
other two: persuading robe senders ro cba„ge and avoiding stressful
situations
,
were less likely possibilities. The types of copi„g
mechanisms observed were behaviors such as 1) humor, 2) writing and
publishing, 3) a focus on change and innovation, and 4) keeping some
psychological distance from interactors.
Avoiding S tressful Situations
There were times when it was more profitable to avoid con-
frontations. It was better not to voice any opinion and to let
conflicting units deal with the problem and work out the solution
themselves. This could only be done in cases which appeared to be
inconsequential. Issues and people were often assessed in terms of
their volatility and importance to organisational purposes and handled
according to that assessment. In order to avoid a stressful situation
the President would 1) give a subunit responsibility to see that the
problem was resolved or 2) have his staff of assistants filter, coordinate,
and prioritize problems letting only those that could have important
consequences for the University get to the President's attention. One
coping mechanism, that needs little explanation yet served to release
tension, was the practice of going on vacations of a week or more.
Needless to say the vacations were welcomed, almost mandatory respite
to his incessant role overload.
Compl iance or Persuading the Role Sender to Change Expectations
There were many times during the year when there was little that
could be done except to comply to the external demands. Examples already
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discussed, such as the Police Consortium or the Medical School admissions
cases, demonstrate how little leeway the President had for negotiation.
In the case of the Police Consortium, once the initial agreement was
set, the University had little choice but to provide the service or
suffer the resultant embarassment of not being able to live up to its
promises. In the case of the Medical School admissions, there was
little that could be done to assuage the public attitude that the
University was not serving those who were paying the bills, except to
increase in—state admissions.
Persuading the role senders to change expectations was not easy.
There were cases in which role senders did change their expectations but
these were usually when the role sender was speaking for himself and
not as a delegate representing some group or formal organization.
The strategy most often used was cooptation which is the process of
absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy defining structure
of the organization as a means of averting threats to the organization’s
stability or existence.
Suggestions for Coping Mechanisms
Team Management
Corporate management or team management may be a solution for
universities to consider. With a team management concept the principal
leader is a primus inter pares - the first among equals (Greenleaf, 1972,
p. 12). There is still a leader, a "first," but he is not seen as the
chief. The primus constantly tests and proves his leadership among a
group of peers. There is, however, mutual problem-solving: there is
trust and mutual sharing of responsibilities in the decision-making
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process
.
The man who has the greatest team-bufiding ability should be
He is the strong person who is able to facilitate the team
working together toward common purposes and objectives. The literature
on organizational development is full of strategies that could be used
to facilitate the process of £^1^3 inter ^ares. ^ key to tMs
concept is that the role set (or senders) of the group would see
the "first" as a leader only to facilitate the functioning of the group
as a team and not because it was leader-dominated.
Visibility as a Coping Mechanism
There seems to be a norm in the leadership and management literature
which says that a successful leader is one who can serve as a buffer for
hxs subordinates. This may not be the realistic or feasible leader
behavior for the circumstances of the university president. Part of the
problem, as described in the examples of the Police Consortium and the
Medical School admissions cases, was that the internal units were not
aware of the pressure put on the President bv the intensity of the
dissatisfaction of the external role senders until the situation
reached crisis proportions.
In both cases, it is the author’s opinion, it would have been
appropriate for the President to reflect the true conditions of inside
units to external role senders and to reflect the true implications of
external dissatisfactions to internal role senders. By making visible
to external and internal constituents all that is transpiring, there
would be a greater chance for comity. External groups must begin to
understand the true nature of the strengths and weaknesses of the
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university,
that there is
accountable.
Internal units on the other hand
an external world to which the
Tnust c on>e to understand
university must hold itself
Implications
This study has theoretical annliori a
’ pplied and research implications
Because the literature on Boundary roles !s sparse and practically
'
non-existent in the context of higher education organizations, rauch
research remains to be done in order to help administrators in
universities and colleges handle the conflict generated across the
organizational-environmental interface. All that this particular
study can do is raise some general questions that will indicate areas
for further research.
Research Implications
This study is of one public University and one President. If
this study were to be done again, the size, age, and type of university
investigated might be varied. Would there be significan differences
in the role senders and the expectations held for the president and the
institution he leads? What differences might be found in the
expectations held for the president by external groups if the
institution studies were small, private, and recently established,
as compared to the results found in this work? What differences might
be found if a parochial school was chosen? Would the categories of role
senders and the amount of interaction they had with the president be
difference than what was found in this study? Would the information
gathering process be as complex or uncertain if the institution were
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smaller?
This study suggested team management as an alternative to the
"one man at the top" organisational structure. Research study could
be designed to test whether team management lessens perceived role
conflict and provides for more adequate coping mechanisms.
Increased visibility of the university's subunits and their
responsibilities was also suggested as a coping mechanism. An experimental
design could be created to test whether or not increased visibility of
university subunits, norms, and responsibilities eases presidential
role conflict.
In addition, an effort could be made to study some of the
external-internal transactions that do not go through the president's
office yet impinge on the president's job and create role conflicts.
What are the other boundary transactions occuring at lower levels of
the organization that influence the climate of the institution and the
ways in which internal units function and therefore the president's
roles?
Research could be done on university presidents' Dersonalities
to find out whether there are common personality traits or attitudes
that make them more capable of withstanding high levels of role
ambiguity and conflict. In line with the above suggestion, further
research might also be done to examine cultural norms or social
attitudes which lead people to aspire to high-conflict, high-stress
positions. In turn, what are the social norms or attitudes that make
it difficult for the occupant of the office of university president
to quit or step down? If research were done in these areas some of
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the answers would of course have practical implications.
Applied Implications
It is the author's opinion that there is not enough information
available to aid in the process of developing more effective higher
education administrators. There must be further research done in the
above mentioned areas before more intelligent decisions can be made
concerning screening, training, career planning, and job redesign for
administrators in the field of higher education.
It is clear from this study however that it may not be appropriate
to pick individuals for the job of university president solely on
the basis of the candidate's academic training or discipline. This
study implies that presidential screening and selection procedures
must take into account factors beside academic credentials,
recommendations, style and appearance. Search committees must somehow
try to assess the candidate's ability to deal with ambiguity and
conflict, information and role overload, and fatigue.
This study also implies that the training of university and
college administrators must include the development of a high level
of skill in the areas of conflict resolution, negotiation, and
interpersonal communication. Training should also provide the future
administrator with experience in coping with role conflict, perhaps
by placing him in stressful situations that allow him to test himself,
his values, his needs, and his stamina and to develop coping mechanisms
before he is given the actual responsibility of an office. Career
planning and training must provide future administrators with the
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above-mentioned skills if the casualtv *y and turnover rate of top level
university and coilege administrators is to he reduced.
Theoretical Implications
It is the author's opinion that there may be some doubt as to the
appropriateness of applying business and organizational literature
terminology to institutions of higher education. An understanding
of university and college organizations may be subtlv lost in the use
of terms such as input, output, and trading behaviors, among others.
Without alternative analytical terms the author was forced to use
terms borrowed from the fields of business administration and
systems analysis. Organizational behavior literature in the future
must be more finely tailored to higher education if any kind of
precise analysis is to take place.
Within the field of organizational behavior testable hypotheses
must be developed concerning issues of organizational autonomv, role
conflict, and coping mechanisms. For example, are any organizational
variables directly related to role conflict? If so, what are they and
can coping mechanisms be developed to reduce conflict and stress? Are
there ways to measure imput and output in educational institutions and,
if so, how might those measures be used to reduce conflict and
ambiguity for the boundary person?
Further research to determine in what ways and how much
personality influences an individual’s range of coping mechanisms in
an organizational setting might also be undertaken.
One general question that could sum up the implications of
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this study would he; is it possible to shape the office of president
to make it more attractive and more sustaining to the talented people
who are now its casualties?
APPENDIX A
the university as an institution and as an organization
The purpose of this appendix is to examine some of the characteristics
of the system in which the focal nerson worts, interacts, constructs, and
defines his job function. The environment is discussed historically in
order to give perspective to present system problems and future dilemmas
and choices. Some discussion of the
tion, and norms, that differentiate
follow.
system’s qualities, flows of communica-
it from other organizations will
The first half of this appendix discusses the university as an
institution. It is set forth in three sections; the first focuses on the
university of the past from 1860 to 1970, the second on the present from
1970 to 1973, and the third on possible future trends. Three main aspects
will be emphasized in this description: 1) the historical development
of the internal components of the university; 2) the historical evolution
of the goals of this system; and 3) the historical relationship between
the university and the emergence of external constituents to which it is
now accountable.
In the second half of this appendix the university as an organiza-
tion will be discussed. There will be an analysis of the organizational
id iosyncracies of the university. A discussion of why the university
is different from other organizations and some description of the diffi-
culty of administering such an organization will be presented. Special
emphasis will be placed on the office of the president.
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Of necessity this appendix will be general,
adumbrate the character of the university on which
Its nurnose, to
to base the hypotheses
developed In Chapters III and V, will therefore
The aim Is to hit the median between detail and
exclude finite detail,
generalization, accuracy
and strawman.
University as Institution
An institution is a mechanism by which goals important to society
are implemented. This is accomplished by persuading those who control
financial resources in the community that what the organization is doing
is important enough to merit financial support. Because Americans have
always held education as a "sacred cow", their hope for the future,
educational institutions have always been subject to external "intervention"
as well as financial encouragement. It is the firm conviction of this author
that the concept of the "ivory tower" is at best wishful thinking and at
worst myopia that comes with preoccuation with institutional self. This
view of the autonomous cloister was a product of ancient and medieval
concepts of the universitas . " Major changes in university life have been
*-n -*-tiated from external forces such as Napoleon in France, ministers of
education in Germnav’s royal commissions and University Grants Committee
in Great Britain; the Communist Part in Russia’s university governing
boards, the Federal Congress and foundations in the United States (Kerr,
1963, p. 105). There are, as Kerr puts it, two views of the university
One pictures it as a radical institution
when, in fact, it is most conservative.
The other pictures it as autonomous, a
cloister, when historical fact shows that
it has always responded to demands of
external groups. The external view is
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that the university is radical: theinternal view is that it is conservative.
The internal illusion is that it is alaw unto itself: the external reality
}o^hat % governed by history" (Kerr,iyoj, p. 94 ).
What, indeed, is interesting is that this duaiistic view has nersisted
so long, yet under close analysis this view has some historical antecedents
worthy of discussion. The discussion of those historical antecedents
wall be divided into three phases: 1 ) before 1860; 2 ) 1860-1930;
and 3) 1930-1970. Each phase represents a critical turning point for
higher education.
Past
Before 1860
The function of colleges in America between the time of 1620 and
1860 was neither totally religious nor totally professional. Although
schools rose from religious sects, schools like William and Mary, Yale,
and Harvard were concerned not only in turning out clergymen but also
with adjusting the individual to the society in which he would play a
part (Handlin, 1970, p. 83). This process of socialization depended
not only on the college but also upon the changing society and the concep-
tion the individual held for himself (Handlin, 1970, p. 3).
Quite naturally, the evolutionary roots of the colleges were European,
where the seeds for a duaiistic function to higher education had already
been sown. Cardinal Newman was fighting the ghost of Bacon who 250
years before had held that knowledge should be for the benefit of man
and not for "variety and conceits" (Kerr, 1963
,
p. 8 ). Bacon did not
like the snobbish superiority that came with a non-functional elitist
ucation. What Newman espoused went to the nt-h0 o er extreme by holding
that inquiry, speculatlon and dlscov0ry
^ the
territory of the intellect (Kerr, 1,63. p. 2). Ne^an favored
knowledge and said that practical knowledge "was a great dea! of trash"
(Kerr, 1963, p. 2). A university training, according to ..should
raise the intellectual tone of society, cultivate the public mind
...
refine the intercourse of private life" (Kerr, 1963, p. 2).
In America, where aristocracy became sublimated, families of wealth
and power tried to gain social recognition of their superiority through
the possession of culture. Where else but in the few budding colleges,
could this culture be acquired. At the onset the earlv colleges
trained ministers, but later they aquired the additional tasks of pre-
paring men for law, medicine, and for a variety of other callings which
acquired professional status in the New World (Handlin, 1970, p. 2).
This training was considered "useful" and the frequency with which this
argument was set forth showed the disdain held for purelv intellectual
activities in the new land. Colleges were frail and underprivileged,
lacking financial or social support, hence utility was the rationale used
and the merit of scholarshop rarely had to be more specifically denoted
(Handlin, 1970, p. 2).
The external constituencies of this period were defined mostly by
the layboards. It was to these layboards that the argument of utility
appealed and they who granted the limited financial support to nurture
these small schools. The layboard has been a distinctively American
device for "public" authority although it was used in Holland in the late
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16th Century (Kerr, 1963, p. 25} rh* i uayboards were very compatible
“ith dSm0Cra“ C WealS aS ™ the lmmedlately„
and practical promise of education. Appeals for aid from the public
purse rested upon the justification of utility (Handlin. 1970, o. 57)
The European tradition did not sit well in this country, hence the col-
lages dedication to their own definition of culture ran counter to the
ethos of this new "public" and pragmatically oriented America.
Even though there were layboards which controlled the colleges of
America
,
the president was always a clergyman (Rudolph, 1962, p. 419) .
He was the man who knew the rudiments of a liberal and Christian ed-
ucation and who ruled his institution almost like a monarch (Kerr, 1963,
p. 32). The president had almost total control of faculty appointments
and very seldom left his appointed post except upon death.
In 1859, the American scene changed, although the purpose of
higher education still vascillated between aristocratic values and
pragmatism, in that 1859 marked a major turning point in an American
culture and economy that had been building and gathering momentum in the
laissez-faire economics of a new country.
1860-1930
Many factors came together in this period to cause rapid change
and adjustment for American colleges. Those factors were: Darwinism
and the dawn of the scientific era, the industrial revolution, wider
separation of the church from education, the ever present problems of
finance, and rapid growth through immigration.
The function of a college education prior to 1860's and 70’s was
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to develop and strengthen Intellectual powers, to cultivate taste and
sensibility for fine art and literature, and to Impart a strong sci-
entific acquaintance with all the branches of learning. The result
was socialization or useful preparation for the battle of life (Handlln,
1970, p. 150). Culture replaced religion as the guide to thought,
behavior and emotion. Not that the college became antl-religlous or
unchristian, but schools, though required by public opinion to have
religion in a general way, were forbidden to have it in any parti-
cular way. The democratic spirit of the times called for a "cultured
citizen in command of scientific methods" (Handlln, 1970. p. 50).
After 1870 traditional morality no longer provided an adequate
sanction for either social experience or for academic disciplines
within colleges (Handlin, 1970, p. 44). Because of discoveries, headed
by Darwin, science became a rival to religion and culture. Knowledge
derived from scholarship gained in influence as the development of
physical and natural sciences spurred the development of social and
personal sciences. Sociology, economics, law, politics, and phychology
seeking new forms of validity often clashed with ethical norms derived
from religious norms as people encountered the novelty of science and
technology (Handlin, 1970, p. 44).
In this period of industrialization, the economv shifted from
an agricultural rural base to an urban, factory-oriented one which
gave rise to large complex organizations. This shift depended upon the
labor of a foreign-born industrial proletariat (Handlin, 1970, p. 43).
Because of this great immigration, because of industrialization and
26 P
enterprise, and becuase of
. general faUh ^
and universities functioned not oniy as the incuicator of traditionai
moralrty in the form of a surrogate parent for the rich, but science
also added new vigor to the old cry for usefulness in American education.
The usefulness, or vocational aspect of American education,
blossomed in an historic act that would, in one fell swoop, give rise
to the American university, make room for the masses seeking social
mobility, and forever bifurcate higher education into two purposes:
namely teaching and community service. The land grant movement brought
schools of agriculture and engineering, home economics and business
administration. It opened doors of higher education to the offspring
of farmers and workers as well as to the middle and upper classes with
the introduction of agricultural experiment satation (Kerr, 1963, p. 15).
At the heart of the Morrill act of 1862 is the assumption that publicly
supported universities are bound, morally and politically, in some way
to serve those who pay the bills (Long and Groskind, 1972, p. 6). The
democratic, even egalitarian and populist trend, manifested in the land
grant act held the doors of opportunity open to all through education,
and this put a strain on the universities to adapt and absorb the shock
of massive growth.
The growing importance of science added a third dimension to
universities’ goals already bifurcated into teaching, socialization and
community service. Science and the demands of the society led schools
to develop in certain ways not yet anticipated by the schools themselves
or by society.
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science with Its emphasis on specialization as well as growing
complexity, began to have consecmences for the once lowly faculty. Ba-
the demand for trained professors, young men returning by the
hundreds from German universities with Ph.D.'s, were "eager to apply to
the American university the continental form of university governance,
a form, which, unencumbered by a president or a layboard of trustees,
concentrated power in educational matters in a small faculty oligarchy
composed of those who had achieved professional rank" (Dodds, 1961. p.iO).
Knowledge, because of Its complexity and specialization, reduced the
possibility that all members of the faculty would have the competence to
understand or judge each other's work. Science became Institutionalized
in the sense that it developed an organization by discipline, Internal
standards for the accredition of practitioners and for the validation
of results, and a claim for recognition of its competence by society at
large (Handlin, 1970, p. 54).
The university function as custodian of culture and of service to
its benefactors was affected by its receptivity to science. The con-
viction that knowledge was attainable by use of apdied objective
reason gained through research and experimentation allowed research to
take its place beside teaching and service as purposes of the university.
Developing factions within the university began to readjust,
especially with the newly gained autonomy for the faculty resulting
from the authority of expertise and the high demand for its qualified
services. This evolution brought departments into the university,
created reserach libraries, took medicine out of the hands of the
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scientists. Instead of the Newman eternal truths in the nature! order,
there was the discovery of the new: instead of the generalist, there
was the specialist (Kerr, 1963, p. 4).
With all this expansion, institutions had to comnete and did so
by raising their standards, therby enhancing their value among dis-
criminating consumers. These institutions worked at improving the quality
of instruction and stiffening admissions requirements. There was, of
course, as a result of the new research, more knowledge which lead to
course offerings to enhance an institutions, attractiveness. "The
freedom for the student to choose became freedom for the professor to
invent and the professor’s love of specialization has become the student’s
hate of fragmentation: until a kind of bizarre version of academic
laissez-faire has emerged” (JCerr
, 1963, p. 14). Social mobility was
being increasingly defined by the professionals. Access to a profession
involved education. For example, entry into the practice of law,
medicine, engineering, and the corporate enterprise no longer occurred
through inheritance or apprenticeship but rather by passage through a
defined course of training in an institution of higher education
(Handlin, 1970, p. 46).
The reocurring issue of academic freedom was fanned during this
period because of the development of two new external constituencies to
the universities. Along with accrediting boards, state farm bureaus
and state regulating agencies came the restructuring of the layboard
through a shift in those most likely to be appointed as trustees. But
the real newcomers to higher education were the fast growing alumni
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and their brainchild, the foundations.
As might logically follow, f lnanclal status and ?roblemg that
accompanied growth were challenging. The administrator also changed in
character. The clergyman president was descarded because he lacked the
ways of the rapidly expanding economic world, because his committment to
the classical curriculum had to give way to the more practical, popular
emphasis which commended itself to the trustees, and because the
direction in which the university now moved was more secular and less
Subject to religious influence (Rudolph, 1962, p. 419). The whole
concept of administration changed with a resultant increase in the median
number of administrators per school. In 1860 the median was four,by
1933, it was 30.5 (Rudolph, 1962, p. 434). Because of the Problems of
growth, organisation
,
and standardization the apparatus known as "the
administration" came into being. Proliferation of goals, demands for
new services by an increasing enrollment, and the need to relieve
research-minded scholars from the details of management gave rise to
an administrative layer "on top" or juxtaposed to the special disciplines.
Finances was one problem that kept many presidents overworked.
This was the age of the big giver, the age of the alumnus and
philanthropic foundations and if the president did nothing else he
could
—"work at incorporating these agencies of financial support into
the structure of his organization — often becoming both the svmobolic
and actual focus of the new foundation of university finance" (Rudolph,
1962
,
p. 424). This need for finances led to the shakey union of the
businessman and the academician. Business united with the academic
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three ways, namely through board membership, by being
!arge donors and later by forming locations to aid higher educational
institutions
.
More businessmen, bankers, and lawyers became board members
because they had the expertise to handle the Increase In Income and
endowment which brought problems of budgets, property investment and
management
,
and of the husbanding and parcelling of resources (Metzger,
1955
, p. 142 ).
Businessmen also began to give large maounts of money. Inevitably,
the increase in the site of gifts changed the relations of donor-
recipient. Businessmen became almost entrepreneurs in the field of
higher education by providing funds and deciding general purposes
(Metzger, 1955
,
p. 141 ). The large contributors, the philanthropies
cush as Andrew Carnegie, romanticized the life of the intellectual by
upholding the "higher satisfactions of the mind and indifference to
material possessions" (Metzger, 1955
,
p. 144).
The patron of the university received from the academic world
the ornate courtesies of gratitude. Donors did not enter academia as
intruders but as welcomed do-gooders (Metzger, 1955, p. 145). it
rapidly became the norm to cultivate the goodwill of these possible donors.
To do otherwise was defined as disloyalty and treachery. This business-
man-academic relationship was tenuous at best, because as the cutting
edge of academic theory ran ahead of present social and economic prac-
tice, inevitable clashes occurred.
Academic freedom became a major issue as benefactors sought the
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dismissal of professors who began to decry and criticize the degrading
and corrupt practices of the benevolent donor. Kconomic exploitive
Practices and social injustices lav at the base of the academic’s
critiques and resulted in many faculty dismissalsj-smissai
. Because of this clash
between business,™ and faculty.a
"professional status" buttressed by
the principles of tenure and academic freedom grew due mostly to the
work of the AAUP.
Expertise and knowledge in the university that could be used in an
industrializing nation, led government and industry to consult with
faculties. Foundations sponsored by government but especially businessmen,
began to relieve scholars of total dependence upon college and university
budgets. Foundations became a means by which businessmen could encourage
the development of certain fields without financing the total school.
The usefulness and mobility needs the university served were still
very much alive after World War I. From the turn of the centruy until
1930 there were a great variety of institutions, that were striving
to produce a single product, the college man (Handlin, 1970, p. 46).
Universities were to endow the student with clutural sensitivities
and knowledge to distinguish them in the future through participation
in a way of life in the academic community.
By the end of World War I the university was in full bloom,
with three divergent competing purpose of research, teaching, and
community service, a well established and autonomous faculty, and a
restless student body. The people of America’s demoractic pluralistic
culture, in sense, saw the the university meeting all their needs and
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-re therefore tolerant of all the ways In which the
growing.
1930-1970
university was
This period was more or less a refinement of the trends of growth,
egalitarianism, complex organisational life, faculty specialization, and’
outside financing that marked the turn of the century Two. I new wrinkles
were the lack of common assumptions concerning values and the age of
student power and assertion. After the great depression of the 1930's
the growing emphasis on egalitarianism made it clear that universities
were no longer to be merely the instrument for producing an intellectual
elite. The impersonal corporation was replacing the family firm, and
as inheritance was no longer the major precondition for success, every
youth was to be able to carry his formal education to the extent of
his native capacities (Handlin, 1970, p. 73). During the 1930's and
1940’S the emphasis was not so much independent entrepreneurship but
rather access to strategic places on the steps upwards within a large
organization. Because mechanization reduced the need for unskilled labor,
more of the nation's youth poured into the colleges and universities
(Handlin
, 1970, p.72). Growth, led upon growth. As modern technology
required a more highly educated population, higher educational institutions
would have the responsibility to provide the trained intelligence that
would create, master, and find the terms on which man could live with
technology (Rudolph, 1962, p. 463).
After 1930 signs of the changing moral tenor of American became
clear. The conception of an established genteel culture broke down and,
because the university was no longer a Diace of exclusiveness, the
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“zr r
“•
•< -
. astes, beliefs, and tuitions became diffIcult to achleve
.hls task of transmitter was iS dlfflcul t not only because outside
these common values were break-i™ aing down but also because inside the
faculty character had changed.
faculty, „ho has been the dlssemlnators of ^^
e, became guardians of particular segments of knowledge that they
expected to develop and spread (Handlin, 1970. p.76). The
factions Within the university which were already divided along de-
partmental lines, further separated by largeness, became even more
autonomous as a result of reserach opportunities that increased enor-
mously with the awarding of government defense contracts during the
late 40’s and 50's and 60's. Faculty members gained a new sense of
ependence because large research grants gave them materials, research
assistants, and freedom from undergraduate teaching. Faculty autonomy
from the dominance of the administration and from colleagues and the
great mobility that renowned expertise gave also had the effect of
weakening the feeling of community among members of the same academic
discipline.
Faculty autonomy had also effectively decentralized authority to
the level of the individual professor (Kerr, 1963, p. 44). This
decentralization of authority required a new kind of executive office
with new areas of administration because unless there was to be chaos,
there needed to be coordination of grants, responsibilities for teaching,
funding for graduates and so forth. The process of administering the
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university changed; it became bigger and
.
,
88 m°re con>Plex, more tense with
checks and balances of interests aI
,
a polite tug of war, a blending of
emphases
. The "presidency
_ an^ ^ ^^^
shot through with so many ambiguities, it was an office that was maly
things to many men" (Kerr, 1963, p. 34 ).
The university was so many things to so many men because its
goals were proliferated during this period. It was as British as
Possible for the sake of the undergraduate, as German as possible for
the graduate student and for research personnel, as American as
possible for the sake of the public at large and as confused as
possible for the sake of the preservation of the whole uneasy
balance (Kerr, 1963, p. 18).
Student life changed during this period, too, because after
1930 the expectation that college would be able to control behavior
or draw young people back to the old code had to be reconciled with
autonomy for students within certain broad limits (Handlin, 1970,
P. 69). Since the university was a mechanism for advancement, the
willingness to accept the discipline of scholarship, for the time
being, was easier. Also because of the re-emphasis on student life
during this period, residence halls, student unions, intramural
playfields
,
undergraduate libraries, and counseling centers sprang
Up In many places (Kerr, 1963, p. 17).
Egalitarian leanings caused other adjustments. The junior
college was born in an effort to make a differentiation among students
with the expectation that they would divert the less prepared or less
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ted students away from senior institutions (Handlin, p. 77 ).
emergence of the Junior college the curriculum became split
between general and special course offerings which resulted in a
widening distance between most of the scholars and most of the
students. Associated with the opening of college to all was the
assurance of public funds as usual and an expectation that the
university would provide the answers to some of society's problem
To be this "service station" the university needed scholars with
a passionate concern for human betterment and for the improvement of
social conditions and relationships (Handlin, 1970, p. 73 ).
The emergence of the federal government grant after World War
II caused another drastic change in the modern university. The G.I.
Bill, the Sputnik and technology explosion, the baby-boom, the weak
position of youth in the labor market, and the federal grant caused
higher education enrollments to double during the 60’s. Enrollment
went from 3.5 million students to over 7 million from 1960 to 1969 .
Student aid grants, medical development grants, and research
grants began to influence the university in numerous ways. Federal
grants resulted in the scientist becoming affluent and the humanist
becoming militantly poor in comparison, and in the concentration of
money in just a few universities. Research became a priority over
teaching and graduate teaching became a priority over undergraduate
teaching. Over time, federal grants led to the commitment of
university funds and to a reordering of university priorities more
subject to federal control and influence (Kerr, 1963, p. 46-84).
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is sfrange char the land grant was repeated a hundred^^ in
i e form ot the research grant and that the university shouid respond
agaxn, with eagerness, to national needs, it is stranRe ..that
higher education institutions which had their historical origins
the training of gentlemen should have committed themselves so
fully to the service of brute technology" (Kerr, 1963, p. 48).
The sixties were turbulent especially for universities because
tudents began to reflect back to the society the conflicting and
unclear values that are a byproduct of change. Most parents became
deeply disturbed when college students questioned accepted moral
values and rejected the values and practices of an acquisitive society
manifested by the Viet Nam War and the military-industrial complex
(McConnell, 1972, p. 6). The public expected the educational institutions
to confirm, not criticize, the values which family and society had
inculcated. After all, the university was not designed to inculcate
beliefs and values (McConnel, 1972, p. 6). It had given up that task
to be a training ground for occupation and social mobility.
Above all, the changing composition of the student body eased the
problem of dealing with values because it was drawn from a wider
segment of the society than ever before. The student body lacked the
common assumptions basic to earlier college life which made students more
susceptible to the influence of external events such as wars and
employment trends (Handlin, 1970, p. 81). The students ended up being a
counter-influence to excessive comroerciality
,
to chicanery, and to the
selfishness of demagogism.
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At best the "true" university spirit migbf have accounted for
students' rejection of current shallow values because of its emphasis
on examination and reflection, and its norms of despising all sorts of
intellectual and moral shams. At worst, the university has by its
emphasis on research, on academic disciplines and specialization, left
the student body well enough alone, to see what other members of the
university community have yet to see - that by accentuating means we
have failed as a society to develop ends; that technology, in and of
itself, is not enough; and that we must work to develop shared
xperiences that result in the sense of community and common goals.
present, the country s commitment to education is reflected
ln the statistics of university and college enrollments. While
m 1870 1.7% of the 18-21 year olds went to college, in 1970 over 50%
enrolled. This means there are over seven million students in our more
than 2,000 institutions of higher education (Rudolph, 1962, n. 486).
The country’s commitment to education is being challenged. In many
ways the violent crisis of the 1960 ’s topped off the already growing
relization that educational attainment had little to do with competence
on the job (Berg, 1971). Historically the purpose of universities and
colleges has been to deal with concerns of religion, professional
training, upward mobility, and socialization. It seems that higher
education is at the point where it cannot deal with religion because
of constitutional restriction and the lack of public support; professional
training, because of closed job markets and a glut on the present market:
280
T"7“ ‘ . «... „ .....cut goods" and with a structure that isn't H P ,- ocn t designed to change values 2
The baby boom and subsequent
enroUments focused a iQt
Df a“entl0n ^ o* education. But now that the boom
has waned win those institutions he forsaken? The violenr,
crisis of the 60's has given way to a quiet, invisihie struggie for
survival and meaning for the university in the 70's.
The Present
This quiet struggle revolves around financial stability In a
period where growth has stopped and proliferated purposes which are not
Clear to the public that is rapidly becoming the University's sole visible
means of support. As enrollments are declining, institutions are hard
put to show the relation between education and the job needs of society.
While the labor intensive character of universities is causing rising
costs because of tenure systems. Money on the federal level is being
cut back and, because of other interests, foundations are nutting their
money elsewhere. Philanthropy has declined as inflation has increased.
Wl
?
ile every one has access to some form of higher educationthere are significant qualitative differences between access through
community colleges or fairly low-level colleges as contrasted to accessthrough Ivy League, high-powered private schools and top state universities
2
For further reading on the question of values change in higher
education see Sanford and Katz, When Parents Fail, the Law's Response
to Family Breakdown
. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971.
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The expansive 60 's for the universities has resulted In a need to retract
in the 70' s.
The internal development of faculty, students, and administrators
has also been affected by change in the national picture toward frugality,
declining enrollemnts, and a disenchanted public. Kerr wrote in 1963
that the ’’multiversity was not one community but several, a community of
undergrads; and a community of graduate students; a community of humanitists
a community of social scientists; a community of professional schools; a
community of non-academic personnel; and a community of administrators
(Kerr, 1963, p. 8).
The student community has focused on the subjective concern of how
can an individual maintain his integrity in a shifting turbulent society
(Bennis, 1972, p. 11). Toffler (1970), Reich (1970), and Roszak (1969)
all clearly delineate this change that is occurring among vouth. "Their
new morality is person-centered. It values technology only if the tech-
nology serves personal growth and social goals. To the extent that
institutions fail in fulfilling these goals they will fail to attract the
brightest young people to work in them. This new culture treasures
smallness, human scale, and cultural pluralism" (Bennis, 1972, p. 38).
The administrative community of this era is looked on a a necessary
evil by faculty and students and by external publics as someone who is
to be held "accountable" for "managing" the university. Administrators
are viewed by some faculty members as having no esoteric specialty, no
systematic competence akin to an academic discioline, and no expertise
or power in governance (Lunsford, 1968, p. 90). "Every campus has heard
282
faculty members comment that the only academics
istratlon are those who are not fully
'competent
who turn to admin-
in their scholar ly
work or those who are motivated by desires for personal
tige" (Lunsford, 1972, p. 90 ).
The faculty world seems to have lost a sense of
intellectual and communal unity (Lunsford, 1968, p. 88
power and pres-
unity, both
Baldridge
,
1971, p. 14; Bennis
, 1972 d 44 ^ ,?/z, p. ). This can be accounted for by many
factors not the least of which Is what R. Oppenheimer called the
"thinning of common knowledge." Knowledge Is so fragmented and the
administration so distant because of Institutional size, that faculty
members are Increasingly alone Intellectually and Institutionally
(Mortimer and McConnell, 1968, p. 111 ). There is a kind of "guild
mentality in the academic profession as in many others. The guild
tends to be isolationist toward society, devoted to producer against
consumer sovereignity
. . . full of senatorial courtesy and selective
of its own members (Kerr, 1963, p. 97 ).
Today the university is afflicted with a three-fold sense of loss
loss of community, loss of purpose, and loss of power (Bennis, 1972,
p. 44). The location of power has generally moved from inside to
outside the original community of masters and students (Kerr, 1963,
p. 26). The nature of the multiversity makes it inevitable that this
historical transfer will not be reversed in any significant fashion
. .
. Kerr, 1963, p. 26). The question seems to be in what form will the
university survive?
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future Changes and Trends
Generaliy there seem t0 be £w0 points of^^ ^ ^
literature today which suggesi dlrectlons ^ ^ ^
one View is to cut back where if is rhe leasr painful, mainfaining
as much balance as possible (non-academic appointmenf s
,
athletlCS> etC °’ try t0 “eather the
-tor-, try to woo the scholar-
SMP winner, try harder to get the foundation or federa! grant, and push
more funds from alumni, donors, and legislators hv hi by showing the severity
of the circumstances and relinquishing what autonomy there is left.
her view is that given the scarce resources available under
heavy competition, the university needs to make some choices among human
needs and make the basis of the choices explicit. Those choices are
among the experimental college, the service of social nroblems, the
emphasis on one goal, the uncoupling of education from research, and
other status-quo shattering behaviors. The reluctance of the university
to change substantially in form has been well-documented by Rudolph,
1962; Kerr, 1963; Hodgkinson, 1970; and Bennis, 1973. The problem
of small incremental change forced by external constraints is that
change Is never well-planned. Incremental change has been how univer-
sities have changed in the past.
The fact that universities do not change rapidly has its strong
points yet if change has its roots in force rather than understanding and
planning, it would seem that choice and autonomy may be threatened.
Some suggestions for the future have been pointed to by the
Newman report, by Hodgkinson* s 1971 study, as well as by governmental
284
agencies such as the National Science Foundation
for the individual organization to assess these
,
but it still remains
suggestions in ligth
of their own idiosyncratic conditions.
The University as an Oreanization
In the foregoing historical account, a discussion of events,
characters, causes and consequences has given the reader a sense of the
development of the university over time. Another way of understanding
the university is by examination through a systems approach. Systems
theory is basically concerned with problems of relationships, of struc-
ture, and of interdependence in secular form (Katz and Kahn, 1966, p. 18).
It is concerned with the patterned activities of a number of associated
units or people that are complimentary with respect to some common
purpose or outcome bounded in a short space and time. As has been
stated, the general qualities of a system or organization are that it has
common purpose, division of labor, and coordinated effort.
A general approach to understanding an organization is to examing
its goals as stated in bylaws or as seen by its leaders, but this
method may idealize, distort, rationalize, or omit essential aspects
of the functioning of the organization. The error may be in equating
purposes and goals of the organization with the purposes and goals of
individual members.
What is needed is a theoretical construct for understanding basic
organizational operation, function, or activity. Patterned activity or
reoccurring activity can be examined in relation to energy input into the
system, the transformation of energies within the system, and the resulting
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product or e„ergy output (Kate and Kahn, 1966> , 17) . The traclns ^
Pattern of e„ergy exchange or activity of peopie as it resuits in see
output, consequently coming to know how the output is translated into
energy that reactivates the pattern, is the focus of this section of
this appendix.
The task of this section is to explain a conceptual model of a
functioning institutional system, examine some of the friction points
that in reality occur, and to place in perspective the function of the
ffice of university president in the university system.
The theoretical framework that will be used to explain relation-
ships and functions will be taken from Talcott Parsons. A characterization
of the input-transformation-output cycle the university engages in and
of various subunits in that cycle as well as the president's position in
the cycle should provide excellent background and context for the
examination of the presidential boundary activities in Chapter III.
Parsons
' Model^
The hierarchical aspects of a system can be broken down into
three main functions. They are the technical function, the managerial
function, and the institutional function.^
The technical function is composed of those behaviors that lead
Parsons' model to which the major roles of the university
have been added is graphically depicted on the next page. This illus-
tration comes partly from Baldridge, 1971.
4
This model will be synopsized from an article by T. Parsons,
"Some Ingredients of a General Theory of Formal Organization", in J»A.
Litterer s Organizations: Systems, Control, and Adaptation, New York:
Wiley, 1963.
Non-Academic
Academic
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irectly to organfzaUonal purpose such as the process Qf ^ ^
educational setting. The technical function must consider those things
that impose limitations on the ptocess such as matetials, what must he
processed, and what cooperation is needed to get the Job done. 1„ the
P division of labor, both the resources necessary for performing
technical functions and the relatione to a.s to the population elements on whose
behalf the functions are performed have become problematical. Resources
must be made available by.special arrangements: they are not iust given.
When the division of labor has progressed beyond a certain point,
decisions that pertain to this division must take precedence over those on
the "technical" level. Thus it does not make sense to set up classrooms
without having decided what students should be taught, what things by
what kinds of teachers without knowing whether specific teachers and
specific physical facilities can be made available. One may say that the
more complex technical functions are performed by sub-organizations con-
trolled and serviced in various ways and at a variety of levels by higher
organizations called administration or management.
The relations between the managerial level and the technical level
can be divided into two categories: mediation between the organization and
the external situation and the "administration" of the organiztion
'
s
internal affairs.
The function of an external perspective and responsibility at the
managerial level is 1) to mediate between the technical organization and
those who use its "products" - the customers, pupils or whoever, and 2)
to procure the resources necessary for carrying on the technical functions
288
(i.e. financial, personnel resources, and physical facilities).
Decisions tnade at the managerial level control the operations of
Che technical level. This Is certainly true for such matters as the
broad technical task which is to be performed in the system, the scale
of operations, emplyment policies, purchasing policies, etc. Control
is not simply unilateral. Professionals i n ,lur I the technical systems who are
closest to the problem are always placing demands on the managerial level.
Those "demands" are based on professional competence at the technical
level, a competence not often shared by the administrative personnel who
in a line sense are the organizational superiors of the technicians.
In its external relations the managerial level is oriented to
its "markets" for the disposal of the "product," and for the "procure-
ment" of the resources required by the organization to perform its
fundtion. But those "lateral" external relations do not exhaust the
external" problem foci of a managerial level. The organization which
consists of both technical and managerial suborganizations never operates
subject only to the exigencies of "disposal to" and "procurement from"
the agencies which stand on an approximately equal level as customers or
as sources of supply. There is always some organized superior agency with
which the organization articulates.
A formal organization is a way by which ends important to a given
society are implemented. The wider social system is the source of "meaning,"
legitimization, or higher—level support which makes the implementation of
organizational goals possible. This means that just as the technical
level is controlled and serviced by a managerial level, so, in turn, is the
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managerial level controlled by the institutional
structure and agencies of the society.
level through the
No organization is ever wholly independent. I„ terms of f„»,
controls it may be relatively so, but in terms of the 'Waning" of
Che functions performed by the organization, hence its "right" to command
resources and to subject its "customs' to disciplines, it is never
wholly independent. Trustees, boards, etc. are the mediating structures
between a particular managerial level and hence the technical level it
controls and the high-order community interest which the organization
is supposed to serve.
The focal point of these higher level controls which stand "over"
the managerial level are of three types, often in combination.
1)
Control is universal. The operation of the organization is subject
to generalized norms, valid throughout the wider community ranging from
formally codified laws to standards of good practice informally accepted.
No organized agency supervises; intervention is likely only when deviant
practice is suspected. Such control is exerted through litigation or
by key enforcement agencies, trade and professional associations, and
relevant public opinion.
2)
The second type of control mechanism is some formal organization
which is interstitial between the managerial structure and a more
diffuse basis of "public" interest, such as fiduciary boards or non-
profit organizations.
3)
The third type is that which brings the managerial level
directly into a structure of "public authority", usually some political
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or regulative authority.
Points of articulation between the three system levels
represent a break in line authority. Persons on one level do not
ply tell the people in the next level down what to do 1) because
of the non-delegated expertise and responsibilities of people at
another organisational level, and 2) because functions at each level
are qualitatively different. Because the technical functions of an
organization often require high levels of competence, professionals
are developed. A manager will never have the last word on planning
and evaluating operations because managers are seldom, if at all,
equally competent in the technical field. A manager has the veto power
not the capacity to implement.
The qualitative break between the managerial system and the
institutional level in line authority can be of two types. One type
is exemplified by the top man who is not responsible to anyone, the
board being a 'rubber stamp." The second type can be issustrated
by the executive who is under the firm guidance of a political structure
of which the executive is considered the subordinate.
The board, whatever structural form it takes, is a mediating
structure between the affairs of the organization at the managerial level
and its publics. It can become absorbed in the managerial structure
only at the expense of its primary function yet it can not just permit
management to operate unchecked. On the other hand, the manager in this
situation cannot merely be implementing other people's decisions. He
must be in a position to present his problems to "his" board and to
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negotiate with it fro* a position of relative strength Thebe a i~ t rri ,
R n * re must
-way interchange of inputs at the instituti
and technical levels.
’ m“a,!erlal
•
These levels also have
"lateral" r *-
on thPf • •
S ^ S°Ciety and carrVeir activities in relation t-
M „
° ^ lnterac tion with the environ-
ment. Intake of resourr'oo aources depends upon the •object" produced. The
organization could be involved in the output of
,.
a commodity, a physical
object or product, while another class of m r , ,materials on which technical
operations must be performed are human individuals or collectivities
In add
;
tl0n> the dlSP°Sal a"d Procureinent functions will be different
depending on whether the oreani^at-inng nizat o must secure the
"cooperation"
of the raw materials or the partly finished products, at any stage.
An organization serving a collectivity must establish a long-
continuing relation with its perspective clients by which its effects
-St be shown to be of interest to recipients. There is a need to
establish a prior and special link between the organization and the
recipients and this imposes important constraints on the managerial
system. Cooperation must be motivated, the service-performer must offer
something to bring about adequate cooperation and readiness by which
the relationship is set up in the first place.
The output of commodities or production of collectivities is
primarily the work of the technical level. But the output of purchasing
power is the work of the managerial level. I„ education the technical
output is change in the character, knowledge, and skills of individual
pupils. But the school system may be treated as responsible for
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another category of output: Its contribution to the general level
of performance capacity in the community. This relationship focuses
not on the community as a whole, hut rather on those particular families
and interest groups, those members who are deemed clients of the
educational systems. The input of students from the community may be
said to consist of the community's support for education as a function, in
its commitments to the maintenance or improvement of the capacity level
°f its population
.
The function of management is the mediation of the organization's
relations with the environment by disposal and procurement of collectivi-
ties, i.e., the contribution of support and educational services to
interested groups and the procurement of resources, personnel, materials,
etc. for the process of producing a "product."
It has been noted how the community provides legitimation and sunnort
to the managerial level. Management cannot secure support solely through
its relationships with the recipients of its product, whether commodity
or service, or through it s relationships with its sources of procure-
ment. This is because it requires tapping into the general political
structure to influence the community as a whole, not just the customers.
The importance of their legitimation and support increases when the
service rendered requires a strategic, long-term relation of solidarity
between the performer and the recipient.
The functions of the institutional level are disposal and procure-
ment of support. When financial resources must be "raised" in order to
finance the function of the organization, the responsibility rests at the
institutional level. In this respect the administrative head of a non-
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profit organization often has a key role in mo„ey-ra lslng
. A university
president oecupies an interstitial position. He is both the top executive
Of the managerial level and a member and representative of the trustees.
As a money-raiser he acts on behalf of the trustees.
The institutional level has not only vertical relations to the
managerial level but lateral relations as veil, it has a product to
"sell" and has procurement problems. The product is a contribution to
the functional needs of the community. The salience of this responsibility
for the institutional level is a function of the failure of "automatic"
market mechanisms to provide for adequate financial solvency, or
proceeds
.
On the one hand, when the financial question becomes too difficult,
there is a tendency to shunt it to the next higher level or organization,
as in the case of financing public education through taxation. On the
other hand typical of private non-profit organizations, the proceeds, if
any, are clearly inadequate to finance the essential services, and hence
the responsibility for meeting the deficit rests squarely at the insti-
tutional level. The function here is basically that of persuading those
who control financial resources in the community that what the organi-
zation is doing is important enough to merit their financial support.
The primary "disposal" function of the institutional level is to
contribute to the integration of the higher-order system with the
managerial level. Its role is to mediate between the claims of the
institution on the community's resources and legitimation and the
exigencies of effective performance of functions at the lower "levels."
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e professional cannot judge his ownJ case in a pluralistic society
The ma„agerial level function in the university is to contribute
o t e generalized capacity of the society to partake of the educational
Process, both in character, knowledge, and skills of individuals and the
Performance capacity of the society as a whole. However, the production
of even the generalized capacity to perform the relevant function
effectively, does not settle the position of that function in the society,
does not in itself determine the "public" evaluation of it, not the
proportions of resources which are to be devoted to it in comparison
with and hence in competition with other functions. To determine that
position is an institutional function.
The most important factor for the institutional level, besides
money, is that of power in a technical, political sense. The essential
point is the "subscription" of organizational goals under the more
generalized goal
-structure of the still higher-level social structure
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and therefore the explicit
"authorization- to embark on the organiza-
tional activities in question and to "take the, seriously.- This ls
sometimes called the struggle for power in a society and consists of
competition for support and authorization among the many different
organized interests of the society.
Organizations have interests in their power positions in the larger
society and these organizations with common interests have organized
to promote their interests. The point is that there is a problem of
allocating power to all significant organizations in the society
Whatever their primary functional significance. The assertion and media-
tion of claims of this interest necessarily focuses at the institutional
level.
In summary, organizations at all three levels are subject not
only to technical exigencies but also to exigencies of disposal and
procurement. These exigencies even at the same level, are sources
of profound differences in organizational type. Furthermore, there
is an independence between levels which qualifies the continuous line-
authority picture usually drawn of formal organizations. This relative
independence among the three levels means there is at each linkage
point, a range of possible different types of articulation.
Parsons’ model is a fine theoretical base but it is only a
starting point for understanding the "nature of the beast." In reality
there are "friction points" and stress points where the system functions
less than optimally and becomes difficult to administer- The beard, as
a rule, does not function as Parsons’ description nor does the president.
The president gets involved in disposal and procurement functions at the
296
institutional level every time he testifies in front of the legislature.
He does try to establish the "position" of education in competition to
other functions. Our next step is to examine some of those friction
points of the system that make it less than ideal and more difficult
to lead. (It should be said that friction point are not so much in
the system as of the system.)
Friction Point (1) - Non-Profit Public Nature of the University
One major friction point is the non-profit public nature of the
university. Universities, as organiztions
,
are greatly influenced by,
and, in most cases, highly dependent on, "a public view or vision " that
will lead to support (from state legislatures, federal agencies,
foundations, parents, alumni, and community groups). Tax-supported higher
education can be considered a public service and is, therefore,
subject to public "ownership." (It is interesting to note that all of
these groups in a pluralistic democracy such as ours feel a claim
of ownership in the public university.) When the university's interactions
with the groups listed above are stable and predictable, then the university
enjoys a degree of autonomy. In the 70's, however, when universities are
beset with budget problems and declining enrollment these interactions
become very changeble and unpredictable.
The non-profit nature of the university as an economic entity
makes it very hard for the university to rationalize its case to the
5
general public. Profit-making institutions price their "product"
5
Ideas on this topic are drawn from a speech made by Herbert
Hollomon at the University of Cincinnati, April 2, 1973.
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at the margin, seek to reduce delivery costs of the product to the market,
and to produce a return to investors in order to ultimately increase market
size. (Universities on the other hand increase costs to match increased
income by hiring new faculty members and support for faculty, by constructing
new buildings, and by instituting new programs, etc.). The modus operand! is
to grow, to change through growth. Growth is seen as the solution to
problems, never the creator of problems by most administrators (Hodgkinson,
1971, p. 25). There is no internal incentive to reduce costs or increase
effectiveness
.
The university has made investments in its employees during
periods of rapid growth, but because of a tenure and security system, it
is difficult to retract during periods of recession. Over 50% of
university faculties are tenured and between 1973 and 1980 only 5 - 10%
retirements are anticipated in total faculty positions. In other words,
the system cannot accommodate a fluctuating market. Added to this is
the fact that many faculty were hired on "soft money" which is quickly
disappearing. In this day of declining enrollments, shifting foundation
emphasis and dwindling federal grant money as well as higher costs of fuel,
paper goods, and building materials, indeed universities are in fluctuating
markets and feel the pinch severely. The universities' almost "non-
retractable" nature makes the procurement of resources at the
institutional level to the next higher level tantamount to survival yet
difficult to rationalize in the face of other pressing social priorities.
In brief, 1) the capital provided for the institution is largely
supplied by outside sources rather than determined by the generation of
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capital from within or by self-investment of capital; 2) the pro-
fessionals who are involved in the institution's processes largely
determine the character of the service rendered and therefore in many
ways the cost of the service as well; and 3) while costs increase, only
in a limited sense is there feedback between what the insitution does,
the services produced, and the market the institution serves. For
example, students have little choice and don't really affect the offerings
of the institution as they would in a true economy.
The public does see education as a consumer good. The relative
value of a university education is perceived by the incoming student
or family m contrast to going to work immediately after high school
as possible income for the rest of life, wheras, in actuality, the relative
importance of a certified bachelors degree of a general character
is of less value than vocational training for certain kinds of jobs.
The perceived possible income determines the "character" of
applicants in a given year. In 1967 the salaries of engineer began to
drop. From 1968 up until 1971 applications declined from 23% to 10%.
A 25 year analysis of engineering applicants shows a fluctuation between
9 and 26% depending on the salary that engineers can get once they have
completed a program. The same kind of analysis can be done with lawyers
with the equivalent consequences.
How does the institutional level of the university compete for
support and power while its structure prevents sensitivity to market
demands? Satisfying market demands is not the sole purpose of the
university, yet in the years of accountability and cost effectiveness
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justification to "the public" and their representative nerve endings,
the legislators, becomes sticky. Within a relatively short span of tine,
universities, as they have expanded have added a number of diverse
functions to traitional research and teaching:
_lty service, co^unity
problem-solving, vocational training, contracted research and development,
adult and continuing education, and others, with the result that
university systems are large, unwleldly, and complex. The "purposive-
ness of the university is not easily established from within or recognized
from without. The university thereby becomes easy to add to, but
difficult to change (if change means to re-allocate or more effectively
utilize resources in an organizational development sense.)
Friction Point (2) - Diffuse and Proliferated Goals
Continuing in this same vein, systems theory also assumes that in
any organization, goals can be specified and consensus about goals can
b_e obtained
. This is easier to accomplish, of course, in smaller, closed
systems. In reality university goals are diverse, ambiguous, and divisive.
There is in a university an incredible number of linkages to the
external environment at many different levels: to local, state, and
federal governments; to parents, alumni, and donors; to deteriorating
neighborhoods and local planning councils; to accrediting and professional
associations; to future local employees of graduates; to other univer-
sities with whom consortia agreements have been made, to clients (such
as hospital patients); and to unions of non-salaried and staff employees.
This leads to tremendous 1) permeability (boundary transactions at more
than just the points of resource procurement and disposal), 2) to
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accountability an, consent lability to ali aotta o f commuufly
pressures, an, 3) to politician. The university, because it is
dependent on outside sources tor income (donors, alumni, partents,
ations, federal, state, and local governments, etc.), is sus-
ptible to scrutiny by these outside groups and to pressures they
can bring to bear on shaping the goals and direction of the univer-
sity. This is especially true in times like the present, of
severe budgetary constraints and in the face of a plan for revenue
Sharing which will mandate closer inter-institutional cooperation.
Given the relevance and salience of these groups to the university's
survival, it is easy to see how difficult it is to achieve, much
less maintain, a consensus about university goals or priorities.
Goals, of course, are achieved and maintained inside the
organization by those who carry on the organization’s purposes. The
fact that research, teaching, and some community service is being done
all under one roof is evidence that either there is no consensus or
the consensus is that all three are goals of some equal importance.
In either case support hinges on what outside groups perceive the goals
of the university to be.
Historically, the university has had two orientations and not
without tension between them: the elitist function of scholasticism,
research, and dispassionate inquiry vs. the populist functions of
training and service. Lunsford writes that:
Only the broadest abstractions will reconcile
the diversity of orientations among scientists
and humanists, ’applied’ and ’basic’ researchers
those oriented to research and those oriented
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quietists and^he^anv
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-<>ve. To what extent eUher
ton will be maintained remains to be seen
goal sjr reason that u is dimcuit to^ «.
dl t .
UnlVerSUy h3S t0 d ° KltH ^ epartmental izat ion and otherivisions within the universitv tw 4
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n a lack of
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....
th-t imii _
Wl<=h eValUatl°n; We al5° lack instruments and methods of evaluation.
This compounds the dilemma of relativelv m-n *y little feedback between the
university and the market it serves.
Fr iction Point (3) - Accoun tability and mu-.
Accountability is predicated on the idea that data can be fathered
about effectiveness. The managerial level functions and the institutional
level functions "retire" in some way, information about organizational
effectiveness and impact on the environment.
There are strong norms in a university supporting autonomy and
prohibiting interference. Intellectual and academic freedom are most
often interpreted to mean independence from institutional constraints
and institutional policy, hence institutional scrutiny. Tenure, as it
IS operationalized in universities, adds to this protectionism and the
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difficulty in generating valid data There t ,
f . „
H ls als° the problem thatthe performance of teachinp ,^8 is rarely subiprt- a •Dject to direct monitoring or
“Pervasion. Faculty members design, conduct, and evaluate their owneachmg without consultation with colleagues. Further, given aca-demic specialization it ,1CU 1 ° r 0ne facultV member to evaluate
fiarCh °UtSlde ^ «* is congruent with the role
-“Cture of the university which segregates administrators from faculty
and Wlth the reWard SySt™ ^ Mgher 6dUCatl™ Professional
Performance is evaluated by discipline and not by institutional con-
tribution. As Blau points out the role between staff and line are
reversed in the university Thp Qt-aff. e s a expects to carry out the univer-
sity's main "production- function - teaching and research - while line
authority is vested in the university's administrators (Blau, 1966
P. 92).
A second reasons that it is diff-fnn^ *icult to generate valid informa-
tion about a university is that it is difficult to measure output.
Since goals for universities are multiple, vague, and conflicting,
systematic evaluation of outcomes or individual role performance is
problematic; furthermore, it is easier to measure quantitative, rather
than qualitative aspects. Consequently, there is no way in most cases
to evaluate what constitutes significant of even worthwhile service
effect upon the client. This lack of measures for goal achievement
makes it very difficult to generate valid information about what is going
on in the organization.
The problems associated with the generation of valid data are some
of the same problems associated with the assumption that systems are
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basically interdepended and facilitate goal accomplish
Technical
Earlier there van a discussion of the reasons why it was difficult
CO specify and agree upon goals for the university theresity, are many other
reasons why goals, once set, are not reached re,. One reason is that authority
and power are diffuse in the university.
Universities tend to isolate individual faculty members from
each other and from administrators during the working day and reinforce
a condition of low task interdependence in which one person's role
performance is not crucially linked with that of another. It is important
to note that change within a system of low task interdependence can be
difficult since there is a lack of communication and meaningful
linkages between parts of the system.
At the same time the university is highly differentiated (into
departments, colleges, institutes, divisions, etc.). These parts, however,
because they are not concerned with the same issues, are highly
—
dependent and insulated from direct contact and conflict. (This
insularity breaks down when one group tries to encroach on another's
traditional area of responsibility and hence two grouns do become concerned
with the same issues.)
The result of these conditions is a very flat, decentralized
organization structure.
It is flat in that most professors (and students) pursue
their own person-professional goals rather than those of
the institution. The university is centralized in that
only the very top administrative officers tend to have
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any perspective about and leverage over
academic community and vpf rho v.
entire
dif f irnl t-v iJ
" yet t ey have tremendous
levfls ^ rJ
8
,
at 18 g° lnS on with othereI of the organization" (Simonides, 1971).
Besides formal, bureaucratic, and legitimate sources of power,
there is also the power of mass movements and the tower of expertise.
Consequently, the "legitimate" authority of administrators is weakened.
In addition there are multiple governance structures in the university
and a "labyrinthian cat’s cradle" of standing and ad hoc committees.
Three paradigms have traditionally been used to understand and
describe university authority structures: the bureaucratic model, the
collegial model, and a political model.
6
Certainly, in many ways the
university resembles other bureaucratic organisations and has, at least
in rudimentary form, some basic characteristics of a bureaucracy: 1)
a functional division of labor; 2) the definition of staff roles as
offices; 3) a hierarchic ordering of offices, providing an authority
structure; and 4) operation according to rules and procedures. However,
much of what has been written in this appendix so far reveals the
looseness and in some cases the. breakdown of this structure. A
bureaucratic model of university governance deals with only one kind of
power and not with the illegitimate or non-formal uses of power mentioned
above. It does not deal with processes, change, or tactics of policy
formulation/negotiation. The bureaucratic model is oriented to business
and formal relationships in the university and not to the academic core
of the organization.
6 Ideas for these three models are drawn from Baldridge (1971).
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A second model of unlerdf,, „„i sity governance, the collegium, which
oes deal with the academic core. Is more normal Ive^toplan than
:;;;;
lptlve
- pr™ts -
-
—— tta Pr0fC8Slonal,
^ t0 make hlS 0Kn declsl°"= and his need for freedom from
organisational constraints. Beeleaking In the collegial model
is democratic, participatory, the result of the deliberation of a
community of scholars and equals. Unfortunately, this model when
applied to a university does not takp -fm-n* e lnto account factors such as
diverse goals, environmental constraints, or conflict.
The third organizational model Is a political, power/confllct
model. Its basic components are interest groups, interest articulation,
and the legislation/arbitration/negotiation of demands. While It Is
descriptive of certain parts of goal implementation In a university it
is lacking to the extent that it denies elements of the other two models.
What is clear is that the organizational structure of universities
IS complex and that there are many areas of overlapping authority, unclear
jurisdiction, and conflict between professional and administrative expertise.
Hence, goals once set are often left unimplemented.
Office of the President
Before this chapter is brought to a close something must be said
about the office of university president in the midst of the organizational
structure. This position is intricately yet finely balanced between
organizational structure and purpose, and the public and its
representatives -- the legislature and board. Most of the constraints
of the office have been mentioned in a general form to preoare the
reader for the analysis of one university president's activity over an
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academic year, contained in Chapter IV.
AH organlzatlons undergQ change
as a resuu ^
c nges
. Those lnternal changes shape th0 character Md conttr>int> ^ ^
Positions within the organization. ^ age ,f ^ ^ ^
" the °r8anl2ati°" ^ ~ of the industry result ln stages
of evolution and revolution in the organisation's form and purpose (Creiner
W72). Those stages of evolution end revolution raise problems for
management
. Part of the function of this appendix has been to show how
the university has changed and what kind of constraints have been
leveled against mana^ent because of those changes. What kind of a person
is Picked to cope with those changes and on what basis is the selection
made?
Over the years, the pace of academic administration has quickened.
The average presidential tenure in 1960 was eleven years, in 1969 it was
seven (Metzler, 1972, p. 162); and, as previously stated, in 1971 it was
four years (Hodgkinson, 1971, p. 268). Why is there so much turnover in
this position in recent years? Is it that the search procedures are so
faulty as to select unstable and/or unreliable men for the job? Could
it be that there are not enough qualified people in the nation to fill the
positions. Or could it be that the job is so demanding and so full of
conflict that there quickly comes a point where the person must "bail out”
or run the high risk of losing effectiveness and health? It is probably
a combination of all three.
There is some evidence to support the case that search procedures
are conducted so as not to match the perfect qualifications of any one
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administrative succession may lead to organizational Instability and
conflict, instititutions of higher education tend to select as presidents
Individuals who have been socialized In institutions with similar
characteristics (Blrnhaum. 1971
, p. 135 ). In buslness organlzatlons
there is a reduction of possible conflict caused by succession because
chief executive officers are likely to be chosen from within the company
after going through a lengthy promotion and transfer routine (Levinson,
1961, p. 362). On the other hand, most chief executives In higher
educational Institutions havp vpvv uh-i„L n e ery little previous experience with the
institution they are selected to lead. Hodgkinson states that 60% of
1,222 presidents polled held no previous positions on the campus where
they were president (Hodgkinson, 1971, p. 286). This type of approach
to the succession question often results in the selection of someone who
step on toes
. While this approach may minimize conflict, it also
decreases opportunities for innovation and change (Blrnbaum, 1961
, p. 145).
The succession processes in business and in higher education are
therefore different. While business firms utilize anticipatory recruitment,
in-service socialization, and internal promotions, higher education
institutions generally select presidents from other academic institutions
using informal and ad hoc processes.
Riesman makes the point that the criteria of the university search
committee are often too high and inappropriate for the institution. There
are no career ladders to develop people for the job hence amateurism and
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intellectual aversion to bureaucracy leaves the™ understaffed (Riesman,
1969, p. 73 ).
The median age of the university president Is 60 (Hodgklnson, 1971,
P. 262). Over 60% have terminal degrees In the primary areas of: the
humanltles-25%, educatlon-18%, social science-17%, and the natural
sciences-14% (Metzler, 1972, p. 162). They come from business or
professional families and usually are products of rural or small town
America. Fifty per cent were born In communities of less than 2,500
(Metzler, 1972, p. 162). Boards also tend to pick people who agree with
their values If not their politics. In a study of 110 state colleges,
88% had the same political affiliation as did the governors of their
states (Bennis, 1973, p. 22).
The satisfaction the executive used to derive from clear lines of
authority, deciding what to do and seeing it done; now, the clear
rules and uncluttered divisions of responsibility and labor are gone
(Sayles
, 1964, p. 45). Those days of presidential monarchs, what brief
they had, has given way to another type. The presidential position
has declined in academic status (Dodds, 1961, p. 1). It would seem that
most presidents more than acknowledge the type of role they must play.
They seem to perceive themselves as working hard at supporting the ideas
of others, mediating across factions, and working to implement their own
ideas (Hodgkinson, 1971, p. 272).
The purpose of this study is to examine what a university president
did and under what constraints he had to operate. What role does a
university president play? In 1973 a faculty member of a major
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tl0nal “4 ™PmSi°n
publics- ^uhL :l nzti tMditf
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?
f diverse
framework, the latter iniM ^
ra t
^
onal academic
noTT
r itiates and sponsorsew degree program and majors which are some-what outside traditional boundaries. In theabsence of traditional structures the col eor university may come to reflect marketdemands to a rather significant degree; andthis would pose a real threat to faculty
autonomy and freedom, this threat becomes
even more real when It Is recognized that theaptain of erudition may Increasingly by the
most common style of administration
(Boland, 1973, p. 3).
How accurate Is this indictment? Is the administrator
deliberately trying to pose a threat to academic freedom? What are
some of the behaviors and constraints that would lead an administrator
to be perceived as a captain of erudition In the times of financial
austerity? These questions are explored In the main text of this
study.
appendix b
criteria for classification of the correspondence
This appendix is designed to give the reader a clear sense
of the basis for the categories In which the nail, phone calls, and
meetings were organised. In the main text categories In Tables
I - IV such as acknowledgements, status requests, reference data, etc
were described without any clear cut criteria. In this appendix
those criteria are spelled out and examples given to highlight the
criteria.
Mail
Most of the mail was classified into fifteen categories.
Those categories were partly taken from Mintzberg's writings on
managerial work (Mintzberg, 1973, p. 246). The total number of
pieces of mail logged was 5770, of which 2,467 pieces were external
(Chart II) and 3,303 pieces were internal (Chart II). A piece of
mail not figured in the total count was any letter considered personal
not system-relevant
. Examples of this would be letters from personal
friends of the President concerning vacations or arrangements for
dinners, etc. Also not considered were correspondence between the
President and his publishers, personal financial and tax statements,
and communication with relatives. All categories contained mail
either received or sent by the President.
The fifteen categories and criteria are as follows:
) Acknowledgements : Letters that formally acknowledged a visit, a
311
favor, an award received, some Information exchanged, or a completed Job
Acknowledgements accounted for 7.2% of the external mall.
2) Status Requests : Letters that required information on a project
or Presidential activity: anything that required Presidential reaction
m a formal way. Examples would be requests to do speeches, send
representatives, send information, donate funds. Other examples would
be letters from public citizens asking for a clarification or for
the President’s reaction to a complaint.
Solicitations : Letters that came from people or organizations
offering to sell products or services. Examples would be a bill
collection agency offering its services or someone asking for a
job. 3 . 2 / of the external mail was in the form of solicitations.
4) Authority Requests : Letters from external and internal units
seeking authorization for an exception to a normal operating
procedure, seeking approval for a new program, or seeking acceptance
for a decision or report. Examples would be a dean asking for
money for a new program or a non-profit organization wanting per-
mission to start a fund-raising drive at the University. Only a
small amount (%) of the mail was concerned with this type of request.
5) Reference Data : Documents that were to be used for reference
only. These would be in the form of agendas, vitas, annual reports,
address changes, policy statements from other organizations concerned
with their operations, and information that could be used by the
University to plan, coordinate, and evaluate programs. Federal
affirmative action guidelines or University, college, and depart-
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mental annual reports were examples.
6) GeseraLReEort^, DocuWa ln bulk or menos Qf ^ ^^
pages that were concerned with topics the Preside. had exptessed
an interest in. These general reports were usually lmportant to
a particular problem or issue that was pending or being resolved.
Examples would be the enrollment statistics for medical schools
across the state or a report on the distribution of salary
Increases for the University. These reports would also contain
analyzed options and possible consequences of those options.
This category resulted in the most mail: 21.4% of the external and
39.4% of the internal mail. Most of the internal mail in this
category was carbon copies for the President's information.
^ Period:i-ca -1
- News
. This category contained newspaper, magazines
or journal clippings that the President either sent or received.
At times the President would send various people clippings or
articles that expressed a point of view or described the state of
a problem. Examples would be articles on collective bargaining
or on the medical school admissions problem.
8) Events ; Communications concerned with keeping the President
informed of events happening internally or externally. Calendars
or brochures, flyers, clippings, or memos announcing an upcoming
event were included in this category.
Reports on Operations : Mail relating to the operations of the
University accounted for 14.2% of the external and 7.2% of the
internal mail. This category contained letters or reports which
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praised or critlclzed che servlces the Dnlv. r,lty produc.d ^^
as feedback to the President as to how well the University was operating
Examples would be consultant reports, independent cities' complaints
about record foul-ups, or an ad hoc faculty committee expressing its
concerns about faculty promotions.
10) Advic^on^ituations: Memos either solicited or unsolicited giving
or seeking advice. Examples would be a presidential assistant suggesting
n alternative to a problem and possible consequences of that alternative
or another university writing for ideas on program evaluation or faculty
salary disclosure.
11) Ideas : These could be solicited but were mostly unsolicited letters
suggesting new ideas or ways of operating. Most came from external
groups. Examples might be an alumni suggesting new ways to finance
football or an assistant provost suggesting a new way to advertise
continuing education.
12) Problems and Pressures : Any letter that related to a clearly
defined problem, a demand, or pressure that came from either external
or internal sources. The contact usually stated the issue as an ulti-
matum or in clearly defined behavioral terms requesting the solution to
a problem. Examples would be requests by black students to address
inequities. In this case a list of thirty-three separate grievances
was presented to the President by a group of black students which required
immediate attention. Another example would be an independent that wanted
the University to turn off the lights in the University parking lot because
the lights were keeping the independent’s family from sleeping.
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13) Self-Initiated Ma-m . -m,.:-J n. This category contained any letter initiated
Y ^ PreSld6nt t0
- -—
- -is. to ask for over.due „orR
to infers peopie of Peering times, t„ inform people „ £ ^ of ^
recent trip, to lohby for or propose
. change. Examples „ould he .
letter written to a legislator to lohby for passage of a federal subsidy
bill for handicapped veterans or a letter calHno fJ-erce ling for an interim report
from the Long Range Planning Task Force.
14) Questionnaires:
,
Any letter or correspondence designed to illicit
information from the University in either survey or open-ended form.
Most of the questionnaires came from other universities or from the
federal government seeking information about programs or college activities
15) These were letters written by the President or to
him giving a reference or the qualifications of someone for a job posi-
tion or application to school or for a scholarship. These were times
when outside institutions were conducting searches and solicited the
President's opinions. 4% of the mail from the outside was in the form
of recommendations while .08% came from inside. This category also
included requests to the President to write a recommendation on behalf
Of a particular applicant.
The mail as represented by the figures in Chart II does not
include the mailing of mass communications by the President, such as
a thousand letters to National Merit Scholarship winners asking them to
consider coming to the University or bulk mail to parents, alumni, and
legislators
.
The key to the roles performed by the University President and
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the role conflict experienced by him lies ln the-Lie purpose of the mall
as well as the purpose of other forms of communication. In effect,
sent roles were contained In the purposes of the mail, phone calls
and meetings which resulted In Presidential activity
- l. e
. purpose
defined the specific skills and behaviors required of the President.
were content and process pressures associated with the mall,
Phone calls, and meetings. Content pressures were explained as specific’
Issues or problems such as budget or affirmative action that were "sent"
in the mail, phone calls, and communicated during informal
and formal face-to-face meetings.
Phone Calls
The President would have all Incoming phone calls recorded on a
form by one of the office secretaries. If the President took the call
only the name of the caller was recorded and after the conversation the
President would write the subject of the call on the form. If the Presi-
dent did not take the call the secretary would record the caller's message
and phone number. The researcher had access to the phone record sheets and
through this vehicle phone calls or role expectations for the President
conveyed by phone were monitored.
It was not possible to learn the contents of all phone calls
because the recording procedures were not followed at the President’s
home yet large amounts of work were done by phone at home.
Of those calls that were recorded, approximately 1,230, the author
could ascertain the purpose of 797 calls. The purpose remained unknown
for 434 calls because the caller may not have left a message or the
President did not always record the purpose of the call. Even when the
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purpose was record, fhe c.U.r someffme* had
or purposes. In this case the author tried to record the most salient
purpose or the purpose that had the most Implications for the University's
operations.
The purposes contained In the phone calls were broken down Into
fifteen categories:
1) This category contained phone calls concerned
with someone wanting a Job or wanting a recommendation for a Job from
the President. It would also contain calls concerning a call from
someone asking the President for suggestions for a candidate.
2) Advice or Planning : This category contained calls In which the Presi-
dent gave or solicited advice concerning a particular problem. The
advice could be around the assessment of a certain motive or maneuever.
If the maneuever was to take place in the future, this could be labelled
or result in planning or strategies.
3) Getting Resources : Phone calls concerning where to procure new
personnel, needed speakers, consultants or money for a particular pro-
ject, were classified in this category. Discussion often involved
questions of whom to contact and how to approach the contact. There were
calls that asked the President to mobilize the University's resources
for a particular project outside the University.
4)
-§.e
-
ttlng or Breaking Appointments : An appointment is a formally planned
meeting either in the President's office or at the caller's office, set
with system-relevant business or a planning purpose in mind.
5) To Say Hello or Goodbye : This category contained calls with no
specific agenda other than maintaining contact or renewing channels of
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communication, personal or organizational.
6) The calls in this category concerns matters of
internal operation. They involved possible changes in standard operating
procedures. The caller may resist or support a present or proposed policy
decision. These types of calls were often concerned with areas of per-
sonnel procurement and dismissal or affirmative action. A„ example would
be an outside foundation asking the President to get a consortium to move
in a specific direction.
7) ComElaints or Compliments: These types of calls were about University
policy or operations. The usual caller in this category had little organ
izational position power and was usually an independent. Calls that
complained about the Dean bringing his baby to work are examples of
calls classified in this category.
8) Conducting Business: This category involved calls from external people
trying to sell a product or service to the University or trying to get
a new program started in the University in order to service a business
or training program. An example would be a business executive calling to
try to get a computer program started in night school for his employees or
an industry trying to sell a product to the University.
Tip-°i:i: or In f romation-sharing : This is where informal contacts pass
on information before a formal announcement or publication is made, where
informal ’’rumors" are passed on that need verification, or where hunches
or possible tips on a strategy for acquiring resources are shared. The
calls could result in the transfer or sharing of information about decisions
made or being made.
318
} £gaHggtlniLln foraatton ; These call, „
.
„
C S con«™ed asking for extensiveinformation or reports to aid the caller iin problem-solving, decision-
making, or in clarifying a situation.
H) Speeches, Benefits, Par. Q -|«. nr ,— *
-
exs
» o Consul t-QT^.1 . Th ncoj-uese calls concerned
inquiries by friends, subordinates, or outside organisations asking the
President to make a presentation in the form of a speech, such as the
presentation of an award at a benefit. Calls which asked the President
to participate on a panel or to act as a consultant to a business or
educational organization were also clasified in this category.
12)
These calls were invita-
tions to events that did not require speeches or presentations, but at
which the President was to "represent" the University. An example would
be a formal "cake-cutting" ceremony or informal cocktail party.
13) Tjransferrals
: These calls were those contacts that were put through
to a subunit that could answer the caller's question or provide the infor-
mation needed without direct contact with the President.
14) Decision-Making: Calls in this category posed options, resulted in
the need for the President to make choices, to join, attend, send a
representative, or allocate resources. These calls were usually toward
the end of a period of negotiations with people asking for permission or
authority.
15) Admissions : Any phone call concerned with the caller lobbying for
an applicant to get into the University at the graduate or undergraduate
level was classified in this category. The caller was not so much trying
to change policy but to get a special dispensation or special consideration
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for the applicant.
V
“> ^^i^i^orArticle: Any call that asked the President to
write an article or collaborate on a book was placed In this category.
Also, calls concerned with feedback on the President’s writings were
contained in this category.
Face—to-Face Meetings
This study examined 293 calendar days of which Saturdays were
counted as work days for a total of 229 work days. There were 37 Sundays
24 of which had meetings, 12 Sundays having two or more work-related
meetings. There were 27 holidays and/or vacation days. Those work days
averaged between 16 and 17 hours of meetings or travel time to some work-
related meeting with between 6 and 7 formal meetings per day.
The purposes of meetings were not assess by frequency because
a variety of topics were talked about In most meetings. Therefore, the
purpose of a specific meeting was not always clear.
Informal meeting or chance meetings such as in the hall or at a
cocktail party were not included in Chart II because they were impossible
to observe and record.
Many dinners or meetings were ceremonial and were often seasonal.
For example, events that were a tradition of long-standing such as
commencement, freshman orientation, and homecoming were included in Chart
IV. The type of meeting that accounted for most of the President's face-
to-face meetings were appointments set in order to resolve an issue, in
other words, for planning and decision-making.
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